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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
Strobl wrote at the beginning of his life of Metternich: 
"Three great imn left the in:y;>ress of their personalities on 
European political development during the nineteenth century. These 
men were Ne.poleon, Metternich and :Bismarck. Their efforts gave place 
1 
in turn to French, Austrian, and finally Gern:an supremacy." 
It seems proper to begin the study of Metternich's part in the 
resettlen:ents of Eu.rope with a consideration of the i~ortance which 
may be assigned to "the impress" of his personality. Metternich once 
wrote of !onaparte, that he was not so great in person as he appeared 
to be; that he was the natural product of the age; that he moved 
"like a rmteor above the mists of a general dissolution," with "nothing 
around him but the debris of a social condition ruined by the excess 
of false civilization"; that his ambitions were opposed only by 
"universal lassitude, feeble rivalries, ignoble passions, adversaries 
2 
everywhere disunited and paralysed by their disagreenV3nts." 
Metternich thus endeavored to e~ress a feeling that Napoleon's 
ascendancy was of more import than the mere rising to power of a 
great soldier. Today, when the brilliant light of that soldier• s 
personality is diffused, somewhat, if not di~d, it seems evident 
that-Napoleon was the incarnation of his_ country• s need. The con:plete 
demonstration of the Rights of Man to assert his God-given powers, 
he was the embodiment of the new exaltation which had seized hold 
of the French masses. He dug a spring at which the old thirst for 
glory might be quenched ,- and he brought the nation safely out of chaos • 
Metternich was neither soldier nor enperor, he does not shine 
forth in the dimness of the past, as did the heroes of Carlyle; but 
he succeeded Napoleon as the dominant European. His rise to power, 
like that of Napoleon's was the result of great need. He was 
demanded to revive the weakening Empire of Austria, and by the same 
need to bring peace and equilibrium to Eu.rope. The recognition of. 
his fitness for the role came earliest from a. Frenchman, Baron de 
Vi t·rolles, who arrived at Allied heaiqua.rters in the early spring· 
of 1814 to plead the cause of the Bourbons. 
2 
"The qualities of his character and of his mind, the very limits 
of his genius, were in the main those which suited best the imnutable 
principles of that old Austrian enpire - conservative, patient, 
temporizing but always persistent. This conformity of the character 
of the one who governs with the political principle of the State, is 
an essential condition of success. Under such auspices, the genius 
of the man identifies itself effortlessly, with the country and the 
circumstances, and becomes naturally the official expression of the 
public will. This marvellous accord explains sufficiently the long 
and imperturbable political career which has .nade Prince Metternich 
3 
the foremost among the statesmen of his age·" 
Though the downfall of Napoleon was accomplished in the interest 
of stability, Metternich was in no sense the enemy of France, nor of 
the Emperor of France. He was the enemy of French preponderance, as 
he was the enemy of preponderance on the pa.rt of any nation. As soon 
as Napoleon had been forced back beyond the Rhine, Metternich was 
ready for peace. When he consented to cross the Rhin~, he did so 
because he felt that a desirable peace could never be obtained from 
Napoleon until extorted-by arms. He agreed to the overthrow of 
I 
Napoleon only when finally convinced that no peace could be 
permanent while he was En:peror of France. As an Austrian, 
Metternich desired a stable peace based on general equilibrium. 
As a European, he desired such a peace, and fo~ht for it on 
issues which did not concern Austria herself. 
Napoleon refused to limit his ambitions to the ambitions of 
his nation and to becone "King of France", as Talleyrand advised. 
The god of utility toppled him from his pinnacle. Metternich 
dominated Eu.rope after that fall because he was the incarnation of 
3 
the necessity of his age. As soon as the need was met, and supplanted 
by another, the Austrian minister was sent hurtling after Napoleon. 
For a time, however, the need of stability and equilibrium was 
most pressing. The land of the Ha.psburgs was a variegated pattern 
of nationalities and principalities. A common allegiance to the 
III!>eri.al Crown bound the whole together, but the power of the Crown 
was, in turn, limited by the ancient privileges and constitutions of 
the parts. In the ma.in these parts hsd been brought to the dynasty 
by heredity, ccntracts of marriage·, or nvoluntanr submission with 
. ~ 
reservation of individual rights." Joseph II attempted to Gernanize 
and c.entralize the empire. He failed because, as Metternich said, 
he "injured the national feelings and the constitutions of the 
5 
country." · To hold this congeries together, two conditions Dl\l.st 
exist: a common interest iD:.'..union; a peaceful balance among the 
integral states. 
The diplomats of the ancient regin:e looked upon Austria as a 
political and geographical necessity. It bound together the 
heterogeneity of central Eu.rope and furnished the decisive weight 
in the balance of power.-between France, Prussia, Russia and Turby. 
4 
_Lord Liverpool bad not lost that conception in 1815. Today in a 
continent made over at Versailles, there is yet to be found a suitable 
Central European substitute for the Hapsburg Enpire. 
During the quarter century which marlced the rise and.fall of 
Napoleon, Austria was the crossroads for the a.rmie_s of Eu.rope. war 
and famine drained the life blood from the land. Metternich rose to 
power in the midst of this degradation because he was cognizant of 
Au~tria' s need; xoost of ell because his own political character was 
analogous to the political character which the Eq>ire nust assume in 
regaining its rigb tful rank in D:Lrope. He dominated Europe only as 
long as ]iUrope•s need was Austria's need. :But his statesnanship was 
broader than a rrere nationalistic policy. 
To look back upon the past, one mu.st perforce gaze through the 
many-paned window of the present. The vista of the years from 
1789 to 1815, ~as well as those which immediately followed, has been 
sadly distorted by the inadequacy of human powers to piece together 
the pattern from divers glimpses of that time. Liberty, equ.a.li ty, 
nationality, legitirrltcy, reaction, - have been point~d to as being 
the principal motivations of men• s actions in that era._ :Bu.t ca.re 
uro.st be taken le st modern concepti~ns of such ideas, intermingle 
themselves with the concept~ons current at the opening of the 
nineteenth·century. 
Metternich has been cursed as the chief opponent of liberty, 
of nationality, in fact, of all the priceless boons which noble 
men clasp to their bosoms. It bas been the fashion to picture him 
as hating the revolution from ea: ly boyhood; growing to manhood in 
the midst Of a decayj.ng::;,empire' to be come the Nenesi s of Napoleon, and 
the leader of reaction; This legend began with the radicals who found 
5 
'Metternich too conservative, and the thirsters after conquest who 
thought him over-fond of peace. It may be laid largely at 
Metternich's own literary doorstep - to the Memoirs which he left to 
posterity. 
These Memoirs, published posthumously in 1881, hindered the 
swinging back to the truth, which had already begun aroong historians. 
The letters and documents were preceded by a long narrative in which 
Metternich ske·tched his youth, his rise in the diplomtic service, 
and the events of 1813-1814. He wrote this account in ig29, when 
the exigencies ~f keeping peace in Eu.rope had zmde him a true 
reactionary. Regarding himself then as having been chiefly responsible 
for the downfall Of Napoleon, he set about telling the story of his 
early life and so wrote into it the caAvictions of later years. 
"I felt n he said "that the Revolution would be the adversary I 
' ' 6 
·should have to fight •11 He even dramatized his entrance at the 
University of Strasburg. "The year I went there,_ the youthful 
Napoleon Bcm.aparte had just left •••.. we had the same professors for 
7 
mathematics and fencing·" Alas for the Metternichian legends . 
derived from this oft quoted statement, for the tale is a pure 
in~ntion. Napoleon never studied at Strasburg, nor even visited 
g 
there till long after 1188. Then to show himself triUJl!lhantly 
stead.fast in the face of all the blandislumnts of innovation, 
Metternich represented his tutor at Strasburg as being a disciple 
of the Revolution, who served on the "abhorred tribunal" in that 
city; who shared in the responsibility for the "streams of blood-
shed in Alsace_, and later in Paris, "presided over the Council of 10", 
9 
which conducted the horrors of the tenth of Augu.st. As a matter of 
fact Simon was a poor professor who had published in succession two 
inoffensive newspapers. He was not president of the "Council 
of 10", an organization which never existed, but served in Paris 
10 
in a very minor and very harmless capacity. 
·Worse than such erroneous dramatizing - for the biographer at 
least - w~s the manner in which Metternich.pictured himself as a 
kind of political automaton. He, whose charm gave him away over 
friends, and helped so often to disarm enemies, was represented as 
6 
a veritable Sphinx. "This personation," ·says Strobl, "knows neither 
love, nor hate, nor joy, nor pain, nor violence •.• The once mighty 
chancellor shows himself a dull pendant who was never young. He 
would us think that the greater part of his momentous life existed 
onJ,.y for the bundles of docmr.oonts which are preserved in the various 
, 11 
archives of the continent." 
Metternich seems to have been inclt.ned to fancy himself in 
this role. In the sumner of 1813, after he had brought Austria so 
triumphantly through the perils resulting from war on all sides; 
after he bad braved Napoleon at Dresden in a heated conversation 
of eight hours• duration; his outward attitude changed considerably. 
F. J. Ja..ckson, who had known him some. eight years before in :Berlin, 
wrote to George Jackson, then at headquarters,. that Metternich's 
demeanor nnst have taken a new. turn. Reme:aibering the gay yo~g nan 
he had known in Berlin, he coUld not picture the person whom his 
12 
brother root in 1813. l3ut this austerity was only an attitude, 
Metternich still had a strong vein of frivility in bis nake-up. 
Only in recent years, have researches by German scholars 
brought to light the real nature of Metternich's political beliefs 
prior to 1s15. Even with the increase in sonrces, nm.ch of significance 
has been overshadowed by the "en;phasis placed on his part in Gernan 
unification.. Srbik, the latest and most authentic biographer, has 
. ,/ 
succeeded largely in transcending the old crunbltng barriers which 




As a youth, Metternich was like all the young men of those 
troubled tizms - dominated intellectually by the writing of Voltaire, 
Rousseau, and the En.cyclopedists; quickened :aentally by the great 
movements which were shaking Europe. As a nan, he neither ignored the 
forces of the tine nor championed them. He was a conservative, a sane 
and reasonable person. His domestic policy in Austria had a decided 
liberal bent; but he dreaded liberalism decked out in the blood-
stained clothes of revolution. He appreciated the force of nationality 
in the overthrow of Napoleon; but he saw nationality also as a 
species of frenzy, as a militaristic crusade, as the spiritualization 
of war between peoples. He refused to see nobility in the nationality 
of Stein and Elucher, which expressed its love for Gernany and Prussia, 
. .:' 
in a desire to raze Paris to the ·~ound, and tear France asunder. 
Today, n.;3.tionality is a political byword, and the "self determina-
tion of peoples", a plati tud.e. Liberalism and democracy have become 
more than respectable.. :eu.t to a reasonable IIB.n, the first part of the 
n_ineteenth century offered ample basis for doubting them. The truth 
is, that even among educated liberals, there was little doctrinaire 
belief in such abstractions. But the "reasonable" nen of yesterday 
are today ma.de the betes noires of human progress, when the ca.uses 
which they aoubted have been accepted. 
Metternich's policy was based quite evidently upon the necessity 
of his age.. Equilibrium, order, stability, - those formed the 
keystone around which he proposed to erect the European structure, 
and by so doing secure for Austria the place which it had once held 
in that s'&ructure. All that he sought in the governments around him, 
was an appreciation of the necessity of bringing a stable peace to 
Europe. He cared nothing for the origins or forms of those 
governments. Talleyrand complained at the· Congress of Vienna, that 
14 
Metternich appeared not to esteem the principle of legitim:t.cy. 
Care mu.st be exercised, to keep in mind the need which was 
g 
then uppermost in Europe, not nationality, nor liberty, nor legitimacy, 
but peace and stability. If the passion for stability swept 
Metternich too near.the cataracts of intole~ce, at least he did 
not flounder into the deep waters of political extravagance where 
his enemies not only drowned themselves but ~ragged down with them 
the aspirations of many peoples. From his entrance into political 
life. in 1801 to Napoleon's second and final banishment, the course of 
his political t!rought and acti~ was unswerving, and in its essentials, 
unchanged. 
CHAPTER II. 
THE MAN AND HIS COUNTRY 
Clemens Lotha.r Metternich was born in Coblenz on May 15, 
1773· His father represented the ecclesiastical court of Treves 
at Vienna and the court of Vienm at Coblenz - one position with 
two salaries. Later, ~hrough the influence of Xaunitz, he rose 
to higher ranks in the service of the Austrian Enpire; but during 
the early youth of Elen:.ens, the elder Metternich was only one of the 
1 
great number of petty diploma.ts in the Holy Roman Empire. He 
seems to have had little ability, and less ambition; he was never 
free from financial stress. :Bnt "powdered and painted, in highly 
artistic per:rugu.e, silk-stockings, and lm.ee breeches, he fulfilled 
his duty as a diplomat, conscientiously as the easy going eighteenth 
2 
century presented it·" From his father, Metternich seems to have 
inherited his native indolence (which he shook off in early nanhood, 
but which returned in later years), his love of the fieshpots, and 
3 
his inclination for the ladies • 
9 
. "Far richer," says Srbik," was the natural inheritance for which 
he 001 ld thank his mother • . . . • To her, he owed extraordinary 
flexibility of mind, the g'iift of political refinenent, unusual power~ 
of reception and adaptation, and the driving force with which he 
fought for the possession of honor and fame. Her, he could thank, 
for a warm heart; for the quickly inflamed and quickly quenched 
ardor of his youthf'ul politics; for loveableness of manner and 
sociability; for an extre100ly attractive physiognomy; for a beautifnl 
eye and a symmetry of figure which opened the way into the hearts 
4 
of so many women • " 
Such were Metternich's parents. From them he received the 
pe rscn e.l charm !fhi ch served him so we 11 throughout life • From them 
came, too, a certain mediocrity which was at once his s.trength and 
wealmess. It made him essentially an average man; a practical 
nan; but a man lacking in a measure the vision which distinguishes 
greatness. 
Though what Vi trolles called "the limits" of l/i.etternich • s 
ttgenius", may have been set to an extent by heredity, in no less 
degree did the environment of early life fashion his character. He 
grew up fer from the ~~in a little Rhenish court, typical 
of the many which dotted the Germanies. As a child, he journeyed· 
to Strassburg to be vaccinated against snall-pox, and later went 
there for his education; but when, at the age of seventeen he 
witnessed the coronation of Leopold at Frankfort, he had never set 
5 
foot in Austria. 
Born a Bhinelander, he never forgot the scenes of his youth. 
10 
In old age, after his exile in London had ended, and he had again 
found a home in Vienna (1857), for the last time he visited the land 
of his birth. "He lingered on the Rhenish heights," says Srbik, 
"letting his gaze wander from Bingen to Nahetal, and memories of the 
old vintage festivals came back to him; as did the realization of 
what the Rhine meant to the Gerroon Volk - a realization which has 
always been foreign to the couprehension of the German national state ••. 
He wrote to his sister: 'The Rhine flows in iey veins, I feel it, and . 6 
there fore the sight of it, intoxicates me.•" 
11 
Metternich had none of the national fervor so colilllDn to the 
men of his age. His family cherished no "genuine love for fatherland 
7 
and pride in e~ire," as did the forbears. of Stein. The Bhenish 
family was, in psychology, actually roore French than Gerxmn. Clemens 
wrote to his mother in French, anl at the age of eighteen, preferred 
g 
that language. He grew up a veritable cosmopoli te. It_ was, perhaps, 
this very circumstance which later nade it possible for Metternich 
to regard the reorganization of Europe in the sense off ffweltanschauung", 
and so enabled him to resurrect Austria and elevate himself. 
At Ooblenz, he contemplated the slack absolutism of the petty 
Germn courts, and the absurd fiction of the Roly Roman ~ire which 
bound them together. He learned to appreciate. the va.lue of law and 
authority. Later, when he governed the policies of the Austrian 
Enq:>ire, he wa.s firmly resolved that .Austria should not::continue as 
the nominal head of the innumerable German principalities. He cared 
nothing for the fiction of authority where no authority existed. 
From the quiet iurroundings of his youth, Metternich went in 
1788 to the University of Strasburg. Here he was in direct contact 
with French thought of the ei~teenth century. The young Rhinelander 
warmed himself at the intellectual fires of Montesquieu, Voltaire, 
and Rousseau, studied natural history, political history, physics, 
. 9 
and even learned to play on the violin. Koch was conducting his 
famous school of diplomacy at Strasburg, and Metternich became one 
of his pupils. Talleyrand and Benjamin Constant had been trained 
10 
by the same master. Under Putter, who t~ught "the existing right 
and its application, a.nd the observance of the laws", Metternich 
11 
studied political science. 
He was a sensitive lad; with beliefs essentially like those 
of the youths of his acquaintance. Reason and humanity were the 
keynotesof his ed~caUon. His religious training had been at best. 
luke warm, and at Strasburg he seems to have fallen into the 
scepticism of the times. The writer, Varnhagan, who met him during 
12 
this period, characterized him as a free-thinker. In gene ra.1 , it 
might be said, that he was a very no~ boy. Metternich's stay at 
Strasburg was ended in 1790, when his father sumnoned him to the 
13 
coro~ation of the D:nperor·Leop~ld. 
The elder Metternich·, in the service of the Holy Ronan Empire, 
had been ma.de imperial representative 0£ circle of the Lower Rhine 
and Westphalia.. Now, through the favor of Chancellor Ka.uni tz, he 
was appointed c~ief minister in the Netherlands for the Austrian 
Enq?ire. During the next two years (1791-93), yo'Ullg :Metternich 
continued his studies at }&:l.yence and passed his S11Illllers at Eru.ssels, 
14 
where he had first acquaintance with the details of diplonacy. 
In the Netherlands he associated with the French emig.res, and 
15 
learned as he said "to know the defects of the old regirre.n 
Through the winter months, he studied law and diplomacy at Mayence; 
associated with Hofman, Forster, Kotzebue - ~11 Revolutionists; and 
read the record of the past under the eye of Nicholas Vogt, the 
. 16 
historian of the Gernan Empire. He seems to have had much to do 
with, if not mu.ch in common with the more revolutionary elements in 
a.nd around the university. But in his 1829 nsmoir, he chose to 
12 
represent himself as having held aloof from such society - a difficult 
task if as he says , he was "surrounded by students who named the 
17 
lectures according to the Republican calendar." As a natter of 
fact, the decree of the Convention which established this calendar was 
not promulgated until October 5; 1793, while Metternich left 
Mayence early in 1793, called away by the overthrow of his father's 
18 
government in the Netherlands. However, the convention troops did 
occupy the city in the Fall of 1792. The revolt pf "3.yence was the 
·direct provocation for the propa.ga.nda decree of November of that 
19 
year. Metternich was amply exposed to the germs of the Revolution. 
Metternich• s academic '.ii:raining came to an end in 1793 with his 
departure for Mayence. Dnring the next year, he acted as .courier 
between :Brussels and the army, and co:ritinued his diplonatic 
apprenticeship. In the spring of 1794 he journeyed to England, 
where he met the great men of the island and frequented· the sittings 
20 
of Parliament. In later years, his knowledge of the English system 
made possible a closer understanding with the :British minister, when 
the reorganization of Eu.rope den:anded agreen:snt between Austria and 
Great Britain. While in England, Metternich was appointed Austrian 
ambassador to the Hague, a decided social elevation for the young 
21 
Rhenish count, if not a very important advancen:snt politically. 
He returned to the continent that sunmer, and :in October, for 
22 
the first ti~, entered the capitol of the Austrian Empire. Prince 
xaunitz, patron of the elder Metternich was now dead and Baron Thugut 
had succeeded to authority. There had been some indiscretions in the 
administration of the Netherlands, and the elder Metternich's 
abilities were not reckoned too highly by the new minister of 
23 
foreign affairs. The father of the future chancellor was left 
high and dry. To add to his misfortunes, the family estates on the 
24 
left bank of the Rl_llne had been confiscated by the French. 
A reimdy for all these enibarra.ssments was f01nd in a brilliant 
marriage for his son. The ·choice fell upon the granddaughter of 
13 
14 
Prince Xaunitz, an amiable yo'Ullg woman with considerable fortune and 
no PB:rticular beauty. Clemens Lotha.r accepted the arrangeioont. Love 
seems not to have entered into the betrothal. Many years after, 
Metternich told a :friend that he had been married - not against his 
25 
will, but without it. 
The marriage, celebrated in September of the year 1795, profoundly 
influenced the career of the young diplomat. The financial independence 
which came as a result, might easily have enhanced his inc~ination for 
study and for the indolence of private life; but Clemens had irarried 
an ambitious woman. The granddaughter of one political celebrity, 
26 
she intended to be the wife of another. For the time being, however, 
the young husband continued his studies,· contented to await the beck 
of fortune. He w8:s, and always had been, a patient, unassuming person 
with no particular evidences of brilliance. His chief disti11ction lay 
in charm of manner and bearing which ma.de him mch sought after in 
society. 
Meanwhile the Metternich family remained outside Tho.gut's favored 
circle. To the Congress of Rastadt, both Clemens and his father did 
go', but one, siJ1!>1Y as the representative of the Westphalian assembly 
of lmights, the other, as minister from the German Reich.. Neither 
gained mo.ch profit or reputation from the proceedings there. Kotzebue, 
also a witness of the Congress, was thought to have written his "Die 
beiden Klingsberg" from observation of the Metternichs - the lover 
with the "grey locks tousled by the zephyrs," who could "never be 
weaned from his youth"; and his son, the young sport running after 
every skirt and continually in the way of his father's amorous 
27 
ambitions. 
The ladies were desi£ned to play an ever increasing part in the 
life of the younger diplomat. He had begun his love affairs at 
Mayence and Brussels, and he was to continue them in most cf the 
capitols of Europe. ".At every stage in his brilliant career," says 
28 
Paleologu.e, "may be seen the shining image of a woman." 
The failure Of the Rastadt Congress left the elder Metternich 
stranded once more. The family political future seemed very dark 
indeed. :But the treaty of Luneville brought, as a consequence, a 
change of ministry. :Baron Thugu.t was suspected of being over 
29 
solicitous of the private investments which he had made in France. 
15 
The change brought new hope to the elder Metternich, and to the wife 
of the younger Metternich though Cle~ns Lothar, himself, can hardly 
have been enthusiastic. Nevertheless, in 1801, he entered difini tely 
upon a diplomatic career. 
Austria by this tine had already suffered defeat at Rivoli, 
Merengo, and Hohenlinden, and had been humiliated by the treaties of 
Campo-Formio (1797) and Luneville (1801). Furthermore, before 
Metternich's elevation to the head of foreign affairs in 1809, the 
sable-hued double eagle was to be lowered successively at Ulm, 
Austerlitz, Wagram. The diplomats of the Empire were to bend beneath 
necessity, and sign the treaties of Presburg ,(1805), Fontainbleau 
(1807}, and Vienna {1809). 
Beginning in 1801, Metternich served as minister at Dresden until 
1803, then at Berlin until 1805, and at Paris from 1806 to 1809; 
learning by these stages the politics of the princes of the Empire, 
of Prussia, and of Fm.nee. His Paris service was an accident of fate. 
He was in 1806 cho~en as Stadion's successor at st. Petersburg, bu.t 
Napoleon knowing his reputation for "agreeableness", asked. for his 
30 
appointment at the French court. At :Berlin, Metternich arranged 
the Potsdam alliance agreement of December 4, 1805. At Paris~ he 
negotiated the Treaty of Fontainebleau of October 11, 1807, which 
defined the bo1mdary between Austria and Italy. In 1809, holding 
temporarily the portfolio which Stadion had resigned, he participated 
in the Al tenberg negotiations after Wagram. Such is the bare record 
of his ambassadorial career. 
When Metternich was given permanent possession of the portfolio 
of minister of foreign affairs, his policy was already formed. The 
course had long been known to him. From the beginning, are to be 
found in his writings, a conception of Eu.rope as a whole, and of 
Austria's dependence upon the proper arrange.uent of that En.rope. 
Most pertinent to this study may be considered the early expressions 
of his political thoughts. 
In 1801, in drawing up his own instructions as representative 
at the Cou.rt of Dresden, Metternich took occasion to discuss the 
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condition of Europe in general. It was impossible then, he said, 
to create a "settled Eu.ropean state-system." To restore Etirope, 
Prussia's militaristic ambitions mu.st be curtailed; Russia• s land 
hunger abated; Poland restored if pos.sible; the acqu.isitions of 
France modified; England's immense maritine possessions retroceded 
in part. Austria nnst define and unify itself. It were better, he 
said, to be rid of the Neltherlands forever. In this expression are 
to be found the cardinal points of his policy in the years 1Sl3-14. 
Be was only too conscious that Austria could not' bring El.lrope 
to stability by her own efforts. Since French preponderance was 
the present danger, he felt keenly the need of alliance with Prussia 
16 
and Russia. In 18o4, he urged Prussia to help gain an "equilibrium 
of Europe." which would insure "the independence, tranquillity, and 
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safety" of all states. Metternich was essentially a practical man. 
A.fter the disasters of December, 1805, and the Peace of Presburg, he 
draw up immediately (Jam.iary, 1806) a. zoomoir upon the exigencies of 
the situation. For the rooment, he easily gave up his fdeal scheme 
17 
and advised Austria, Russia, and Prussia - united by alliance - to 
draw a line of demarcation between Eastern and Western Eu.rope. Ignore 
Napoleon, he said; let him tear down kingdoms and set up empires and 
satrapies to his heart's content, so long as he confines himself to 
33 
Western Europe. l3ut in the spring he had given up that hope for 
the Franco•Prussian alliance had come to his knowledge. Prussia can 
no longer be depended upon, he said. She is lost to "the general 
~ 
cause." 
Then came Jena. As ambassador at Paris, he saw Ru.ssia succumb 
to the blandishments of the wily Corsican at Tilsi t. Writing to his 
superior, he detailed the gossip of the Parisians in the cafes; the 
vision of two great enq>ires, Russian and French, with Austria divided 
between them. Tilsi t made the Austrian position 'more precariou.s, but 
Metternich was comforted that, at least the monarchy was intact. He 
foresaw a time when the hastily fashioned structure of this Eu.rope . 
\Vould fall. "The wisdom of our government", he wrote, n should bring 
about a. day when 300,000 men united, '1u.led by one will, and directed 
towards one end, will play the first part in Europe at a time of 
35 
universal anarchy." Did he perhaps think of himself, as that "one 
Will"? 
After the treaty of Fontainebleau of 1807, the boundary line 
18 
oetween Austria and Italy was definitely settled, and Metternich 
hoped for peace. "We find ourselves for the first time in a situation 
. 36 
clearly defined and understood by France; no question is left open." 
But Napoleon was not long in dispelling hopes of peace. Already, he 
had made himself master of Germany and Italy, had tra.npled Pru.ssia 
underfoot and cajoled Rtissia into an alliance. Now he proposed to 
. 37 
conque.r the Speni sh throne for his brother, and partition Tu.rkey. 
He talked to Metternich about dividing the possessions of the Porte, 
but the Austrian minister refused to consider taking any share in such 
action. He wrote hone to Stadion.that the next move would be against 
the Empire of the Hapsburgs. "The ancient and venerable union of ·so many 
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happy peoples •.• will not sustain the first shock," he said. 
Austria began to prepare against the -tine when Napoleon's troops, 
having gained: the day in Spain, would come marching back over the 
Pyrenees. Napoleon was aware of the armaments in the neighboring 
Empire and protested against them to Metternich. In September of 1808, 
he journeyed to Erfurt to neet Alexander. There, Russia agreed to 
recognize the new Kings of Spain and Naples, and secretly promised to 
join with F:rance if Austria should be the first to open war. The 
difficulties of the Spanish campaign forbade Napoleon's thinking of 
immediate war with the Emperor Francis. He began, in February 1809, to 
discuss a treaty of mutual guarantee between Franc~, Russia, and 
4o 
Austria. 
war broke out, however, in AprU, and Napoleon quickly proved 
his military suprel18cy. ·:sut he fo'Ulld before him a sturdy foe. The 
Tyrolese peasants f_ought valiantly, Hungary refused to declare its 
independence despite the French war.manifesto of April 25, inviting 
41 
"" such action. All the Austrian peoples were quickened to life by the 
19 
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unifying spirit of the new ·national militia. Napoleon himself was 
impressed by the resistance of these forces. Later when his minister 
of war spoke of Austria as no longer being a great power, the French 
43 
Enperor said, "Then it is clear that you were not at Wagram." He 
marvelled at the enthusiasm with which the people greeted the 
Austrian sovereign on his return, despite defeat and an unfavorable 
4>t 
peace •. The significance of this new feeling in Austria, for the 
career and views of Metternidl, mu.st not be overloolred. 
"It is well to remember," says Herbert Fi sher, "that Metternich 1 s 
political barque was first launched on the tide of a popular and 
45 . . 
national movement." In truth, the young Austrian had long been 
conscious of the potential force of this tide. He was by no means 
anti-national, but he was strongly set against revolution with all 
its attendant horrors,. Especially was he opposed to the political 
cast given by the succeeding revolutionary governnents of France to 
what he considered a distinctly social upheaval. His distrust of 
the "passions of the people" was a thing of gradual developimnt, 
however. For example, in 1829 he wrote as if he had always been 
46 
averse to popular appeal. But at twenty-one, he advocated a species 
of "guerilla" protection against the borders of France, and wrote a 
paper "On the Necessity of a general Arming of the People, on the 
. 47 
Frontiers of France, by a Friend of Universal Peace." .Again, in 
1805, he wished his government to compete with Napoleon in appealing 
to Public Opinion and advised the establishment of a newspaper of 
48 
pupular appeal. Du.ring the war in Spain, he constantly applauded 
~he national spirit which fired the Spanish peasants to brave Napoleon's 
veteran legions. In short to picture Metternich as unaware or 
20 
unappreciative of the greatest and newest force of the time, would 
be to make him a man of no vision whatever, a veritable dolt. certainly, 
he was neither. 
At the battle of Wagram, ~y 5, 6, Austria was badly defeated 
but by no means crushed. In the interim which foll~wed the cessation 
of hostilities, the Emperor Francis was hoping agaim t hope for 
assistance from Prussia or Russia, from England's exP.edition .into 
Holla.t\d., even from Turkey. But none was forthcoming• Tb.ere was no 
sane alternative but peace. Considerable mystery surrounds the 
negotiation. Stadion withdrew and Metternich took his place at 
Altenberg, where the first meetings with French plenipotentiaries 
were held; while Prince John of Liechtenstein negotiated separately 
with Napoleon himself at Schonbru.nn. TP,e treaty seems to have been 
concluded there. Austria was compelled to sign away over. 2000 square 
49 
miles of territory. Metternich thus came into the ministry of 
foreign affairs in the train of the worst of all the humiliations 
which the Empire had experienced from Napoleon. 
The new minister was just thirty-six years old. Al though he 
had been ambassador to Prussia at thirty and to France a.t thirty-three, 
he was not thought of as a great man. Gantz said that ,he could be 
considered only a "demi-minis tre, n and even accused him of scheming 
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to overthrow Stadion. Six months later, he was still dubious though 
forced to admit grudgingly that the direction of foreign affairs by 
Metterni.ch was not "absolutely ba.d." "He believes himself hapPy; 
that is an excellent quality. He has his methods, he has savoir-faire; 
his personality is a great asset. But he is frivolous, dissipated 
and pre~tious. If his star shines for a few years he can obtain 
for the State a very adequ.a.te position. But beware of new crises. 
51 
They will tumble him down." 
While negotiations were going on in the fall of 1809, Napoleon 
21 
had written to the Enperor Francis: "If peace is established between 
us, it will then depend on Your Majesty to make the bonds between 
52 
our States even closer·" · This advice' was to be answered within six 
months by the marriage of Ma.rie-Lo~ise to the Emperor of France. In 
1829, Metternich represented this marriage as having been arranged at 
53 
the solicitation o:f lTapoleon. But tbere is good reason to believe 
that Metternich's insinuations offered an opening. In 1810 he boasted 
54 
to Gentz of his wdtsdom in .thus uniting the two Empires. At :Basle 
in January 1814, he told 'Castlereagh that N..arie ... Louise had been given 
in marriage to Napoleon, to prev.ent a rapprochment between :Russia 
55 
a.nd France. At least, both parties were agreeable and the marriage 
was celebrated in March 1810. Viennese society was horrified. The 
Prince de Ligne appeared in the salons with a. bon mot, as 113ual: 
56 
"L'Autriche fit au Minotaure le sacrifise d 1i.'ille belle genisse .n 
The new minister, however, felt that the marriage had brought 
Austria the golden gift of peace, temporary though its possession 
might be. He planned to make good use of it. "The chief efforts of 
the Government," he advised the Emperor, "mu.st have for their aim the 
regula.tion Md restorat-ion of vigour to our internal energies, and the 
accumulation of these energies for all possible eirergencies in the 
57 
future·" · With this goal in view, he reargailized the foreign offices; 
eet al:x>ut redraughting .the Hungarian Constitution; and in the face of 
strermous o:pposi ti on launched wide financial reforms throughout the 
Empire. The organization of an Imperial Council was recomn:ended to 
Francis as a neans of unifying the administration, and giving the 
different parts of the Empire a greater share in the government. 
Al though busy with internal reforms, Metternich had not 
forgotten his idea of a "genere.lH peace of Eu.rope. While negotiating 
a loan in Paris during the sumner of 1810, he offered to Napo~eon, 
the Austrian mediation of a 'maritime peace with England. His offer 
was turned aside, but he nevert11:leless set Gentz to writing a memoir 
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on a ma.ri t in:e arrangement • For all his hopes for peace , when he 
returned t.o Vienna. in October, 1810, he saw that a fresh war on the 
continent between France and Russia was inevitable. In a long 
report to Francis of January 17, 1811, he outlined the results of 
59 
his Paris mission and reviewed the prospect of Eu.ropean affairs. 
The people of France, he said, were far from happy under the 
burdens which Napoleon• s conquests forced them to bear. However, 
the appearance of what seemed to be a "calm after prolonged storms" 
gave them comparative contentment • No revolution would take place in 
22 
old France. The question of whether or ·~ot the provinces would 
revolt, depended upon the sentiment of unity against French 13.ggression 
That at present seemed to be lacking. England was in critical condition; 
Pmssia, no longer to be reckoned as a Power. Russia had placed 
herself beside France, and by so doing "rendered herself dangerous to 
a.fl her neighbours and powerless against France." The marriage of 
Napoleon with the daughter of the Austrian Emperor had robbed 
Alexander of the. advantage which he found in alliance with France. 
War was inevitable. Could Austria prevent it? No, he answered. 
Despite the threatened destruction of Russia, Austria could not side 
with that power under present circumstances. To make war against France, 
. or with her' seemed out of the- qo.estion. The important detail of 
the moirent was Galicia. If Napoleon set up a Kingdom of Poland as 
he planned, Galiciawo'Uld ·soon be lost. :France had offered Illyria 
as compensation for Galicia. Perhaps it would be better to accept. 
Austria would favor the reestablishment of Poland, except for hesitancy 
to lose Galicia. 
Thus, Metternich su.nured up the problem. It should be noted well 
that in Austrian eyes, Russia loomed as a dangerous eneley', as 
dangerous ~s France. :Both of them, Met-ternich reported to Francis in 
November, 1811, were "Powers equally to be feared by e.11 others whether 
they are allies or enemies." In truth, Russia at present was perhaps 
the most. to be feared, since the marriage of Marie Louise would hold 
France· off for a time. Russia, he showed, had turned covetous eyes 
on Austria's western frontier since the reign of Peter the Great. She 
bad supported Prussia when.. that country was a menace to Austria. She 
had ·aestroyed Poland, "and with this kingdom all idea of true 
Eur~pean policy; established in its stead a system of destruction 
and robbery·" If Austria. had not resisted, Russia would have crushed 
Turkey. The downfall of the German Empire dated from the beginning of 
Russian intrigues within 1 t. Worse,. she had twice abandoned her 
allies to their fate when sh~ had seen her own frontiers threatened. 
Stability in Eu.rope could be attained only by curtailing Russia's 
6o 
ambitions, ju.st as those of France mu.st be limited. 
It is well to remember this feeling, in the light of Metternich's 
later attitude toward Russia; an attitude which the English minister, 
castlereagh found it difficult at tines to understand. 
Wit~ the opening of the year 1812, Napoleon was ready for war 
against the Czar. In Feoruary, he bound Prussia to help him, and in 
I 
Ms,rch succeeded in arrallging a defensive alliance with Austria by 
which tha.t power reluctantly agreed to furnish an auxiliary corps 
of 60,000 men. Society in Vienna made no secret of its distaste 
for this alliance. Napoleon, as Baron Ernouf has pointed out in his 
life of ·Maret, had co"UD.ted too mu.ch upon the personal sentiments of the 
Enperor of Austria for his daughter. :Bees.use of the dealings with 
France, the ministry of Metternich was popularly regarded with small 
favor. The force of public opinion in the Empire was not to be 
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disregarded, though the government had been pro-French. Metternich 
was far from being that, but he was soimthing else - a very patient 
man. 
The attitude of Austria under the treaty was but lightly veiled. 
The auxiliary corps played a waiting garre to which Ernouf attributed 
a "fatal influence" on the events of 1812. He said, inonically 
enough, that "Prince Schv1arzenberg owed his conmand of the allied 
armies to the memory of what the coalition diplomats called •sa belle 
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campagne politiqu.e• in Poland." Metternich bided his time. Its 
coming did not take him unawares. 
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CHAPTER III 
AUSTRIA'S ENTREMISE - THE OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES 
Lying fairly in the middle of Eu.rone Austria found her-- ' 
self in constant danger of becoming the battle ground of two 
great imperialistic powers. Russia and. France were to be feared as 
allies or enemies. But in 1812 Metternich found protection in an 
' 
alliance with Napoleon and a tacit agree~nt with Alexander~ A 
defensive cordon nominally an auxiliary to the French arll\V kept 
' ' 
the lands of the Empire free of foreign soldiery. The understanding 
with Russia allowed that· auxiliary to remain on· the defensive. It 
mu.st be well understood however that Metternich did not think of the 
' 
Russian arrangement as basis for a combination against Napoleon. 
•French preponderance. limited. as he thought by the life span of 
. ' 1 
Bonaparte, was preferable to pernnnent Russian suprems.cy. He 
awaited the right m@rrent for bringing forward a general peace of 
Europe~ ca.lculated to allay the threat of both empires. 
Prussia · nov1 virtually a. French province looked to Austria 
' ' 
for guidance in the dilemna. Chancellor Hardenberg wrote to 
Metternich in September 1812. to a.sk for direction on his country's 
2 ' 
future policy. The Austrian minister did not answer for some tine. 
As the war began to favor Russia, his ·thoughts turned again to peace. 
He wrote He.rdenberg that he was thoroughly resolved against "useless 
sacrifices·" He had never wavered he said from his original 
' ' 
conception of the task before them. "We mu.st strive to emerge from 
this contest and finish it with the least possible harm to the ' . 
preservation of the appearance of independence. We mu.st by all means 
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in our power. so direct ourselves as to regain in the future that 
" .veritable independence which is the health of states; we lllllSt not 
risk our existence on a single ca.rd. Such is the one and only end 
of my solicitude. The ways of attaining it are the more difficult 
because no conduct offers complete security. I limit myself to 
ways of ending the frightful complication of the moment; and to the 
arrival at a more stable state of affairs. however intermediate 
it rray be." He felt called upon therefore to propose peace to ' . . 
Engl~d, to France and even to Russia though he £el t no reliance 
3 
upon the latter. 
Metternich wrote thus on October 5. A fortnight later tre 
4 ' 
last of Napoleon's troops had evacuated Moscow. :11he disastrous 
retreat had begun.. Otto the French arribassador to Austria, began 
. 5 ' . 
to hea.r talk of peace. On October 28, it was learned at Vienna 
through Hurriboldt•s report, that Napoleon had sent General Lauriston 
to Russian head.quarters; that a rapproachuent was, or might be 
impending. Metten1ich acted at once for a te ace between these two 
powers alone, would be only a truce. Hope of stable equilibrium 
in Europe. would be. as distant as before. 
Floret had been invited to Vilna as Austrian cha.rge d 1affaires 
6 
on October 16. To him Metternich sent an urgent instruction. 
' 
Maret French foreign secretary wa.s to be informed that Austria 
' ' 
desired to negotiate a general peace. There was a.mple founda,tion 
for: . the offer. At Dresden in May, Napoleon had spolk:en favorably 
of a peace with England, and suggested Austrian action for it. 
:Before Floret received the despatch from Vienna. Metternich had 
selected a trustworthy nessenger for a voyage to England. The letter 
(dated November 9 1912-) to be delivered by the envoy was shown to 
i ' . 
Hardenberg by Count Zichy, Austrian representative at Berlin. The 
Prussian Chancellor approved the mission, although unable, he said 
g ' 
to expose his government by publicly seconding it. 
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More extended despatches to ~oret on December 9 ,. pressed up.on 
t 
France the acceptance of Austria's good offices. In. one instruction 
' 
:intended for the eyes of Maret Metternich outlined in detail the 
' ' 
state of Europe. Russia he declared would never n:ake a senarate ' ~ ..... 
peace while she held the advantage; the difficulties of a second 
campaign against her made further hostilities unwise. It would be . 
futile to ask Englt:md to negotiate separately, when by so doing she 
would alienate her allies. A general peace on a reasonable basis 
could be offered to all powers by Austria. "The E~eror Francis, 
alone, can speak to France. to England. and to Russia. language which 
offends neither the ~ 12roure of rival governrrents and enemies 
9 ' 
nor the national sentiments of their peoples." 
Napoleon had now left his retreating army, and was hastening 
to Paris. "He did not seem to have at once realized the full 
10 
significance of the events in Russia~" says Fournier. Arriving 
at Dresden on December 14 he desnatched a letter to his father-in-
' .i.; 
law. It began with an expression of confidence in Austria's desire 
for a prompt and "satisfactory peace," and ended with a request 
for a corps of 60 000 mm in Galicia and Transylvania. No n:ention 
' 11. 
was made of accepting peace offers. Nevertheless the a.rri val 
of this letter on the 20th gave sufficient opening for the departure 
12 
of General ]ubna to Paris with the Austrian E~eror 1 s reply. In 
]ubna.•s instructions Mettfrnich stated clearly .that the rmssenger 
was in no sense charged with a negotiation. He was sent merely 
' 
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~o ascertain the intentions of Napoleon. Yet "M. de Bubna will not 
conceal from the Emperor Napoleon, our conviction that a general 
peace on generous bases .~ ..... could alone repair the disasters of 
the present campaign·" More active participation on the part of 
13 
Austria in future ca~aigns, was not to be expected. 
At Pa.ris the Austrian envoy found Napoleon doubtful whether 
Russia or England had. any desire for peace. Bubna reported this to 
Vienna. Floret. who had been sent to Paris on January 3, received 
despatches en route, giving Metternich 1 s belief that the powers 
14 
would be amenable to a general pacification. There seems to have 
been considerable feeling in Austrian official circles that 
England's financial status was such as to preclude continued 
15 
hostilities. Russia would follow her ally. it wa.s thought. 
In the first days of January, Napoleon called a co1.Ulcil on 
foreign affairs upon the Austrian proposals. Two questions were 
presented. Should offers of peace be entertained? In case of an 
affirmative decision should direct negotiations be opened with 
' 
Russia, or should the good offices of Au§tria be accepted? The. 
council voted to consider peace proposals advanced by Austria. though 
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her genercd good faith was distrusted. On January 7, then, 
Napoleon replied to the Austri~ Emperor's letter of Decenlber 20. 
Consideration of the good offices took up a very snall space in 
this missive. Bonaparte announced tha.t he would not oppose any 
plan of pacific settlement proposed by Austria - but he laid down 
rigid conditions of acceptance. No jot of territory once united by 
Senatus Consul tes would ever be relinquished. By far the greater 
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part of the letter consisted of a resume of the Russian campaign -
put in its best light. of course - together with a forecast of .. 
future campaigns. A long analysis of French arms and resources 
was evidently intended to show how little Napoleon's supren:acy had 
17 
been disturbed by the disasters of the winter. 
On the next day Maret despatched a letter to Metternich. 
' 
Less restraint was demanded by a communication between the ministers, 
and Maret said everything that l\J'apoleon \'las kept from saying by the 
etiquette of royal correspondence. He imp~aned the good faith of 
18 
Austria' and sharply criticised her conduct in the war. 
' 
These 
two replies showed plainly how far from peace were Napoleon•s 
' 
thoughts. 
Meanwhile, the Austrian letter of Noverriber 9. h~d been 
received in England by a ministry intent not on peace but on the 
. ' 
overthrow of Napoleon. Austria had offered herself as the logical 
mediator at a crisfs which she considered most advantageous for a 
' 
general peace. British reaction to the offer. rr;:J.y be ~judged from 
a memorandum written supposedly by Cooke, an undersecretary of the 
foreign office. The matter of peace was ignored, the writer 
confining himself to assurances that right and duty demanded that 
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Austria dissolve her alliance with France. 
But Metternich had no intention of forsaking France for by 
so doing he wonld lay himself open to attack, with no aid in sight 
except that of Russia. And Russia had deserted Austria many times. 
Furthermore now that Prussia was imnotent he had no intention of , -:t" ' 
helping to crush France - his single threat against the on\Vard m::trch 
of the Bear. For these reasons, when Walpole came secretly to· 
Vienna from st. Petersburg late in 1812, with English inducements 
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for Austria's joining the coalition, he was given no encouragement. 
The revolts in the Tyrol region, being stirred up by the Bt.i:tish 
agent, King, were suppressed by Austria as an ally of France. ·When 
Metternich later discovered King• s part in this intrigue, he expelled 
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him from the country. 
While rejecting such English proposals, the Austrian minister 
was called upon to define his goverlllD3nt's attitude toward Prussia, 
as well. The status of that power had changed since Hardenberg• s 
letter to Metternich of September, 1812. On Deceniber 30, General 
Yorck had signed a truce with the Russian General Diebitsch, agreeing 
not to fight against Russia for two months, even though the King 
should repudiate the arrangement and order the tropps to rejoin the 
French army. Yorck, an old style Prussian, with strong aversion to 
reformers lilre Scharnhorst and Stein, was forced to this action by 
the rising tide of national sentiment. Alexander' declared that he 
would la.y down arms only when Prussia had been reconstructed as of 
1806. This appeal separated the dynastic ambitions of the Berlin 
government, from the popular aims. Hardenberg had been thinking of 
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Poland, and hoped to get it by a French victory. The Tauroggen 
truce changed matters significantly. When news of the agreement 
reached Berlin (January 4), General R'nesebeck was sent at once to 
23 
Vienna to ma.lee an arranger.rent on Poland. 
But Metternich y;as still maneuvering for a satisfactory 
Austrian position, and could not afford to coinprorrdse relations with 
Napoleon by consorting with a power which had viola.ted an alliance 
with Frnnce. He promi..sed K.nesebeck that Austrian troops would not 
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be used aga~nst Prussia, and the envoy from Berlin left Vienna on 
. 2.4. 
January 30, with that assurance and no more. 
That day, Metternich sent off instructions to Count Zichy 
at Berlin. The present object, he wrote, was a state of affttirs 
stable to-the degree that its bases ga;ve guarantee of its duration~ 
In this, the interest of Prussia as an intermediary power between 
France and Russia, lay side by side with that of Austria. It would 
be useless to pretend that no danger attended the present Russian 
advance. But Austria must not deviate from the proper course of 
action. 11 I am moved to caution you anew," he concluded, n that for 
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the tine being, you should naintain the strictest neutrality." 
Metternich thus turned a cold shoulder on English· invitations 
. . 
to desert France; and held aloof from entangling Austria in the 
Prussian defection. Russia, however, he had yet to consid.er. Two 
distinct objectives governed the Austrian policy in that quarter. 
Metternich wished first, to prevent the signing of a separate 
treaty between Russia and France; second, to insure Austrian 
frontiers against any inroad. 
The Czar had twice in November made fruitless advances to 
the Vienna court. On December 29, he invited the ~eror Francis 
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to take possession of his ancient frontiers. On January S, 
S chVTa.rzenberg, commanding the Austrian auxiliary corps, was 
approached by Anstett, Russian agent.. Assurance was given that 
the Czar had never thought of the reestablishment of Poland. No 
change in the reigning dynasty of France wa.s conte~lated. Anstett 
produced powers to sign an armistice of three months duration, and 
-revea1ed a "secret" instruction offering to Austria her ancient 
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limits, including "Lublin and cracovia". But Metternich was 
not to be tricked into compromising himself with Na.poleon by such 
a move. 
Alexander's decla.ration on Poland was insincere, even as 
Metternich suspected. The Polish patriot, Czartoryski, had received 
assurance from t4e monarch, that his nation would yet be revived.~ 
The jealousy of Austria. and Prussia, he said, made any immediate 
~ ~ 
action impossible. Metternich learned of this correspondence. 
His resolution not to throw himself into the arms of the coal.i tion, 
was strengthened b.y this evidence of Ru$sian duplicity. 
Meantime, Napoleon's letter of January 7, had convinced the 
Austrian diplomat that whatever the difficulty attached, a strongefj 
attitude must unavoidably be assumed. A truce with Russia would 
allow the Irqperial troops to retire toward a more favorable defensive 
position. On January 24, therefore, instructions were sent to 
Schwa1:-zenberg, authorizing the signature of a truce terminable a.t 
two weeks 1 notice • Thi.s was carried out on January 30, and the 
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Austrian auxiliary corps retired from the fighting zone. 
Metternich was now ready to press his good offices. His 
reply to the French correspondence of January 7, B, consisted of 
three separate pieces. On January 23, 24, the EII!>eror Francis 
answered Napoleon's letter. On January 23, Metternich replied to. 
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Maret' s letter. On Jarnl.ary 25, he sent a long instruction to Bubna. 
n1t is left to the Emperor of France ,n he wrote Bubna, "to· convinoo 
us that the present war is an Austrian wa.r; the first step has 
been talren; he has accep~ed our intervention ••.. .- .f if the 
conditions on which he wi~l favor peace are of such a nature as to 
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prove to the Emperor of Austria, and to the nation, that the cause 
of our ally is our cause; we will lend far more assistance than 
the Emperor Napoleon actually expects .n This was not rhetoric. 
Metternich was fighting for the stability of Eu.rope. Austria 
would ally herself with the :party whose views pointed toward that 
ideal. All the comnunications to the French court sounded the sane 
note. Oncken sums it up in two phrases: Bu.bna was to deny the 
imputation of bad faith, and certify Napoleon's acceptance of the 
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Austrian good offices. 11What does the Eq>eror of Austria write 
to rre?" said Napoleon when :Bubna came into his presence. The. envoy 
read the letter of January 23. 
Peace and stability,. Francis declared, were now imperative. 
A reign of twenty yea.rs' duration had taught him to lmow the minds 
of his people. No more sacrifices which did not lead plainly to a 
"general tranqu.illity ," could be demanded of them. 
Then Bubna read the Err;peror•s retort to the threatening tone 
in Napoleon's letter of January 7, with its accusation of bad faith. 
Bonaparte began to regret his hasty terr;per. He agreed; after 
reading a copy of his own letter, that it did ~ppear to be a threat, 
and begged Bubna to assure the Austrian Emperor that it had not 
been written in that sense. 
But the conciliating tone of this interview was not destined 
to last out the morning. The Austrian envoy now produced the 
second letter from Fre.ncis, to which wa,s attached Schwarzenberg's 
instructions to sign a truce. The announcement of this intention 
took Napoleon unawares. "It is the first step of defection," he 
cried. "Any hope of peace is lost. England and Russia will see 
your disposition ••.... I have accepted your intervention for 
peace, but an armed mediator does not suit me .n The army would be 
badly effected by this nnve, he said.. The Viceroy would be forced 
to retreat. But he wo14d exhort his people, raise new ~evies, 
perliaps withdraw behind the Rhine. He would make advances to 
Mu.ch of this was temper, of course. Napoleon was not yet 
ready to abandon Austria. However, the t.ruce with Russia markBd a 
beginning of the shift' to a new position which Metternich would later 
find inevitable if an equilibrum in Europe was to be obtained. 
The missions to England and Russia, on Februa.ry 8, were a 
pa.rt of Metternich's original nentremi sen plan, and as such not 
affected by the Bubna interview. The instructions given Wessenberg 
for the London fjourney, were virtually the srum a.s those furnished 
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to Lebzeltern as envoy to Russian headquarters. However, a certain 
difference existed in the Austrian policy toward the two courts. 
Metternich said, that it was governed by the fact that England had 
always followed a consistent line of conduct, while Russia had 
changed more than once. The Czar• s last turn with the wind had 
brought good fortune, and it could not be denied that this fortune 
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might awaken "ideas of conquest incon:g;>atible with our interests" 
The off er which the envoys were to ma.ke, may b.e summed up 
briefly as follows: An equilibrurn in Europe is a necessity. 
Circumstances now offer a fair chance of obtaining that equilibrum. 
Austria is the ~ogical int.~rmediary through which it may be arranged. 
The present need is not for a detailed peace, but for preliminaries 
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by which the general bases ~Y be established. Austria suggests 
a Cqngress a.t Prague, or elsewhere if the Powers desire, to decidE3 
\ 
upon these bases, be they uti -possidetis, co~ensa.tions, or what not. 
In the light of Metternich's policy, it rray be seen that the 
chief aim of the Austrian diplomat was to secure English acceptance 
of peace negotiations. He expected little from a victorious Russia. 
But to the English ministry, through Wessemberg, he pleaded the 
necessity of regaining a balance be;t)Veen France and· .Russia, and the 
function of Austria in striking the balance. It is no exaggeration 
to say, that he was pleading for the very existence of Austria. 
Fi_ve years only, had passed, since strollers on the boulevards of 
Paris were dividing Austria into petty kingdoms; and Metternich 
had heard the g·ossips in the cafes erect two mighty e~ires of 
Europe, while sipping an aperitif. 
At Paris, now, Napoleon was not deserting Austria despite the 
bad temper with which he had received the news of the Russian 
truce. He was, also,. still willing to make peace with England, 
wha.tever his fe:Slings toward Alexander. In January, Floret had 
protested that the text of the report to the Senate on foreign 
a.ffairs would make the English mission impossible. The French 
E~eror declared that the report had been entirely oral, and that 
Austria wa.s authorized to d~ny that the published details on peace 
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were those of the government. As late as March 18, Napoleon wrote 
to Francis V, to make a~nds for the interruption of Wessenberg•s 
,journey by the police at Hambourg. If he should lea,rn that the 
Austrian envoy's papers h~~ been ta~ered with, he promised to 
prosecute the offenders as criminals. Bonaparte was evidently in 
,.. 3iS 
sympathy with the English mission. 
Du.ring the month of the February, the increasing evidence 
of Russian intrigues in Poland, spurred Metternich to strengthen 
his arguments at the French court. His de]3patches to Bubna and 
Floret, were full of new details on the Polish question. He 
characterised the Poles as "that nation which takes on any color, 
whose very breath is in:trigue and secret dealing; and ha.s become 
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Polish only since it has ceased to be Polish." He likened them 
to the emigre 1 s who came to allied courts during .the first wars 
of the revolution, with disastrous results for ~11 those who lent 
ear to their pleadings. Like all men without ·a co~1try they· had 
4o 
nothing to lose and nuch to gain by the efforts of others. 
Of more import than the Polish difficulties was the rising 
tide of popular feeling against France. In instructions to the 
Austrian envoys at Paris, Metternich urged this development as a 
prime reason for rre.king pes.ce. Everywhere, he said, at Vienna, 
in Berlin, throughout Germany, "l 'esprit d 1effervescence" rose day 
by day. In Bohemia there is a strong disposition against France. 
"At home, our language in the naroo of peace, alone keeps a strong . 41 
party from embarrassing the government .n 
Metternich was still fighting for a pea,ce. He had no desire 
to see the rising tide of national hatreds sweep France out of '. 
Alexander• s path. Above all he feared it, when that monarch was 
already nnrching eastward, flushed with victory over Napoleon, 
sweeping Prussia trimnphantly before him, holding out high hopes 
to the Poles, and lending ~is ear to the confidences of Stein, the 
most radical of German nationalists, and consequently the bitterest 
37 
Napoleon hater. 
While Metternich ·was urging peace at Paris, forces were 
gathering which were soon to effect a change in his attitude •. The 
necessity of a stronger position than a irere "entremise", became 
gradually apparent as winter drew to en end. It appeared first, 
out of the north with the onward n:arch of the Russian armies. 
Alexander ts genera.ls, always more conservative and more Russian 
than their e.rrperor, had strongly urged a halt at the Vistula, with 
the idea of m..'3.k:ing that frontier a condition of peace. :But both 
Nesselrode and Stein had advocated the advance. Stein because he 
thought it would further the natio11,alistic movement in Germany; 
Nesselrode because he considered a long and secure peace possible 
only when France had been forced back within its natural frontiers. 
Both argued that an advance would bring Prussia and Austria into 
the coalitition and thus malre Napoleon's defea.t inevitable. Here 
was the opPortuni ty, Stein told Alexander to become the benefactor 
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and peace rraker of Europe. So Russia advanced. 
The Prussian government did not meet Alexander with open 
arms. King Frederick William's ambition in Poland precluded that. 
With Alexander's advance, a conflict appeared between the national-
istic emotions of popular movements like the iilgenbund, and the 
dynastic ambition of the Pro.ssian government. The Tauroggen 
convention in Decenfuer, wa~ a decided victory for the popular part~, 
the truce with Russia having been signed without authority from 
Berlin. As soon as Hardenberg heard of it , he s~nt Ifuesebeck to 
Vienna to get Austria•s support. Metternich, it will be remembereg., 
would not comni t htLmself and Xnesebeck returned on January 30. On 
February 8, he was sent to R'ussian headquarters to negotiate an 
alliance. The King had in mind, an arrangement which would protect 
him fDom Napoleon until a general peace could be arranged. He had 
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no thought of a war for the overthrow of Bonaparte. But the 
neople did have that thought, as Metternich well knew. He warned 
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Napoleon repeatedly of this rising national tide. 
Knesebeck held out ·obstinately in the parleys at Kalisch for 
the return of Prussia's old possessions in Poland. Alexander, on 
Stein's suggestion, appealed to the Prussian government (now at 
Breslan). The army was in a state of high excitement. The King 
was force.d to relinquish the old dynastic ambitions for those of 
his people, and the treaty wwas signed at Kalisch on February 28. 
In the negot ia ti ons ;Uexander had hinted that Saxony was a better 
field for Prussian amibition than Poland. This, perhaps, influenced 
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the decision at Breslau to relinquish Polish claims. Alexander's · 
·hint was des tined in the next eighteen months, to become one of 
the serious barriers to the resettlement of Eu.rope~ A new treaty, 
reflecting the national character of the alliance, was n:ade at 
Breslau on March 19. A proclamation was issued, dissolving the 
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Confederation of the Rhine. 
This alliance between Russia and Prussia was a factor in 
the necessity for assumption of a new Austrian position .. Hetternich 
had not been adverse to an alliance based on much the same idea as 
that of the King of Prussia. But the character of the Kalisch-Breslan 
negotiations forced upon the Austrian diplomat some very serious 
conclusions. The ambitions of Russia would be aided considerably, 
since Prussia's weight as an intermediary power had now swung to 
her side of the. balance. Ttte spirit with which the Prussians greeted 
39 
the alliance, showed that the downfall of Napoleon was uppermost in 
their minds. Metternich had long been convinced that when 
Napoleon's rule ended, France would again be plunged into anarchy; . . . . 47 
the only check against Russian power would be. completely effaced. 
Lastly, the turn given the proceedings by Stein and other German 
radicals, indicated a revival of Prussian rivalry against Austria. 
Castlereagh also saw this and regretted it, but he felt that the nain 
ob ,ject was to get Prussia into the war. Other consi<lerations must, 
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of necessity, be subordinated. 
Metternich was not taken unawa.res by the turn of events. In 
-anticipation of the new and stronger position, he gave to the- states 
of the German Confederation assurances that they need fear no 
Austrian domination. No aggrandizement at their expense was intended. 
In the middle of February, Metternich declared that a return to the 
old order of things was not comtell!Plated; that Francis would not 
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accept the Imperial crown if it were offered to him. Some attempts 
were made to gain support for .Austrian armed mediation. With the 
new :position in view, Metternich opened negotiations with Saxony, 
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with Bavaria, and with Mu.rat. 
The Austrian minister now turned his attention to the 
northern allies. He hoped to gain sone influence on their actions 
by bringing himself in clos.er touch with Alexander. Since both 
Russia and Prussia had pledged themselves at Kalisch to "Cil"ge Austrian 
entrance into the coalition, an approach to Alexander was not 
difficult. Lebzeltern, on account of the Czar•s presence at the 
allience negotiations, had little conversation with him until Marcil 
8, a month from the date of the Austrians envoy• s first instructions. 
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Alexander spoke very plea.santly of Russian relations with 
Austria. Definite terms of peace, however, he would not offer unti 1 
informed of the reception which they would receive. Lebzeltern 
refused to state any bases for peace, because, he said, the role of 
a. mere "entremi se", would not permit it. At present, Austria was 
merely offering to corrnnmicate and arrange terms proposed by both 
parties to the war. The Czar declared that Austria mu~t regain all 
her possessions; Prussia acquire her independenoo; Gerrrany be freed 
with new arrangements for govermnent, or preferably united as before 
under Austrian dominion. Lebzeltern asked if these were the Russian 
terms; if he could transmit them to his court. .Alexander demurred 
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at that. 
"I have a very sir!J'le plan to offer you," he si:-id to Lebzelt ern. 
The "si~le plan" was merely a scheme to corrpromise Austria. She 
was to resume her old frontiers, with the declfl.xa.tion that she 
rrerely took possession of what belonged to her; to announce that 
she was not making war on France, but confronting the powers that 
wished to attack that country. Then a general congress should be 
proposed. If England brought exaggerated pretensions there "we shall 
B2 
act in concert - the interests of the continent above everything .n 
The baldness of this scheme must have arrro.sed Metternich. On March 
23, he sent off an instruction which was intended to give the Czar, 
through the medium of the Austrian envoy, an impression that 
Metternich was now sylll?a.thetic with the Allied cause. 
He even allowed. himself to suggest a proclamation which might 
be issued by the coalition~ It is interesting to note that many of 
the phrases were to· be included in the Allied declaration to France, 
drawn up by Metternich nfne months later. "Let the Allies announce 
!;enerally," he wrote, "that they make war neither on France nor 
on Germany, but on Napoleon outside of France; that the object 
of their efforts is the reestablishment of a state of equilibrium 
between the great powers, ••• , that the powers of the second and 
third rank ought not to lose any actual strength, but that it is 
desired that they en~joy all the rights of sovereignty with the 
greatest independence; this language will co~letely reassure the 
southern courts and have more effect than all the negotiations 
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possible .11 
Metternich's scheme for the complete independence of the 
Geruan states was very different from the.t of Alexander. On March 
29, Alexander assured Lebzeltern again, that Austria was invited 
to enter her old territories and assurre her ancient proponderance 
over the states of Germany. The settlement of north Germany was to 
be regulated by the Allies, but Austria would be given carte blanche 
~· 
for south Germany.· 
On March 29, as a result of Metternich's quasi-understanding 
with Alexander, Lebzeltern and Nesselrode signed a convention to 
12nd the truce of January 30, in orcler that Aus tria.n troops might 
retire in the face of superior forces, to Bohemia. There, as else-
where in the Empire, new levies were being raised in preparation fbr 
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a stronger Austrian position. 
The day be~ore the termination of the Russian truce, new 
instructions were sent. forward to Prince Schwarzenberg, who was non 
returning to his post as ambe.ssador to France. Metternich was still 
urging on N~poleon acceptance of offers to negotiate a peace. In 
the instructions of March 28, he followed his usual line of argument, 
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.By peace, Austria meant "a. ;just equilibrium between the gT"eat powe~sn, 
and "the independence and well being of those of the second and tbi rd 
rank." She did not intend in the expression Hf!quilibrium"-a return 
to the old order, for "that would be wasteing precious means of 
establishing an order conforma.ble to the needs of the times·" The 
return of Prussia to her old independence was considered indispensable. 
The most important pe.ssage in the despatch of March 28, is 
that \vhich mentions Spain and the Ottoman Empire. The latter, 
Metternich says, has not been considered in the peace because its 
existence is demanded by the need of all states. Spa,in, has been 
omitted, because it has become an Anglo-Franch problem, entirely. 
This staterrent throws a strong light on Metternich's predominant 
characteristic - practicability. He was eager for a marittt:me peace 
and had been urging it since 1810. He had considered it necessary 
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for a stable equilibrium. in Eu.rope, since 1801. But there seemed 
little chance for such a peace now. T'noUgh England had not yet sent 
formal refusal of the present offers, the Austrian minister was 
expecting it, very shortly. If he could not arrange a general peace 
now, he would at least press for a continental settlenenti 
Appa.rantly Napoleon, at that time, re?-lly desired peace with England. 
Perhaps that desire was his major motive in countenancing the 
Austrian "entremise 11 • Perhaps he was trying to bind Austria closer 
to him, by demonstrating the corrplete hostility of England towe.rd 
peace. 
On April 9, Schwa.rzenberg had an audience with Napoleon. He 
repeated the ideas on a stable peace which had been ret forth in 
his instructions. To Napol~on's repeated doubts as to England's 
desire for peace, Schwarzenberg reiterated the Austrian belief in 
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:Sri ti sh ·willingness to agree upon reasonable bases. Napoleon 
thereupon took some pains to show the Austrian general the extent 
of his military preps.rations. He had not yet given up hopes of 
Austrian aid. On April.S, 9, Schwarzenberg talked also with the 
Dulce of Bassano (Maret), minister of foreign relations. Maret 
pressed the ambassador for news of England's reception.of the good 
offices. Schwarzenberg answered that he had not been informed as 
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yet of the definite stand which the British government would talre. 
The English refusal of the good· offices now brought matters to 
ahead. When Wessenberg arrived in London, a.t, the end of March, 
he found popular feeling strong against peace - stronger even than 
the sentiment of the government itself. Castlereagh declared that 
the Prince Regent had no desire to even entertain proposals., and 
seemed very anxious lest Wessenberg•s mission bring disrepute to the 
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ministry. The English intention not to accept the offers was 
strengthened by the news from the continent during the month of 
Feb~y. The report of the French minister of foreign affairs in 
January, had prejudiced the negotiation before Wessenberg had 
begun his journey. But armed with }Tapoleon•s a.uthority to deny 
any official declaration in the published report, he had left Vienna 
. 60 . 
on February B. Then Mapoleon compromised his chances once more, 
On Februa.ry 14, the new Concordat with the Pppe was sent to the 
Legislative Assembly. The in~erial message transmitting it contained 
some remarks on the Spanish war, which indicated small desire or 
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expectation of peace in the mind of the Emperor • 
. On the pretext of that message, castlereagh rejected the 
Austrian proposal that England might arrange peace by ceding certain 
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colonial conquests. He felt that the Vienna court could no longer 
offer its "entremise" without compromising itself, since _the grounds 
on which it was based no longer existed. He wrote Metternich on 
April 9, that peace was not possible at that time, and concluded 
by inviting Austria to join the Allies in forcing Napoleon to his 62 
knees. 
CHAPTER -IV • 
AUSTRIA - ARMEi.1) MEDIATOR OF THE CONTINENT 
Sinul ta.neously with the failure of en tremi se efforts at 
London and Paris on April 9, events elsewhere forced Metternich 
to assume a new attitude. Narbonne the new French arribassador at 
Vienna, was denanding in the name of his government that Austria 
enter the war as Upartie principale" if Great Britain did not 
entertain proposals for negotiation. Metternich, adroitly enough, 
declared on April 11 that this dema.nded a position beyond that of 
an auxiliary in a defensive a.llie.nce. If the refusal of offers was 
to force Austria into an aggressive war, then she r~st mediate peace 
as an armed power. The decision to take this stand at so early a 
date, may have be en influenced by the increasing popular hostility 
l 
agciJ.nst Metternich in Vienna. 
On the sane day, the Austrian minister wrote to Lebzeltern, 
whom he had ordered to ternunate the armistice, asking why his 
2 
instructions had not been carried into effect. He had not yet 
learned of the convention agreed to on March 29. Napoleon, still 
counting on Austrian help, rre,de a last bid for ·support from his 
fa.ther-in-law. On .A:pril 13, news reached the Austrian capitol that 
Mtlpoleon, before leaving for the war, was conferring the Regency up on 
the Empress Marie-Louise .. 11 If this was done to flEttter Austria," 
wrote Gentz to Carad,ja, "it can be sa.id that it has co~letely failed. 
3 
But it is true that it has presented embarrassments." In all 
probability, the "embarrassments" were those arising from the 
suspicions with which the Allies looked upon this action. English 
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uiplorn8ts thought it a piece of cajolery, calculated to make the 
Austrian Emperor amenable to a closer alliance. From Russian head-
quarters Lebzeltern reported suspicions on the part of the Czar, 
and a continued unwillingness to place himself, as it were, in 
4 
Austrian hands. 
News of the termination of the Russian truce, by the convent ion 
5 
of March 29, reached Metternich on April 16. Austria moved very 
swiftly to the new position. On April 20, 21, 23, Narbonne in 
conversations with Metternich and the EU!Peror Francis was given 
official notice that the circumstances of the impending war nullified 
6 
the alliance arrangement of March, 1912. On the day of the first 
interview, a treaty was signed with the King of Saxony, by which that 
sovereign, in return for a guarantee of bis kingdom, promised to . 1 
support Austria's armed mediation. 
Metternich did not at once announce to the Allies the 
assumption of the new position. A:ppanently this was to be done tmrough 
a special envoy, Qount Stadion, whose prospective sending was made 
8 
known in a letter to Chancellor Hardenberg, April 16. 
Although Napoleon had departed for headquarters shortly afta .. 
theraudience with Schwarzenberg, and before news of the developments 
at Vienna had arrived, ea.rlier reports of Narbonne had left him with 
considerable doubt as to the good faith of his father-in-law. Also, 
when he. joined his troops i~ Germany, he heard rumors of suspicious 
dealings with Saxony, Bavaria, and other minor states. He sent off 
orders to General Clarke in Italy to bring his troops in to line. 
"I do not suspect her disposition," he said of Austria, "nevertheless 
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my intention is to be prudent and not to depend on her.n 
At M~yence and Erfurt, the French Emperor reviewed the new 
~ecruits, called up to replace losses of the disastrous campaign in 
Russia. In the last days of April, camp was broken, and the new 
army moved in the direction of Leipzig. The Allies, to Napoleon• s 
surprise, moved forward at the same time. Ney•s troops, mostly new 
recruits, were attacked at Liitzen on the morning of rt.ay 2. After 
fighting all day, the Allies were forced to retire. Thus hostilities 
10 
opened with a victory for Napoleon. 
Austria's armed mediation was confined to the continent by the 
English refusal. ·However, on the continent, Metternich had yet to 
obtain the recognition of the new position. Definite terms of peace 
nms t be ccn veyed from J.us tria to the belligerent parties - terms 
which the mediator would be willing to forcibly defend. 
On May 7, becfore the news of Liitzen had reached Vienna, stadion 
was despatched to Russian headquarters to arrange definite mediation 
bases. Metternich thus restated the Austrian principle. France~has 
conquered the continent. England has conquered the sea and with it, 
French possessions abroad. France mu.st give up conqu.ests on the 
continent. England ought to place just co~1:msa.tions in the balance 
of peace. Austria does not intend a return to the old order, but is 
convinced tha.t "a veritable state of repose cannot exist without a 
general a.nd maritime peace." If Prussia'·and Russia, knowing England's 
attitude, saw little chance for such an a.rrangement, Stadion was to 
say that Austria thought a general peace might be brought about through 
a prior continental peace. The Austria11 envoy was to declare that 
the actions of his country were not dependent 'll:Pon the events of the 
war, and that there was no desire to delay military action if it was 
ne ce s sa.ry • 
Metternich outlined three sets of terms - an ideal peace, the 
48 
Austrian minimum, his idea of -the Allied minimum. As a maximum 
or ideal continental peace, he listed: the reestablishment of Poland 
as before the peace of Vienna (1809); reestablishment of Prussia in 
her former possessions in northern Gerrra.ny; restitution by France 
of all German territory beyond the Rhine; dissolution of the 
Confederation of the Rhine; Holland made independent of ]Ta.nee. 
In Italy he recomnended the restitution_ of a.11 French province_s; 
reestablishment of the Pope in his former possessions; independence of 
the Kingdom of Italy. For Austria a frontier in Italy as before the 
·~1reaty of Luveville; restitution of the Tyrol, the Inni"tertel and 
the Dalmation provinces. 
These terms were, how~ver, only Austria's secret ideal. Her 
real pr.etensions, that is to say, the bases on which she was willing to 
fight for a peace, were more modest. For herself she demanded only 
the recovery of Dalmatia, the dissolution of tbe Duchy of warsaw and 
a new frontier s.gainst Bavaria. Outside of Austria she considered 
as necessary: the return of southern Prussia to King :Frederick 
Willia.~; renunciation by France of. German provinces beyon4 the 
Rhine, with at least a partial dissolution of the Confederation of the 
Rhine, or a modification of the organization. rt may be seen that 
11 
Metternich was willing to se.crifice much for peace. 
On May 11, Count :Bubna was sent to Napoleon with essentially 
the same instructions. Metternich had shown stadion•s instructions 
to Count Narbonne, the French ambassador, in order to prove that 
the armed mediation wa.s not favoring either party. In the J3ubna 
instructions, emphasis was placed on an independent Germany, and the 
dissolution of the Duchy of Warsa.w. Austria considered these conditions 
mo st irr;>ortant. 
An indepen~ent Germany was necessaxy to her idea of 
intermediary powers in the balance between France and Russia. A 
breaking up of the Duchy of Warsav1 would prevent Alexander's in:fyrigu.es 
for get ting .hold of tlw .. t territory. Prague was suggested as the place 
for a negotiation on these bases. Bubna was authorized ·ta notify 
12 
Stadion at Russian headqu.!1rters, if Napoleon asked for a.n armistice. 
Stadion wa.s greeted cordially, on his a.rri val at Allied 
headquarters. Alexander had been urging Austria to declare her terms, 
since his first conversation with Lebzeltern. Furthermore, Stadion 
in his piHi tics had always been strongly anti-French. His appointrrent 
to this mission, therefore, augured well for Austrian sentirmnts •. 
The terms with which Nesselrode met the Austrian demand for 
a statement of war aims, were given Stadion a.t W'firschen on May 16. 
They were beyond the minimum of Stadion 1 s secret instructions. Russia, 
in addition, insisted on the complete dissolution of the Confederation 
of the Rhine, the freedom of Holland, the exclusion of France from 
Italy, and the restoration of the :Bourbons in Spain. The last was, 
13 
of course, inc~uded in courtesy to England. Stewart, English envoy 
to Prussia, wa.s impatient at the del::w entailed by the Austrian 
negotiation, and spoke derisd.vely of nstadion with the gout," trying 
to make peace at such a moment. Cathcart expected Austria to come .. 14 
in to the war on the Allied side, within a. short time. 
On the day of the Wurschen meeting, J3ubne. arrived in Dresden. 
On Nay 8, Napoleon ha.d brought the King of Saxony back into the ranks 
of French allies, by marching into his capitol. Senfft, saxon 
minister, was informed by N~tpoleon, that Metternich ha.d declared that 
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Austria had no ·alliance with Saxony. Therefore, the King may have 
revealed to Bonaparte the course of Austrian negotiations. From 
Narbonne at Vienna, ca.rre complaints that Cariati, Murat's aide-de-
camp, was in Vienna consorting with French enemies, and with Austria. 
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Napoleon sent off a note to Naples, demanding the recell of Caria.ti. 
Bubna• s reception at Dresden was exceedingly storIIzy". Bonaparte 
boasted that he would not aid a single village which had been 
constitutionally united with France. What compensation, he demanded, 
did Austria offer for Illysia? Nothing. Russia had fought him, and 
had a right to set terms. Austria had no right. "I have bought 
Il lyria with the loss of a million men, u he said, nyou shall not have 
it by force without as great a sacrifice." "The exaltation of your 
na.tio1~ of which you boa.st, will disappear as soon as the E~eror 
dema.nds sacrifices of it •11 A continental peace was out of the question. 
He wru.ld agree only to a general peace \Vhich included arrangement of 
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maritime difficu.l ties. 
For all his temper, BoP..aparte was anxious to gain. tirre. He 
sent ]Ubna back to Vienna on the 17th, with a :proposal for a general 
congress, to which Mapoleon wa.s willing to admit even the Spanish 
insurgents. If England would not enter, he would negotiate a 
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continental peace. France wa.s willing to conclude an armistice. 
~1he Monitar announced the decision to the French public on 
Ma.y 24. A congress at Prague had been proposed by Na:poleon, to which 
even the United States was to be invited. ~nis was a note designed to 
catch the French fancy .. "If England, through that sentiment of 
egoism on which her politics is founded, refuses to cooperate in making 
the pea.ce of the world, because she wishes to exclude from the universe 
that element which make'S up three quarters of the globe ••. " the Emperor 
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will make a continental peace. 
Uapoleon seems to have had several motives in making this 
move. First, he wished to play the part of a peace-maker before the 
nation; second, to keep Austria out of the war until he could make 
a separate arrangement with Austria. He had long been contemplating 
this move. At the very time of J3ubna• s audience in Dre.sden, Ce:µlain-
court was belng sent to Russian headquarters. He was to offer Poland 
to the .Czar; the Duchy of Warsaw and Republic of Dauzig to Prussia; 
and to ask for Prussia's cession of the territory west of the Oder -
J3randenberg to.go to the King of Westphalia, the Silesian portion to 
Saxony. 
"Say to the czar , 11 said Napoleon, "that my intention moreover 
N is to make a PO$t d•or .to deliver him from the intrigues of Metternich. 
"' 
If I have sacrifices to make, I prefer that they be to the profit of 
the Emperor Alexander who rrake s fair war against me, and of the King 
of Prussia in whom Russia in interested, than to the profit of Austria 
who has betrayed the alliance, and who, under the title of mediator 
assumes the right to dispose of everything, after having played the 
20 
pa.rt that suited her .. n 
On the day after J3ubna•s interview; Napoleon sent a new 
instruction to ca'Ulaincourt, advising him of the proposal for a 
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Congress, and giving powers to negotiate a truce. · When that 
despatch arrived, hostilities had recommenced. Caulsi,rrcourt 
had no opportuhi ty to offer either a separa.te peace or a truce. The 
Czar refused to grant a.n audience, and the French envoy was informed 
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that Russia had accepted Austrian media.tion. 
Bubna returned to Vienna on May 22, and was sent back to 
French headquarters on the -next da.y with new instructions. 
Metternich had his own reasons for not wishing a general congress 
where France ndght arrange with Russia to leave Austria in the cold. 
He had been guarding against such a chance, from the time when 
Napoleon sent General L~_url_ston to Russian headquarters in October, 
1S12. Therefore he declared through Bubna, that a general congress 
was altogether i~ractical, that a negotiation should be held to 
establish the broad bases of peace, and a general congress assembled 
later to arrange the details. The Austrian envoy was furnished with 
three sets of instructions, one to be used in the event of Napoleon's 
having won a battle; one in case no new developments had occured; 
one, if Napoleon had been defeated. This gives the idea that 
Metternich was willing to advance beyond or retire from his original 
bases, but the instructions themselves were very sirrdlar in contents. 
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The difference was one of' eiq>hasis and attitude, rather than of terms. 
Bubna, returning from Vienna., found N~oleon in the field. France 
had defeated the Allies at Bautzen on May 21-22, but only with great 
losses in the ranks, as well as among the officers of her Army. 
Napoleon had won two battles within the month, but both ha.d cost him 
dearly. He was anxious to gain time for the assembling of new forces, 
and so pressed on the negotiation of an armistice. The French Emperor 
now vdshed to avoid seeing Bubna who might denand an answer to the 
Austrian tern~. Refusal would throw Austria into the war, and so 
thwart the efforts to gain t;ime. "Tell :Bubna," he wrote to Maret 
on June 1, "that I sent overtures for an armistice in order to give 
the enemy an impression of weakness." The Austrian general•s 
apprehension lest his instlilctions fall into Allied hands gave 
53 
Napoleon the idea that he was authorized to offer lower terms than 
he we.s then presenting. "See if he hasn't other proposition:" he 
ordered Maret. If nothing was to be drawn from him, the French 
minister was to argue generalities on a n:aritime peace with England. 
"Try to penetrate all his instructions. I count on avoiding seeing 
them. If the armistice is not concluded, the circurustances of war 
wi l~ sufficiently justify that ; if it is not, I wi 11 send you back 
to Dresden, where I shall be reputed to be coming, but where I shall 
24 
not go .n 
Metternich, at Vienna, was now moved to take more decisive 
action. His decision was moti va .. ted by uneasiness over the caulain-
court mission to Alexander, and the receipt of news from the battle 
of Bautzen. The first led him to desire a clearer understanding 
with Russia, and the second confirmed his belief that Austria must 
gain time in which to bring her troops into line on the ::frontier. 
The Russian retire~nt towards Silesia would leave Austria open to 
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inroads from both sides 011 the out''greak of further hostilities. 
On June l, at five o'clock in the norning, the Emperor 
Francis and Count Metternich departed for Gi tschin half way between 
Dresden and the Allied headquarters. Metternich had sent off 
despatches to Dresden, urging acceptance of .Austrie.n mediation, and 
to Silesia announcing that the Emperor Fra.ncis was departing for 
the army. On June 2, the Austrl.an party met Nesselrode on his way 
to Vienna. T'ne Czar had despatched, him on May 30, because of Stadion•s 
la.ck of instructions to accept the W11rschen bases. The Russian 
minister now returned to inform the Czar of Austria's willingness to 
discuss terms. The Empe~or Francis proceeded to Gitschin, where he 
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arrived on the third. 
Meanwhile -the negotiations for a truce had been going on 
since the battle of Bautzen. Napoleon issued an ultimatum, drawing 
the line of derr.e.rcation at the Elbe. Russia and Prussia found this 
accepta1::il.e but were in doubt as to the date for ending the armistice. 
July 26 had been suggested. The Allies in conference at Reichenbach 
hesitated between consider.e.tion for .Austria's military condition end 
disinclination to give Napoleon so much time for new preparations. 
Stadion was asked to give his opinion, but the Austrian representative 
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would. not conmi t himself. Metternich was not ready for wrar. As 
Pentz wrote on June 5, it was still a question as to whether war or 
peace would best serve the Austrian ends - the reestablishment of a 
28 
stable balance in Eu.rppe. 
The Prussian general, Knesebeck, was incensed at Stadion•s 
tone, and stigrratised Austria as being intimidated by Na~oleon, as 
preferring negotiations to war. Stad.:i.on did not deny the latter 
accusation. He declared that his master had little confidence in a 
resort to arms; that most certainly Austria would be anxious to gain 
"by negotiation and without drawing the sword the most essention 
conditions for the repose of Europe - conditions which were the very 
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object of the war .n The Allies fqr the time being were forced to be 
content with this expression. Ot?. ~une 4, the armistice was signed at 
Pleswitz. No reference was rrade of the Eritish ambassadors or the 
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Spanish w:ar. Stewart wrote to Castlereagh tha.t England must keep 
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a sharp lookout, since the ref\1.sal of Austrian mediation offers. 
From June 3-19, Metternich was busy in Gitschin and Opocno 
negotiatitjg the bases on_which Russia and Prussia would accept the 
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Austrian mediation. He wislied to reduce them to a minimum in order 
to gi-re Napoleon no public excuse for rejection; and also to test his 
sincerity for peace. For Austria, there was danger that Napoleon 
aimed only at dissolving the alliance against him. He would be free 
32 
then, to .turn on his fa:ther-in-la:w. 
The Austrian four minima for a continental peace were: the 
dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw; the :enlargement. of Prussia by 
restoration of Danzig; the reversion of Illyrian provinces; the 
independence of the Hausestic towns. These four points, Austria would 
back with force. She regarded a.s advisable two others; the dissolution 
of the Confederation of the Bhine, and the restoration of Prussia as 
33 
in 1806. l'J'ei ther of these was rega.rded as ind:i:spenss:ble conditions .. 
Both Alexander and. King Frederick William, hesitated to 
desert English aims, by agreeing to these minima. They urged the 
mediation of a. general· peace. Metternich now realized tha.t Austria. 
alone, was sincere in the matter of arpacification. He wrote to 
Stadion in that sen~e. Napoleon, he said, wishes to caJLl a general 
congreS>.s for five weeks (the dib.ration of the armistice). Russia and 
Prussia talk of negotiating a general peace in five weeks. The motives 
for both positions are easily discernible. Napoleon wishes to gain 
time, as well as to vindicate himself in the eyes of his people by 
showing that the Allied denands are immoderate. Russia and Prussia 
~ 
have no desire for peace. 
True, the northern powers were cent on war, but ihey were also 
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convinced of the necessity of having Austria with them. Believing 
that Napoleon would never submit to such terms himself, Russia and 
36 
Prussia agreed to the Austrian minima on June 14. Alexander, 
thinking of his English subsidu agreement, st~pulated that only a 
preliminary axrangement would be rw..de on the bases of the four points; 
to be followed by a general pacification, not to be carried out 
37 
without British cooperatfon and assent. His decision to accede to 
the Austrian four points was in all :probability influenced by 
knowledge of Metternich's willingness .to sign an "eventue.111 concert.. 
This treaty, based on the Austrian four points, was to become the 
stepPing-stone to an alliance, if Napoleon refused to accept the 
same tenns. 
For Stadion had been given full powers to sign such an 
ag:Jfeement, on June 11. In the instructions, however, Metternich 
declared thet the treaty mu.st remain secret, even from the allies of 
Russia and Prussia. He was preparing e.s always, for the future. If 
a continental peace should be arranged, he said, English ministers 
would be forced to bring pefore Parliament the historyyof the 
diplomatic relations on the continent. The publication of this 
treaty wou.ld. pre,judice .Austria's chance of mediating a general and 
38 
maritime peace. The .Austrien minister had not forgotten all that 
he he~ learned of the British government in his English ~ourney of 
1795· Every parliament, besides, demonstrated the public character 
of all BrHish governmental actions. All Europe was influenced by the 
pressure of public opinion which this method aroused. ·Napoleon's 
publications had much the. same effect. 
The position of Russia and Prussia was not extremely 
"peculiar," as Gentz put it, for while accepting the Austrian four 
points they had signed subsidy treaties with England on the basis of 
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an active continuation of the war. They were pressed to this by 
pecunhtry distress, "and the secret desires of the cabinets to 
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reserve a pretext for escaping a peace which they fear·.u 
The Allied explanation of th.is negotiation to the British 
ambassadors was not received with the best grace. Stewart complained 
that .the two allies had lost sight of Spain and Holland. He found 
the distinction between a "preliminary peace" a11..d a ngenere,l peace" 
extrenely "curious";. Nor did he care for the play whereby "negotiators" 
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and not "plenipotentiaries" would be ·sent to discuss a peace. Had 
he known that Prussia and Russia were negotiating a treaty with 
Austria based on the four points, his language might have been 
stronger. 
There is reason t6 believe that the two powers soon began to 
have misgivings re~rding the step they had talren. Sometime before 
June 21, Hardenberg at Gitschin learned that the propositions agreed 
to, had not yet been communicated to Napoleon. He then asked 
1,!etternich to o:pen the Wiirschen terms of May 16, instead. The 
Austrian minister declined, w~th t~e ·st~te:roont that Napoleon was 
waiting for just such terms in order to publish them as proof to the 
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nation ·that war nru.st be continued. 
In the rrddst of all this maneuvering, the Emperor Francis had 
held aloof, at Gi ts chin, balf way between Dresden ana_ the Allied 
headquarters. He refused to meet either Napoleon or the monarchs 
of Russia and Prussia. Meanwhile, at .Dresden, the French Emperor 
was far from content with Metternich's diplomacy. He suspected his 
dealings with the Allies. As a safeguard, and counter-check, he now 
definitely took a position wbich he had often approached in 
conversations with Bubna and Schwarzenberg. He required binding 
evidence of Austrian good faith. If, as Metternich had insi.sted, the 
alliance of March 14, ~812 was still unbroken, then new secret 
provisions must be negotiated. 
Maret wrote to Metternich. on June 15, that France would not 
accept the mediation of Austria, until the a1liance question had been 
42 . 
satisfactorily concluded. News continued to reach French head-
quarters of Stadion•s extended mission at Allied headquarters. 
Metternich was known to have journeyed to Opocno, June 16-20, for a 
conference with Alexander. Bubna1s la.ck of powers to negotiate new 
articles of alliance with Napoleon, gave an excellent excuse for 
summoning the Austrian mfnister. As a result, when lletternich 
returned to Gitschin, June 20, he .found an invitation to come in 
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person to Dresden. He informed the Allied Cabinets of his intention 
to accept, and left for Dresden, where arrived on June 25. 
The next day he was closeted with liJ'apoleon for eight hours, 
an interview which has become celebrated both for its results and 
for the complete uncertainty which still exists, as to the actual 
substance of the discussion. Writing in 1829, Metternich reproduced 
an exciting dialogue in~·,·which lfapoleon exposed his true feelings with 
unbridled temper a.nd recklessness. He, himself, rerralned as always, 
ca1m, moderate, reposeq ,but very mu.ch impressed with the improtance 
of the occasion, and his own significance in it. 
"I felt myself, at this crisis, the repr~sentative of all 
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Eu.ropee.11 society. .If I n13.y say so, Napoleon seemed SID9.ll to rr.e .n 
Such are his words. 
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It' is of tto matter here, to ponder over the possibility 
of after-thought and the influence of later events, upon Metternich's 
conception in 1829, of his feelings in 1813. In his own report to 
Emperor Francis, made ,just after the event, however, Napoleon is 
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represented as having been altogether rabid in his declarations. 
Even Napoleon, reporting his own indiscretion to Maret, ad.mi tted 
saying to Metternich, "How nm.ch has England given you?" with other 
references to the:mgotiations then going on at Reichenbach.. Metternich 
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always denied that this entered the conversat'ion. 
However that rnay be, one thing is certain.. Mapoleon tried 
to pin Austria to the retention of an armed neutrality. Metternich 
answered thax Austria did not offer neutrality, she offered lll:ldiation. 
That question having been settled, Bonaparte wa.s left to accept or 
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reject. Then on June 29 Metternich modiified· this extreme a.tti tude 
by reno1mcing a.ny Austrian pretensions to being the sole intermediary 
of propositions ma.de by one side or the o.ther. He felt that a 
continental peace was alone possible "pour le moment,n but assured 
the French government that a new overture was being made a.t Londo·n. 
He expressed even a willingness to arrange the alliane~ in the light 
. t~g 
of new circumstances. When, however, Y.a.ret made known to 
Metternich his reception of full powers to negotiate a convention 
accepting the Austrian mediation; the latter suggested by note that 
"the stipulati6ns of the said Treaty (of Alliance) 'IVhich effect the 
impartiality of the Media.tor, shall be suspended du.ring the entire 
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course of the negotiations .n l~apoleon was extremely provoked a.t this 
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communica.tjon, but negotiations proceeded. 
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It does not belong to this study, to enter into the . , 
historical controversy over the various responsibilities in the 
signing of the convention of Dresden. Who was it that first a·sked 
for an extension of the armistice? Such a question has little import 
here. Both Napoleon a-nd MetterniclJ. were anxious to obtain such an 
extension. It was agreed tha.t August 10 should be the date of 
terntlnation, with six days leeway before the resumption of hostilities. 
Who drew up the convention? That too, is beside the point. Whoever 
may have been responsible for the final draft; whether Metternich 
as he claims in his memoir, or Maret as some hj. storians contend; 
it is clear that: first, the French minister presented a plan for 
51 
a congress to settle a general peace. To this congress, were to 
be invited England, the United States, Spain, Portugal, and all the 
belligerent powers. But the refusal of England to accept the 
Austrian mediation made that project impossible. Therefore 
eventually, two conventi6ns were proposed, cne for-a continental 
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peace, one for a general peace. The continental convention was 
agreed upon and signed. The convention for a general or naritime 
peace seems to have disappeared into the void. Ernouf says that 
after Maret had communicated it to Metternich, he heard nothing more 
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f?tYom it, despite nrepeated solicitations. n 
AusP~ia had now been recognized by both parties, as armed 
mediator of a pontinental peace. In order to gain this reQognition. 
from Prussia and Russia, she had been forced to accede to some 
preliminary or "eventual" arrangements. At Reichenbach, on June 27, 
Austria engaged herself to declare war against France if that 
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country had not accepted the Austrian four points by July 20, the 
~ 
date -oh which the armistice was to be terminated. From June 30 
to July 12, Austria was represented at the military conferences at 
Trachenberg, where the protocol.was arranged which would assure her 
efficient participation in the general campaign in case she entered 
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the war. England was deliberately not invited to these conferences. 
Was Metternich now ready to go to war against France? The 
Allies were far from confident, despite the definite course which 
the Austrian minister's policy had taken. It nnst be remembered that he 
nm.st carry with him not only the Emperor Francis but all the 
influences which surrounded that monarch. On June 16, Stewart had 
written home that Metternich was finding it necessary to "wind up" 
the Emperor, at short intervals. The rninister•s stand, he said 
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seemed to be valiant enough. 
On July 3, arrived the news of Wellingtonts victory of Vittoria. 
This evidence of allied success doubtless had some effect on 
Metternich•s determination, but not as much as Jackson and· ste\vart 
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thought. Czartoriski expressed to Jackson a belief that Austria 
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would never declare wa.r agaim t France. In England, the general 
expectation was the,t Metternich's r.ise to po11ver in Austria meant that 
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no war would be undert!aken. 
On July 12, the Austrian minister requested from Emperor 
Francis definite instructions for Prague. The negotiation, he wrote, 
may have three distinct outcorres. Peace or preliminaries to peace may 
be accepted. France ffi9,y refuse terms thus forcing Austria to make.· 
herself a party with the Allies. France may accept preliminaries 
and the Allies reject. From the third result Austria takes a fresh 
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position free from all ties... No questicil a-ises on the first 
possibility. In the second, Austria has already justified action 
by making the terms low. There is a possibility that the cession of 
Illyria might be excluded 1 as a sine qua non. The Allies cannot 
force the Empire to .take Illyria if it does not wish. But care 
must be taken not to overstep the limit of eventually securing 
Illyria by the maritime peace. In the event of the third result, a 
decision must be rrade according to the circumstances of the moment. 
If the chances of the Allies appeared lower on August 10, than a.t 
present, then certainly Austria nm.st join the Allies. Otherwise 1 
ar100d neutrality nro.st be assumed, a position essentially degrading 
to the nation. 
Metternich summed up his report with the question: "Can I 
rely on the firmness of your 1w.jesty, in case of Napoleon not 
accepting Austria's preliminaries of Peace; is your Majesty 
unalterably determined, in this case, to entrust the right cause 
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to the arms of Austria, and the whole of united Europe?" 
The ~eror• s reply was by no means as strong as Metternich 
desired. Peace is the object, said Francis. Wa.r devastates the 
dependencies of the Imperial Crown. Do everything to nake peace 
possible. Hold Russia and Prussia to the minimum on which they 
agreed. If the restoration of Illyria stands in the way of 
Napoleon's acceptance, give it up. The question ofwar will be 
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decided when it arises. 
The negotiations could not begin. however, until a very serious 
difficulty had been removed. When Metternich agreed at Dresden on 
June ?JO that a Congress should assemble at Prague, he pledged Russia 
and Prussia to a step far in advance of their intent':!.ons. The 
I, 
plan agreed to by them in Opocno and Gitschin had.involved the 
sending of representatives to the latter city. These "negotiators" 
~the word sneered at by Sir Charles Stewart) were to accredited only 
the the Em.P.eror of Austria, in order to -avoid any appearance of a 
"Congress." Metternich, ho\vever, had not only arranged· to a "congress", 
but had agreed to prolong the armistice. It nay well be imsgined 
that the announcement of this ass~tion of responsibility was rret 
with vehement protest. The Austrian minister was upbraided for 
committing a breach of the treaty of Reichenbach. Not until July 
26, at Neumarkt~; did the sovereigns accept the extension of the 
armistice and only after repeated assurances from Metternich tha.t 
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Austria would go to war if Napoleon refused the terms. 
The"negotiatorsn now assembled at Prague, and the "congress" 
opened. But there was no Congress. All but the last few days were 
filled by a controversy in wriUng over the form of negotiations .. 
Metternich was virtually committed to a form before the matter had 
been broached at Prague. His agreement with Russia and Prussia at 
Opocno, as well as the Austrian position generally, demanded that 
\ 
the bases not be proposed in a congress but through the roodiator. The 
Teschen Congress (1779) was pointed out ·as a precedent for the . 64 . 
adoptio11 of that manner of negotiating. 
Russia and Prussia stood for this way beccu se it did not 
com.nit them so thoroughly to a peace, while it was calculated to bring 
Austria to war by compromising her neutra1i ty. Metternich, himself, 
insisted on it, inorder to retain his control of af<~airs. He was 
on guard to ,pre~ient the signing of any separate treaties behind his 
ba.ck. France did not want the proposed form for reasons exactly 
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opposed to those of b~tternich. 
Meanwhile, a growin~ sentiment for war began to spread through 
officia~ circles in Vienna. In the middle of July, Francis had net 
Alexander in Bohemia, very secretly, and talked or er the possibility 
of war. ~1he Russian Emne:r or seems to have been satisfied with the 
... 65 
results of his interview. On. July 27, Count Hardenberg wrote 
Munster that the Austrian tone had strengthened considerably. 
Metternich declared that war would open on August 10, without any· 
quibbles if Napoleon refused to be rea.sonable. The ~eror Francis 
placed less en;>hasis on pleadings for peace, and watched interestedly 
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the completion of Austrian armaments. The new enthusiasm spread 
itself throughout the Empire. Hunge.ry-, increased by a third, her 
regiments of Hussars. This was done voluntarily, without the Diet's 
having been convened. In the la.st days of July, Metternich entrusted 
the advance preparation of a war ms.nifesto to Gentz, who had become 
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one of his secretaries. 
The Austrian ministe·r continued to warn Caulaincourt, tr1at with 
the ending of the armistice on Au.gust 10, chances of ~ace would vanish. 
Napoleon replied through his representatives on August 5 that no 
termination ~f the negotiations had been set at Dresden, that the 
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agreement had been to prolong them until peace was rrade. He accused 
Austria of being partial, of having presented herself as "arbitrator" 
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tnstead of "conciliator" • 
Nevertheless, the firm attitude now being taken by Austria 
must have convinced Napoleon of tha.t powE?r' s determination to perfonn 
what she promised. On the heels of the uncorr~romising despatches 
of A~uu.st 5, Caulaingourt came to Metternich to make a comnnmication 
\•1hich was to be kept seciet even from Narbonne. What did Austria 
mean by peace; and what were ·the conditions on which France agreeing 
to them - she would either ally herself with that power or remain 
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neutral. Napoleon still retained the idea that Austria could be 
bought, if only ,.he bid high enough. Austria coi..iJ.d be bought, but 
only with a stable peace and an assurance of equilibrium. 
Metternich presented the French questions to Francis. Stadion, 
thl9 head of the war party in Austria, had been urging the En~eror 
in his letters, not to restrict himself to the four points~ but to 
seize the opportunity of securing the frontiers, and gaining 
independence ifor Germany. Stadion seems to have exercised consider-
able influence on the Austrian sovereign, and doubtless the advice 
71 
given had some material, effect upon the decision. Perhaps, 
Metternich decided the question. At least on .August 8, Qa;ulaincourt 
was handed an ultimatum of Austrian conditions. They included not 
only the four siva quilis non - dissolution of Duchy of Warsaw, 
restoration of Da:utzig to Prussia and of Illyrian provinces to 
Austria, independence of Hauseatic cities; but the two which 
Metternich had declared advisable but 11ot indaspensable - dissolution 
of the Confederation of the Rhine, a.na_ reconstru.ction of Pru.ssia as 
in 1806 . 
.A loophole vrns provided· in the preamble through which 
Austria might escape from the cm seqtiences of Napoleon• s acceptance 
as against Allied re ,jecti on afterwards~ The Emperor announced these 
bases, "knowing by former confidential. explanations what the courts 
of Russia aJ1d Prussia seemed (paraissent) to regard as conditions of 
a pacific arrangement." Metternich wrote to Ste.dion that the 
ultimatum would not be accepted by Napoleon. He thour-)lt it a good 
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i 
point, that the character of th~ cornunmica.tion forbade publication 
of the terms, since he ha.d insisted that the answer to Caulaincourt•s 
secret proposal be kept equally secret. This stipulation was included 
to prevent publication to the French nation, rather than from fea.r 
of allied knowledge. Metternich informed Austett, tbe Russian envoy, 
and Count Hardenberg, the Prussian representative, of the proceedings, 
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on the day before the ultinatum \~as presented. The promise of 
secrecy, however, did not prevent ~!apoleon from exagge·rating Auspria•s 
terms. He wrote to Jerorr~, and to General Lavary on August 9, that 
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the Emperor Francis derranded Venetia. 
The ultimatium had reached Napoleon that very day. In a 
conversation with Bubna he offered to dissolve the Duc{ty of Warsaw, 
make Dauzig a free state, and give Illyria and Dalmatia without Trieste, 
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to Austria. But he wrote to Jerome that the armistice ~ould 
probably be terminated on the eleventh or twelfth, and that Austria . 76 
would declare war. 
The report of Napoleon's conversation with ]ubna reached Prague 
on the 11th, but the French negotiators bad received their passports; 
and the "Congress" of Prague was dissolved. Austr:i.a declared war at 
77 
midnight on August 10. Public annoncement was iw.de on the 17th. 
This paper was drawn up by Gentz, though probably a reflection of 
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Metternich• s ideas.. It reviewed the whole course of Austrian 
actions: the atternptrto prevent the war between France and. Russia; 
the neutrality of Austria, finally resulting in an alliance with 
France in order to bring her to reason; the long effort for peace; 
Napoleon• s evidence disregard of the necessity of" repose" in Eu.rope; 
and ithe decisi·on· of rthe .Tulperor Francis to enter the· war to fight 
for the guE\rantee of peace under the aegis of an association of 
79 
independent states." 
Metternich hc:1d now ,joined Russia and Prussia in a war against 
France; but wha.t of Austrian relations with England? The l3r1tish 
diplomats received no official announcement of Austrian mediation, 
until Ha.rdenberg transmitted Stadion•s note of May 16, to Sir Charles 
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Stewart on May 18. All the Allies were dissatisfied with the bc~ses 
81 
in this note, but the English representatives openly denounced Austria. 
1rhey always regarded her with suspicion. Castlereogh wrote to 
Metternich on June :P,. to ask him for a point blank declaration of the 
Austrian position. Viessenberg had been sent no instructions for 
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some time. 
Vfnen the English minister received from Cathcart a r~suroe 1 of the 
Russian bases proposed in_ answer to Austria at Wiirschen on May 16, 
he prepered an instruction on the English view of a satisfactory 
peace. This pro,ject, despatched to Cathcart on July 5, emphe.sized 
the British interests·- Spain, Portugal, Sicily, Sweden - as 
sine quibis non, having been pledged by the crown. Inststence 
was pla.ced on the independence of Holland, restora.tion of the 
Hanoverian dominions and the reconstruction of Austria and Prussia,.· 
Restoration of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy was strongly urged. 
rfue question of maritime rights was not to be considered in any peace. 
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England would not accept Russian rrediation in the America.n war. 
It may be readily seen how far below these deuands, were the 
Austrian four points, e.greed to by Russia and Prussia, nearly a 
month before this despatch was written. 
After announcing English conditions, Castlereagh sent off 
instructions on July 13, 14 to accept Austrian mediation for a peace 
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on the bases of the July 5 Clespa.tch. England, he said would cede 
rnari time :possessions in the event that proper bases were arranged 
on the c<hlntinent, but no particular would be made known until such 
bases were assured. Agaitj he ernpha.si;.zed the necessity of 
"peremptorily excluding from general negotiations every maritime 
84 
question." 
The English acceptance of mediation was withheld from 
Metternich's knowledge, on the request of Alexander who believed that 
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war was now inevitable. Fu.rthermore, he wished it to be inevitable, 
and the announcement of British acceptance mi.ght weaken Austria's 
sentiment for war. England had no representative at Prague. 
Jackson was anxious that there should be one during the negotiations; 
11 not with the ljope of being eble to effect a peace, but to prove to 
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the world that peace is not practicable ••.. " Austro-Bri ti sh 
relations during this period were confined to some conversations 
between ca.th ca.rt and General Nugent on subsidies. Metternich 
refused to sign a convention, on the grounds that it would com-
87 
pro1nise Austria's position in the mediation. 
A supposed treaty of Prague on July 27, allusions to which, 
Branchi included in his storia docurrentata della diplomazia ]~ropea 
$8 
in Italia never existed. The letter from Metternich to Castlereogh 
of May 26, 1814, in which references a.re given to this document, is a 
89 
fabrication, as Fournier has adequately proved. 
The Austrian diplomat, giving up hopes of a general peace 
when England refused his offers, put all subsequent efforts into 
obtaining a continental settlement. On Aug. 2, Jackson wrote to 
Stewart that he believed the Allies would accept a "brilliant" 
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continental peace. Stewart, returning to headquarters as the 
negotiations in Prague came to an end, learned of the "eventual" 
convention at Reichenbach, which had been kept secret from Engla.nd. 
He was inuneasurably shocked at the duplicity which would allow such 
a treaty, after the subsidy agreements of June 14. When he learned 
from Hardenberg that Metternich had been responsible for withholding 
lmowledge of the treaty, the English diplomat's distrust of the 
Austrian minister was intensified to a degree col11Prehensible only in 
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the light of Stewart's violent nature. 
The Prague episode was. closed, but Maret wrote to Metternich 
on August 18. Austria's duplicity, he said, ha.d rendered conciliation 
i~ossible. Without h~r, peace between the belligerents would have 
easily_been arranged. France now proposed to open a real Congress 
at some neutralized s~ot, where all powers, great and small, should 
meet together and fran-e the peace of Eu.rope. Negotiations were to 
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have no effect on the fighting, which was to go':on at will. 
Despite the insulting tone of this missive, Metternich 
answered in his usual tone tha.t the proposal had been comnn.micated 
to the other powers; that Austria had now no "ob.,ject of interest" 
93 
except in common with her Allies. The Austrian minister never 
refused an offer to negotiate peace. 
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CF..APTER V. 
AUSIJ."RI.A AS MODERATOR OF THE COALI'I1ION - ~1HE 1m.RCH TO THE F.HIUE 
Austria had now ranged herself definitely on the side of the 
coalition against France. The fundamental difficulties in the way 
of settlement in Europe were by no means effaced by this rmve. France 
must still be saved from oblivion; Russia's arribitions curtailed; 
the rising tide of militarism in Prussia kept within boo.nds; England• s 
maritime suprems.cy reduced to reasonable proportions .. 
The first task was the breaking of French military despotism .. 
Metternich was willing to fight until France would rrnke an adequate 
peace, and no longer. Napoleon must be forced back over the Rhine. 
This was the first objective. On September 9, separate treaties 
were signed by Austria with Russia and Prussia a.t Toepli tz, with the 
express purpose of the reestablishment of a ,just equilibrium of 
Powers. Mutual guarantees were given for the possessions belonging 
to each of the three countries. The Duchy of Warsaw question was to 
1 
be arraDged by friendly aglfeement. No r.rent ion was nade of Spain, 
Italy, Holland, or SWeden, the chief :British interest in a 
continental Scheme. English diplomats found the treaties most 
2 
unsatisfactory. 
:Before the month was over, Napoleon made another effort to 
separate Austria from the Allies. General Fle.haut came under a ;f:].ag 
of truce to the Austrian headquarters, Offerfng·.pe<ace. Metternich 
was not to be enticed into any truce. Evidently Napoleon feiled to 
comprehend the breadth of the Austrian foreign policy. The French 
envoy returned to headquarters with the answer that a partial :peace .. 
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was out of the question; but that ]Tench ouvertures had been 
3 
forwarded to England. 
In September, Aberdeen arrived. Castlereagh had felt the need 
of an English representative at Austrian headquarters, and ea.rly in 
August had drawn up extensive instructions for the envoy. Metternich 
was to be informed that the British desire to confine France to the 
Pyrenees, the Alps and the Bhine, was as strong as ever, but that a 
less exacting peace would be agreed to, if.the struggle grew too 
difficult. England wished to see Austria resume preponderance in 
north Italy as a barrier against France. Venice should· belong to 
Austria. Metternich was to be given cognizance of the Bentirck 
negotiGttions in Italy. }/iurat should find compensation in the center 
of Italy if Naples was given back to the Bourbons. In a separate 
and secret despatch, Aberdeen was given authority to accede to the 
wish of Metternich if Hu.rat ma.de the retention of his throne the 
sine qua non of his cooperation. A convention might be signed ·4 
subtject to ratification •. 
Aberdeen came too late to influence the Anglo-Austrian treaty 
then being negotiated. This agreenent _of October 3 was the. barest 
kind of an alliance, guaranteeing continuation of the war and no 
5 
separate peace. The English diploma.ts, with the exception of 
Aberdeen, continued to be suspicious of Austria's good faith. George 
Jackson wrote in his diary in September that "Some secret influence 
is believed - and not without reason - to be still working in Boney's 
6 
favour in the Austrian :Cabinet." On October 6 after the alliance 
treaty had been signed, he still had it "on undoubted authority, n 
7 
that agents of Marie Louise were near Erq;>eror Francis. Metternich 
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had now taken Aberdeen into his confidence and with all the charm of 
8 
his engaging personality soon enthralled the young man completely. 
But the curtain now went up on the second piece in what Herbert 
Fi sher has called the trilogy of Hapoleon' s fall. The battle of 
Lei-psig !.·:heralded the turning point not only of Napoleon ts campaign 
beyonQ, the frontiers of France, but a crisis in the policies of the 
Austrian cabinet. On the second of the four days which ms.rked the 
progress of' the battle, Napoleon released the Austrian-··General, 
Merveldt ,taken prisoner during the fighting, and sent him to Metternich 
with proposals for pea.ce. England should receive Hanover; Poland, 
Spain, and Holland should be made independent; Italy .. 'united under 
a ruler of its own; the ncr th German coast surrendered; all states 
of the Confederation who voluntarily deserted, rele·ased from French 
9 
control. For this .P~ustria wa.s not ready yet. "Wir. werden am Rheim 
10 
antworten," wrote Metternich to HudeHst. Leipzig forced Napoleon 
to retire. The way to the Rhine lay open. When the news of the 
battle reached Prague on October 21, 22, Te Deuins were sm1g in the 
churches, and Gentz as censor put out "extra" editions of the Prague 
11 
newspapers. 
Napoleon's allies were now deserting him. The ra.ts were 
leaving the ship. On October 8, Bavar~a had sign~d an alliance treaty 
nith Austria at Ried, with the principal objects of dissolving the 
Confederation of the Rhine, and assuring the independence of Bavaria. 
Very liberal, too liberal terms as it proved later, were agreed to 
by Austria on the bo1mdary settlerrent. The Bavarian troops deserted 
13 
Napoleon on Ocbob~r 14. The Saxons ·on the last day of Leipsig. 
12 
Metternich was negotiating Yd th Murat, having learned from Aberdeen of 
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his secret instructions almost at once. Castlereagh had intended 
this ca.pitula.tion as a last resort, but Aberdeen was too naive to 
14 
rest st the seasoned blandishments of the Austrian diplomat. 
Immediately after. the co~leUon of the Anglo Austrfa.n treaty 
at Toepli tz, Metternich returned to Prague. He was there from 
October 4 to 7, parleying with Cariati, troxat•s representative, 
and with Count Bernstorff, envoy of the King of Denmark. After 
Leipzig, Mu.rat obtained leave to go and. look after affairs in his 
15 
kingdom. 
Ca,thcart, English ambassador at Russia.n headquarters, received 
a long despatch from home, on the second day af~er Leipzig. 
Castlereagh was determined to bind the Allies together in a general 
alliance treaty. The ease with which the Coalition powers, deserted 
British aims in June prior to the acceptance of Austrian mediatio~, 
still lingered in his memory. In his instructions to Cathcart (dated 
September 18) he declared that Austria was virtually pledged to 
fight for the Wiirschen bases of May lQ. He wished a general alliance 
treaty with a provision for after peace cooperation e.ga.inst Napoleonic 
ambition.. A secret article should stipulate the bases put forward 
originally by Austrie., plus the Wurschen bases which added Spain 
and Holland, plus the British Treaty ag;Ceemen ts, Sweden, Naples. 
How 1i ttle Castlereogh understood of the continente.l situation may be 
learned f~oni his expectat:i.on that the treaty migpt be ready in time 
16 
for the opening of Parliament in the first weeks of November. But 
he saw the shadow of one diffd.culty- when he ta.llred to Lieven in 
London. He sent off an irmnediate despatch to Cathcart, warning him tha:t' 
17 
mari tiire ri@lts could not be the subject of general peace. 
Cathcart found Alexander quite willing to enter into this alliance 
and assured Castlevagh that Metternich was II free from all jealousy" 
on the· question. "Therefore," he wrote, "I expect great aid from 
him in surmounting all apprehensions of engaging in an offensive 
18 
and· defensive alliance to maintain doubtful questions •••. ·" 
The Austrian minister was busy in his own right. The Topelitz 
agreements had set the goal of operations at the Rhine, and that goal 
19 
had now been reached. At Frankfort, Metternich was determi.ned to 
open peace negotiations. A half dozen reasons stood behind this· 
determination. These reasons may be summed u:p in that many words: 
Alexander' stein' "Prussianism, II ma.ri time rights' stability. The 
relations between Stein and Alexander gave him grounds for uneasiness. 
Stein, it was, who had persuaded Alexander to advance beyond the 
Vistula. Stein it would be, Vlho advocated the march to Pari"s. stein 
had been appointed president of the German Provisory Administrative 
20 
Commission, despite the protest of Metternich. This.comnissinn 
ruled the conquered German territories, under the direct supervision 
of Hardenberg. In this capacity it became the· executive head of 
21 
sa~ony upon which land Prussia already looked with covetous eyes. 
Metternich told Aberdeen in the last days of October, that he would 
22 
never agree to the incorporation of Saxony in Prussia. More than 
that, he had no intention of putting down o~e great militRry power 
with ideas of irrq_:>erializing Eu.rope, in order to set up another to the 
north of him. 
Metternich feared the 'l.1ugenbund with· its strong militaristic 
caste, even more t~an Prussian dynastic ~bi tions. He found nothing 
in a nationalistic spirit bent .seemingly on a "war of extermination," 
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6n the plundering and destru.ct~on of Paris. Such barbarism seerood 
only the old militaristic ferocity of Prussia, ncl'1 spread broadcast 
23 
by propaganda. Stein kept the German princes waiting in his ante-
room for hours and treated them with such hauten.11 and arrogance 
that they were completely alienated. But the thought of a pugnacious 
and fanatic·~·Germa.ny was made more abhorrent to Metternich by the 
evident close attachment between Alexander and the ne\V forces. The 
Russian bogie st ill lurked in the background. England was seeking a 
genera,l alliance treaty with peace bases entirely excluding maritime 
and no stipulc:ttion of England• s intention to give up her colonial 
conquests. One after another of Metternich• s ideas on a new and 
stable organization of Europe were being lost si~t of by the different 
parties to the coalition. The importance of keeping France intact 
and undespoiled Wfl.S never more apparent. 
On October 27, Metternich wrote to Schwarzenberg that Alexander 
had agreed to peace offers. "We are sending St. Aigna.n to the ~eror 
25 
Napoleon with a reply to the ouvertures whl ch he made through Merveldt. 11 
Aberdeen was informed of the decision, but his British colleagues 
were not. Metternich pledged Aberdeen not to tell them. "The excuse," 
says Professor Webster, "was the extreme secrecy of the proceedings; 
but Metternich could not but know that Stewart at least w~ts likely 
26 
to take a very different tone to Aberdeen' s.11 The young Englishmen 
wrote home on October 29, to tell Castlereagh of the irr[:>ending 
comnunication with Bonaparte, to be kept secret in order to give rise 
27 
to little speculation on Allied intentions. Metternich had taken 
as assent from England, a letter written in September by castltereagh. 
28 
in answer to the proposals rr:e,de by Maret, dulce of Bassano in August. 
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St. Aignan, who had been held as a prisoner, was relee.sed on 
parole and brought to Frankfort. On November 3, Metternich held an 
extended ccnversation with him, explaining the pacific viewpoint on 
29 
a number of difficult questions. Francis would not accept the title 
of Emperor of Gern:nny. The Napoleonic dynasty was to be undisturbed, 
England being much more moderate on that point than was supposed. The 
plans for peace included the setting of tjust limits to the power of 
England, and the possession b_y France of all the ua.ritime liberty which 
she had a. right to claim, other powers of Europe the same. England 
was ready to make Holland independent. Indemnities would be settled 
fairly. 
The next day, St. Aignon drew up in the presence of Metternich 
and Nesselrode a formal° note of the peace-:i;>'ro:po~als. In outline, the 
scheme for settlement was as follows: At Prague Austria had thought 
that a continental peace might be arranged, but since the intentions 
of all the Allies and of England had been learned, it vras useless 
nto think of a negotiation which does not have as first principle, a 
general peace." France nm.st retain its integrity as a nation, within 
its natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps and. the Pyraneese. ~e 
independence of Germany was a sine qua non. An independent Spain 
nnl.St be reestablished under the ancient dynasty. In Italy, Austria 
must have an atlequ.ate frontier, which should be the object of 
negotiation, as shotill.d the affairs of Piedmont. The Kingdom of Italy 
should be governed independetly, without tne influence of France or 
any other principal power. Holland ought to be independent, but 
negotiations di ould decide. 
"England was ready to _!Dake the greatest sacrifices for a peace 
77 
foundedo on these ·bases, and to recognize the liberty of conu~rce 
and of navigation, to which France might rightfully pretend·" 
According to St. Aignon 1 s report to his government, Aberdeen 
arrived at Metternich's house during the conversation and listened to 
a reading of the note. He asked to hear it again. When St •. Aignon 
had finished he observed that the expression t1liberty of corrurerce 
and navigation" was very vague •. St. Aignon replied that he had 
written what Metternich had dictated. Metternich then offered to 
change the wording, and wrote merely that "England would ma.ke the 
greatest sacrificesr: for a. peace founded on these bases·" st. Aignon , 
thought this phrase as vague as the other, and .itberdeen agreed. :I.1he 
English diplomat expressed himself as willing to keep the original 
wording since he could give assurance that indeed England nwas ready 
to make the greatest sacrifices." 
With this document, St. Aignon departed for French head-
quarters. Cathcart, who learned inunediately of the affair, wrote to 
Castlereagh tha.t he thought the proposal would be "not inconsistant" 
30 
with :British ob,jects. :But before rrany days had passed a violent 
quartel broke out among the English ·ministers. 
:Bas.sane replied to the Allied ouverture, from Paris on 
November 16, suggesting thnt Mannheim be neutralized for the meeting 
31 
of the Congress. l1~etternich replied on the 25th. He declared that 
France must accept the bases proposed through St. Aigflon bedlore the 
32 
Allies would consent to enter into negotiation. In the rreantime 
Aberdeen, perhaps fearful already of having compromised the English 
stand, a.d.dressed a note to Metternich protesting on an allusi'llD. in 
]assano•s note to the settlement of maritine rights. Metternich's 
78 
~ . reply was considered satisfactory. He agreed that Aberdeen ha.d 
not sa.id England would disturb mariti~ rights. The young Englishman 
33 
sent both notes home, in order to vindicate his position. 
Sir Charles Stewart, envoy at Prussian headquarters, and his 
as si stnat Ge or f"J3 Jackson, were both convinced that Aberdeen had been 
taken in by Metternich. Jackson wrote in his diary on November 23, 
34 
"Never was anybody more con[)lettely bitten than he is .by Metternich." 
Three days later Stewa.rt e.na. Jackson vis:i.ted Rardenberg. ·Sir Charles 
derM1nded an explanation of the ma.ri time rights business. Ha.rdenberg 
refused to discu.ss the natter. "Lord Aberdeen has approved all," he 
said. m.s own mouth, by promise to Mettermich, was shut until 
tomorrowt It is well to note that this conversation took place on 
November 26, the day after Metternich's reply to :Sassano. :C.1he next 
day, the letter would be w~ll on its way. If the French accepted the 
St. Aignon bases, England would find it more difficult to withdraw, 
vhen her allies were committed to peace. 
The next day, Stewart visited Hard.enberg again .. "A most 
violent breeze, to speak euphoniously, between him and Sir· Charles, 
who threatened to ask for his passports," Jackson recorded in his 




Stewart in a. great rage, wrote off to Castlereagh. 
On the last day of November, allied ministers were to be 
entertained at an elaborate dinner. · Stewart told Jackson he could. 
not "face it .n "It would reall~r cost him an effort to give a 
cordial reception to Metternich." Jackson assured him that "Metternich· 
could and would, when it si;._ited him, make it difficult for any one 
79 
to give him other than a cordial reception." After dinner, Jackson 
talked with Hardenberg who was inclined to take Metternich's part. 
The Austtian minister had read him a con~rehensive paper on the real 
basis as stated in conversation with St. Aignon; Hardenberg aclm.awledged 
however that it "was not calculated" to satisfy the British view. 
Aberdeen admitted that if Bona pa.rte agreed to the beses, negotiations 
would conrnence. Jackson found his note to Metternich "as weak" as 
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the Austrian ans\ver was"unsatisfactory .n 
Wh~tt was the purpose of Metternicht s action in the st. Aignon 
mission? Tod{ly it seems clear. In Metternich's self addressed 
instrtlctions as minj_ster to the Court of Dresden in 1801 ;· in his 
first offer as mediator in the summer of 1810, in all the proposals 
for a general pa.cification, which he advanced through the year 1~13; 
may be found the conviotion that a durable peace in Europe ~ust include 
a European settlement of the maritime rights question. Furthermore,· 
English colonial preponderance must be reduced.or the balance in 
Europe could never be maintained. Now Ce..stle:r~ was pressing for 
an alliance treaty, which would exclude the maritime rights qu.estion. 
Metternich saw a last chance to :paace this natter in the rank of 
negotiable objects. If Napoleon accepted a general peace including 
this as one of the bases, England could withdraw only by 
zeparating herself from her allies. In order to gain time, he pleaded 
Aberdeen to secrecy with the belief that the young ma.n could be 
hoodwinked long enough at least to give France tima to comnit 
herself to peace.· Anyone so carefu.l :i.n expression as Metternich, 
would never have allowed st. Aignon to depart with a note c_ontainjn g 
a misstatement of such an important detail. But Metternich's hopes 
so 
for European arrangement of maritime law were destined never to be 
fulfilled. 
Metternich• s influence was now at its height in Allied councils, 
and that influence was directed definitely toward a moderate peace. 
He ccnvinced the Czar that it was best not to carry war into France. 
Alexander was anxious not to lose the influence which he had acquired 
as the liberal ''savior" of Europe. Metternich played skillfully upon· 
39 
that string. Hardenberg and Aberdeen were both obedient to his 
4o 
:plans. 
"Moderation in our political attitude, and force in our 
military measures," was Metternichts idea of the ideal point of view. 
41 
'l~hus he wrote to Wessenberg on November 26. . Even then Metternich, 
i·n pursuance of this ideal, was preparing a manifesto to the French 
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nation. On the fir st day of December, it was made public in the 
naroo of the coalition. "The allied powers," it announced, "are not 
waging war on France, but on that preponderance ••.• which, to the 
misfortune of Eu.rope and of France, has too long been exercised by 
the Emperor Napoleon, beyond the limits of his empire .n This, 
certainly, was a true stateroo.nt of Metternich! s point of view. How 
much it w2.s that of the other Allies, will be seen later. "The 
allied sovereigns," it continued, "wish France to be great, sP.;rong, 
and happy, because a great and strong French power is one of the 
fundamental bases of the social edifice .n And furthermore, "the 
powers guarantee to the French empire, an extent of territory which 
France never knew under her kings •...• 11 This was the Metternichian 
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attitude in its pure expression. 
Metternich wa.s _prepa.red for criticism of the declaration. 
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He sent a copy to Hudelist :fn Vienna. nyou will observe our usual 
moderation again in this docurnent," he wrote. "Perhaps the reproach 
. -44 
of too great moderation may be made against it by the Enrages." 
He was not mis ta.ken. Sir Charles Stewart found it "mu.ch too ta.me", 
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though Jackson approved its tone. When the latter arrived in 
England in December on a special mission, he found Castlereagh"' also 
dis se.tisfied. On his return he was instructed to urge on the pa.rt 
of the British governinent that part of the proclamation be reconsidered. 
He was to declare that "it would be highly objectionable to give 
France an assurance that whaxever rrJ3.y be the conduct of the French 
nation or its Government, it is nevertheless to be exe~t from the 
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ODdinary conseqL1ences of an unsuccessful war .n The English minister 
evidently he.d in mind the clause guaranteeing to France a. greater 
extent of territory than under her kings. Thi.s might mean cut ting 
into the frontier which England planned for Rolland and the Netherlands. 
Meanwhile at Paris, Caulaincourt, Dulce of Vicenza, one of the 
leaders in the peace party' had succeeded Maret' Duke Of Be,ssano as 
minister of foreign affaj_rs. ·On December 2, he wrote to Metternich 
to announce the acceptance of the bases outlined in the St .. Aignon 
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note .. Metternich replied on the 10th that his letter was being 
sent to the other allies, and expressed the. hope tha..t negotiations 
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would begin very shortly. 
Metternich was now most anxious to open peace negotiations. 
On December 4, Cathcart reported to C$Js\lereagh tha.t there wa.s "some 
intenti6n of sending Po!Zm) dd Borgo to England to exp~ain the ideas 
of this court in regard to sorm· important arra,nger:tl9nt which, it is 
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thought; it would be most desira"ble to settle before a general peace." 
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The intention vras carried out, and Pozzo left on the evening of the 
6th bearing with him Ca:ulaincourt 's acceptance of the St. Aignon 
50 
bases. 
The hot headed Stewart was pleased to consider this mission as 
as insult to the British representatives a.t Frankfort. He despatched 
?ackson to London on December 8. Jackson was to go by a. short route and 
arrive in England in time to warn Cast1S:rea.gh of the dark imotives 
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behind Pozzo's journey. 
Though the mission we~s ostensibly s~nt by Alexander, Metternich 
was behind it. The motive for it all, reveals the innate practicability 
of the Austrian· minister's mind. The hue and cry over the maritime 
rights matter had finally convinced him that England would never cone 
into a negotiation in which those rights were questioned. ~erefore 
he promptly forsook his old idea sacrificing to the adva.ntages of a 
prompt peace. But cm the cession of colonial conquests as shall be 
shown presently, he was still in tent on England's declaring herself'. 
He wished to leave no loo:phole thrcugh which one power might withdraw 
from the negotiation. A d.iscussion of the conquests belongs properly 
to the story of the general elliance negotiation, and will be so 
treated. 
'I'he conclusions which ~;!etternich ha.d now reached, may be best 
stated in the te:>..-t of a letter v!hi$ he sent to iVe ssenberg in Lond6n, 
by Pozzo di Borgo. 
"We. believe th2t only in the form of a congress, can a matter 
as complicated as the Jiext peace·, be brought to a happy end. We 
propose then to Engla.nd to declare jointly with us, that in order to 
eliminate from the principal rnatte1~ all petty intrigues and jealousies, 
we believe it obligatory to insist to France on the opening of 
negotiations in the form of preliminary conferences .n England, 
J 
France, Russia, Austria and. Prussia were to be admitted to the 
preliminaries. There should be arranged the bases and mode of a 
definittive pacification to which the representatives of th~ other 
powers were to be invited. 
"You will moreover make explicit assurances that we are 
desirous of seeing excluded from the future negotiation all moral 
questions, ••. which certainly will be excluded by France also, if 
she is truly desirous for peace, and we shall reserve for the next 
war discussion on the question of searching vessels, and the rights 
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of the flag.II 
During the month of November, Austria ·maa.e treaties with 
many of the lesser German states. The ·King of Wurtenbourg, the 
Grand-Dulce of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Prince of Nassau, the Elector 
of Hesse-Cassal, pledged adhesion to the Grand Alliance, and 
pronti..sed to lend themselves nto all cessions in Germany demanded by 
future arrangements calculated to maintain the strength and 
independence of that country·" The Confederation of the Rhine was, 
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of course, to be dissolved. 
Parallel with the progress of the parleys with France, may 
be traced the a.dva.nce of a negotiation within the circle of the 
coalition. This negotiation, already referred to, had as its 
object the foundation of a general alliance. The English representa-
tives at Frankfort had received instructions to arrange such an 
alliance, on October 20. rt will be rerrembered that Cathcart found 
Alexander willing and counted strongly on Metternich's acquiescence. 
But in November, Cathcart found in Alexander a new reluctance 
to sign. He pre~erred a separate subsidy treaty. On being 
pressed by Cathcart, he expressed the conviction the.t in such 
an alliance treaty there should be included a .. stipulation on the 
cession of English maritine conquests. He waived the que,stion of 
rights and. was quite willing to withdraw from any appearance interven-
tion in the .American war. But he was rather decided on stinulation 54 ~ 
of English conquests to be ceded. Cathcart was puzzled and 
disappointed by the Czar•s change of front, but he assured Castlereagh 
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that Prince Metternich would assist. This was on November 24. 
T\vo days later Jackson wrote in his diary: "At the moment we were 
expecting the signature of the general alliance, Lord Aberdeen, who 
declared that he would get it done in forty-eight hours, has 
allowed Metternich to persuade him that it will be better to send 
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the whole thing to London I" 
On November 29, Cathcart received a notice from Stewart 
that Prussia was rea.dy for the alliance. Aberdeen said Metternich 
was also willing to sign. Cathcart had now learned that Alexander 
had sent off instructions to the Russian ambassador in London to 
eettle the ID.8Xter of subsidies and conquests by a separate article 
supplement.a.ty to the treaty of Reichenbach. The envoy to the Russian 
court hurried to tell Alexander of the acquiescence of the other 
allies. The Emperor said he must talk to Metternich before making 
a decision. 
On December 5, Alexander told Cathcart tha.t he had talked 
to Metternich and now believed the.t an alliance could be arranged at 
Frankfort instee.d of in London. Ce,thca.rt went with Aberdeen to 
see Metternich and found to llis surprise that the Austtian di~9lomat 
had pronounced views on the question. 'llhe subsidies should be 
t 
stipulated in the treaty; Englan~ should declare herself on the 
colonial cessions, especially on the ones which she was resolved to 
retain; Austria cou~d not admit Norway into the treaty because of 
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the negotiations now pending with Denmark. 
The discussion continued through December. In a conference 
on December 9, Aberdeen, (always over careful: of Metternich's 
reputation) co~lained that Nesselrode took mu.ch the stronger tone on 
the cessions; that the Austrian di~loma.t was not willing like 
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Prussia to desert her ally Russia. But Cathcart 1 s eyes were now 
opened to the true state of Allied opinion. He wrote Castle-retigh 
that Alexander would not decide without the others agreeing. "Al though 
Prince Metternich attributes the opposition to Russia, he is the 
only person who is eloquent in supporting that opposition; and it 
neither occurred to the Emperor nor to Count N;esselrode till after 
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consulte.tion with him." 
An examination of the course of this entire negotiation 
reveals clearly Metternich's policy. His plan for a general 
pacification included both the cession of colonial conquests and 
the settlement of the maritime ri@:lts difficulty. He had no 
nationalistic interest in either of these points, outside ·of Austria's 
dependence on a stable equilibrium in Europe. The cession of 
colonies was desirable as a means of trading, in the peace settlements. 
:But lv~etternich was already distrO.sted by England. His strenuous 
insistance on both anti-English propositions would brand him as 
pro-French in the suspicions eyes of the British envoys at Frankfort. 
Therefore, he used Russie, to advance one of the two. The traditions 
of his royal forbears, would naturally prepare Alexander to be the 
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-champion of maritime ri-ghts. :But England had already given him 
a severe snubbing on the offer to nediate a peace with America. 
British ministers would always be cautious with a descendant of the 
Great Catherine. 
Therefore, Metternich assumed the role which normally would 
have been Alexander's, and while stri~ing to insert maritime rights 
into the negotiations, used the Russian En!Jeror to pull the colonial 
cessions out of the fire. When he gave up his position on ma.ri tine 
rights, he could corre out into the open to fight for colonial 
cessions. Such, it is believed, was the reasoning behind his actions. 
In London, Castlereagh still waited in vain for the alliance 
treaty which he had expected to present to Parlialll:'nt at the 
beginning of Noveniber. He told Ld.evin tha. t England saw no reason 
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why she should stipulate the ccn quests to be ceded. . On December 
22, Castlereagh wrote Cathcart that he, himself, was coming to the 61 ' 
continent. The disciple of Pitt was determined to have an 
alliance. While the opening of peace negotiations waited upon 
England's acceptance of the Caulaincourt letter, the coalitionists 
at Frankfort were struggling with a new perplexity. In the declaration 
of December 1, they had announced that hostilities wculd not. cease 
until peace was actually in the ma.king. Should the armies advance 
beyond the Rhine? That was the question which continued to be 
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discussed throughout November. 
Three plans were presented. The Austrian general, Duka, 
wished to take up an intrenched position on the Rhine. This would 
suit Metternich best as a political attitude, but it left Napoleon 
free to organize his for·ces preparatory to xoore war. The Prussian 
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general, Guersena.u, advocated crossing the Bhine between 
S~rasburg and Mainz. The Silesian army was to enter into Belgium. 
The third plan wa's that of Schwarzenberg, the comnander-in-chief 
of the Allied forces. It involved a more extensive and IlX)re 
thorough plan of operations, designed to force peace on Napoleon 
by strategy rather than battle. SWitzerland cou.ld not be left open 
for a French dash into Italy. Schwarzenberg, therefore, advised 
that the Austrian army advance through Switzerland to connect on 
the left with the other Austrian arnw advancing through.upper Italy, 
and with Welline?;ton on the Spanish frontier. Wrede, the Bavarian 
general, was to advance on the middle Phein. Bl'ficher•s army would 
cross the Rhine at Bonn and Cologne in order to connect with 
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Bervadotle in coming into Holland from northern Germany. 
The Austrian government hesitated between the plans of Duka 
and Schwarzenberg. On account of the manifesto, it was decided to 
advance. Lebzeltern was sent to Bern in the middle of November to 
64· 
learn the disposition of the Swiss people toward the Allied cause. 
Metternich felt that the advancing armies would be "received as 
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friends an:l liberators·" Orders were issued to cross the Rhine 
at Basle on December 13. But early in· December, Alexander announced 
that he could not see Swiss neutrality violated, and met the pr~test 
of Austria by declaring that an advance through that country would 
be considered as a cause of war with Russia. Metternich was then 
forced to give in. 
Alexander had promised Mada.ne de Morges, a SWiss governess 
in the in:perial household, that the neutrality of Switzerland would 
not be violated. La.barpe, once tutor to the Russian Emperor, wa.s 
also a native of Switzerland, and feared that an invasion would 
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mean "a. return to the old order of things .. " 
After Russia•s declaration, conferences were held upon a new 
campaign plan (December 7, 9, 11) .. On the·llth, Hardenberg confided 
67 
to his diary that Alexander seemed "un peu ravise" on Switzerland. 
Metternich had learned that troops were being recruited in Switzerland 
for French armies. This was too mu.ch. The Austrian minister departed 
for Carlsrube and Fribourg on -December 12, and Alexander followed him .. 
Gentz arrived at Fribourg on December 15 and assisted Metternich in 
his negotiations with the Swiss. Court Senfft, a Saxon diplomat was 
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sent~.:. to Bern and later Lebzeltern followed. 
On the 17th, Metternich wrote to Alexander that the Canton of 
Bern bad refused to prol11\llgate the act of neutrality and had appealed 
secretly to Austria for protection.· "The reports of M. de Lebzeltern 
and of Capo d 1Istria leave no doubt on the general dispositions of the 
Swiss peoples. We are overwhelned here with deputies from all parts 
who beg us to advance in order that they may pronounce, themselves in 
69 .. 
favor of the Allies." Alexander replied from Oa.lsruhe that despite 
these reports the advance ought not to be made. He sa.id the Allies 
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had agreed not to metldle in SWitzerland. Metternich authorized the 
entrance, and the Austrian troops proceeded. Alexander was quite 
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angry about it all. 
Back at Frankfort, Metternich talked for five and one half 
hours to Alexander. "We finished by embracing," he informed 
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Schwarzenberg. In describing the interview to the En:peror Francis, 
the Austrian minister wrote, "The problem remains:- were or were not 
the Swiss free under their last Cons ti tut ion.? Er sagt Ja und ich Nein. 
We banished this question into the great chaos of all philosophical, 
speculative, hyperbolical ri-ghts questions - continental or maritime ••• n 
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and decided to neet things as they came. 
One can imagine the ease with which Metternich, exercised all 
his conversational charm to laugh off the matter. :But as often happens 
with clever people, he soothed Alexander as he stood before him, but 
the sting returned as soon as the poultice had been withdrawn. Nor 
did it sooth the Czar's vanity when Metternich got from a spy evidence 
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that Ma.dame de Morgas, the Swiss governess, was a French agent. 
The last protest was stifled but Metternich's cleverness in using 
this information overreached itself. Alexander felt deeply Metternich's 
. disregard of his wishes. This was the opening breach, soon to be 
widened by new controversies. The Russian Emperor turned to St~in as 
his confidant and advisor. This relationship had caused Metternich 
much concern in the past, and was destined to bring him many anxious 
moments in the future. 
The passage of the troops through Switzerland, made the task 
of maintaining law and order a delicate one. Metternich was detennined 
not to allow the advance to assume the character of an invasion. 
Lebzeltern•s reports were very satisfactory on this score, but Senfft 
was severely cri tized by Metternich for having gone to :Berne "with 
sword in hand," Strict instructions were sent to Schwarzenberg on the 
matter of maintaining peace. "Charge your militaries," wrote 
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Metternich, "esp~cially :Bubna, not to meddle in any local question." 
Thus it was, that the Allied troops marched into France. The 
Austrian troops filed through the passes of the Jura mountains; 
. Blucher crossed the Rhine on New Year• s night. A new epoch in the 
stablization of Europe had begun. .As the new year sounded, the curtain 
rolled up:.on the third piece in the trilogy of Napoleon's downfall. 
CHAPTER VI 
AUSTRIA, MODERATOR OF THE COALITIOM: BEYOND THE RHINE 
The year 1813 was a tine of real triumph for the politics of 
Metternich. l3eginning with the offer of good offices, passing Ibo the 
position of a peaceful mediator, from thence advancing boldly to arned 
mediation, finally casting lot with the coalition when rmdiation failed, 
Austria ermrged from the diplomatic labyrinth of the times into the 
light of a new dignity and purpose 1 Metternich became the dominant 
personage in Allied councils • A.t Frankfort he was easily the most 
i~ortant statesman in Europe, both as the dominator of Allied policy 
and as the spokesman of a diplomacy which argued for peace and stability 
rather than punishment and revenge • 
. Austria's immediate object was a pacification which would leave 
France intact and powerful, capable of acting as a counter-weight in 
the general equilibrium of Europe. Through his influence upon Russia 
and Prussia, Metternich won over those powers to the idea of a peace 
at the Rhine. Upon British policy, he had less effect; but his sway 
over the youthful Lord Aberdeen very nearly conq>romised England in a 
negotiation with which that nation had small sympathy. 
J3ut the exigencies of military strategy together with the English 
hesitancy to agree to the making of peace, forced the crossing of the 
Rhine. This move was contrary to i~tte~ich's fundamental conception of 
stability. :Beyond the Rhine., he found himself constantly on the 
defensive; the moderator rather than the dominator of Allied action. 
So long as his influence rei:gned· suprene, no immediate necessity 
for peace existed. But with the very crossing of the Bhine, 
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difficulties presented themselves which nade peace imperative if the 
Austrian idea of European order was to be realized. After the Swiss 
disagreement, Alexander turned away from Austrian counsel and thence-
forth heeded only the collective advice of St~in, Pozzo di ~orgo, and 
Laharpe. Each of these roon, for different reasons, advocated a crusade 
to Paris and the destruction of the Napoleonic regime. The consummation 
of such desires wou.ld mean the shattering of France as a bulwark against 
Russian illllerialism; the particular danger which Metternich had been 
fighting from the time of the first peace offers, late in 1812. 
Furthermore, though Hardenberg was moderate in his views, King 
Frederick William was d~mina.ted by Alexander - not so nuch because he 
believed in the Russian stand, but because his timidity naturally led 
him to cleave to the strongest and most dangerous entity with which 
he cane in contact. 
Despite the difficulties Metternich hoped to bring the war to· 
an end within a short time. ·He was counting on help from two sources: 
'Napoleon, himself, and Castlereagh, who was coming to the continent 
in person, to represent Great Britain in the Allied councils. The 
French Emperor seemed to have accepted the idea of a France confined 
within limits roughly similar to the old kingdom of the Bcnrbons. In 
an address to the Senate, he called upon the provinces by their 
ancient names, and Schwarzenberg hoped that the military conqueror 
was now willing to become "King of Franc~" as Talleyrand had advised. 
Metternich•~ ada:ptabili ty is strikingly exhibited in the manner with 
which he was now depending for help on England, a power which he had 
attempted to isolate but a few months before. 
The Aust'rian surrender on the n:a.tter of inari tine rights had 
paved the way for an understanding between the two ministers. On 
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January 6, Oaulaincourt wrote· from Luneville to complain that 
nothing had been heard about the opening of a·Oong;ress, since 
December 10. "It is difficult to believe," be said, "that Lord 
Aberdeen had powers to propose bases, without having authority to 
negotiate·" Metternich /took advantage of this opportunity to clear 
himself of any suspicion·that he was still disposed.to argue the 
marO·ime rights question. "Your excellency's suppositions," he wrote 
to· Caulaincourt on January 8, "that Lord Aberdeen proposed the bases, 
and ·that he had been furnished with full powers to that effect, are 
without any foundation." He announced the future coming of Lord 
Oastlereath, and promised further COilllIWlication as soon as the 
3 
English minister arrived. 
While waiting for Castlereagh's arrival, Metternich instructed 
Schwarzenberg to advance "prudently" •. The Austrian minister had no 
intention of going any farther into France than was necessary or 
fighting any battles until the Allied position had been clarified. 
However, Sch?rarzenberg wrote that there could be no stopPing beyond 
the Bhine until the ariey' had occupied the valley of the saone and 
4 
the plateau of La.ngres. That region, then, became the Austrian 
objective. Metternich was resolved not to go beyond it until he was 
sure of his groUn.d .. 
He did not put off building his defences against Russia, however, 
until that time. His first task lay in gaining the support of 
Prussia for an early peace. rt will be remembered that Prussian 
ambitions in 1812 had been directed toward the acquisition of Polanq 
and that Alexander had suggested Saxony during the Kalisch negotiations 
as a better compensation· than the Duchy of Warsaw. In· November and 
December of 1Sl3, Hardenberg conferred first with one and then with 
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another of his continental -allies on the affairs Of Poland and 
5 
Saxony. At the beginning of Noveniber, Metternich had told Aberdeen 
6 
that Austria would never consent to Prussian acqu.i'si ti on of Saxony. 
:But in January, the necessities of a strong check on Russia, led him 
to give in to Hardenberg in order to gain support against Alexander. 
On January S, the Prussian minister wrote in his diary - "Metternich 
7 
accedes to the plan concerning Saxony." On the very next day, 
Hardenberg pressed upon Alexander the necessity of allied cooperation 
g 
in negotiating a peace. When Hardenberg told Alexander that 
Metternich "abounded in the same sentiments on the expediency of 
giving a frontier to Prussia in Saxony" , the Russian monarch was in-
clined to believe that the Chancellor had either mistaken the Austrian 
minister, or that it was Hardenberg 1s intention to sound Russia on 
9 
her attitude toward the Saxon question. He did·not co~rehend the 
purpose of Metternich's move. 
The Austrian advance guard reached Langres about January 13. 
On that day Caulaincourt was invd!ted to go to Chatillon with the 
10 
expectation that negotiations would soon begin. Metternich was 
bent upon peace. "All our forimr engageroonts are fulfilled, n he 
wrote to Hudelist, "all objects of the coalition were not only 
11 
attained, but exceeded in tpe year 1813.n Fu.rtherrnore he was 
rather optimistic about th:e chances of ending the war. "Who knows, H 
he wrote ·in ·another letter to Hudelist, "but what we shall have the 
12 
peace of the world within fourteen days·" 
Just at this ti.rre, rumors began to circulate concerning 
Alexander's idea of placing Bernadotte, the king of Sweden, on the 
French throne. In Metternich's eyes the Russian cloud suddenly 
loomed blacker than ever. -He wrote immediately to Schwarzenberg, to 
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assure himself that the advance would be retarded at Langres. 
Either pea.ce Il'JllSt be nade, or the alliance established on a new basis, 
he declared. Alexander was departing for the front, he infor:rood 
Schwarzenberg. As soon as Castlereagh arrived the English and 
Austrian ministers would follow the Czar. The matter was to be 
settled at once. "I need not tell you," he wrote to Hndelist, "that 
I am as nnch embarrassed now.with the plenitude of good fortune, as 
. 14 
before with the plenitude of bad.fl In this frame of mind, he awaited 
the arrival of Castlereagh, at :Ba.sle. "On the fir st hours of ·conversation 
15 
with him will depend the welfare of the cause," he predicted. 
Alexander, as an.i:ious as Metternich to gain the support of 
England, had requested through Cathcart tha.t Castlereagh talk with 
16 
him before seeing the other Allied monarchs. But the Czar already 
had ·hastened on to the front, when the British minister arrived at 
Basle on January 18 .. 
The hopes which Metternich entertained of assistance from the 
English minister were amply fulfille~. Castlereagh was a practica1 
person, with an outlook upon affair's in general which agreed with 
that of Metternich's. He was anxious to be on good terms with 
Austria, and for that reason had insisted in September that Metternich 
be informed of England's acceptance of Austrian nediation during the 
sullllD3r of 1813. Hard.enberg and Alexander had both objected, but to 
17 
no avail. 
In the instructions which Castlereagh brought with him to the 
continent, especial care was taken to outline the British attitude 
toward Austria.. The -eror Francis was to resuim his rule in the 
Netherlands, but the possession of Belgilum in entirety mu.st depend on 
the success of the war .. · Austrian preponderance in north Italy was 
18 
accepted and urged as a matter of course. England was thus 
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willing to concede Austria mu.ch more than that country demanded for 
herself. Further more, her attitude toward the :BoUt"bons had so far 
been similar to that of Attstria. The Count d 'Artois was forbidden 
to appear at Wellington's headquarters, despite the Prince Regent's 
19 
outspoken desires for the restoration of the old dynasty in France. 
Castlereagh felt somewhat as Metternich did, that the overthrow 
of Napoleon would be acco~anied by disturbances highly prejudicial 
to any hopes of gaining stability in Eu.rope. He wrote in this vein 
to Liverpool, as he traveled toward Allied headquarters: " ••. if 
:Bonaparte will give you your own terms, you ought not to risk your-
20 
selves and the confederacy in the labyrinth of counter-revolution." 
At Basle, Metternich lost no tiim in conmunicating his own views 
to the newly arrived minister. The Austrian army would advance not 
a foot, he said, until Alexander had disavowed al~ intention of 
placing Bernadotte on the.throne of France. Such a connection between 
France and Russia, Metternich considered "formidable to the liberties 
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of Eu.rope." Privately, the Austrian minister had difficulty in 
believing that France would declare for the ::Sou.rbons, but with the 
idea of placating Castlereagh, he seems to have refrained from 
mentioning his doubts,, He even declared that he would prefer the 
Bourbons to :Bonaparte (a rank untruth), "but that he _would not interfere 
22 
to decide, what belonged to France to regulate." 
"I have had a very full confidential comminication with 
Metternich on the Bourbon questi<!lm. •••••• n, wrote the English minister 
to Liverpool. "My opinion is that, if we iooet this event in our 
progress as a French measure, Austria will not embarrass it from 
any family considerations, ~and the less so from the dread she feels 
of :Bernadott's elevation; but:· she will not speculate upon it, or 
commit herself upon either loose or partial grounds. She will desire 
always to see the public act, and to frame her decision with reference 
to its nature and extent ••••• Metterni'ch seems strongly impressed with 
the feeling that, to take our terms high against France, we ID1l.St not 
encumber ourselves with anything that can bear the appearance of an 
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initiative on such a question on the part. of the Allies·" 
All of Metternich's conversation on the Bourbons was designed 
to gain Castlereagh to. the view of not meddling in the dynasty 
. question. The Austrian minister was familiar with the tenq:>erament 
of the people •. He knew that if the Allies seemed bent on giving a 
ruler of their own choice to France, the peace for which he hoped 
would imroodiately be out of question. To gain Castlereagh to the 
side of peace he was even willing to retreat from the Frankfort basis -
the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. The English minister wrote 
home on January 22, "I am happy to observe that Metternich's 
geographical notions are improved, and that he will listen at least 
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to modifications of the Rhine in advance of Dusseldorf ." 
Metternich, privately, seems to have. been convinced that 
Napoleon wonld accept peace rather willingly. He therefore, urged 
that offers be made him so that, if refused, the Allies would then 
"be perfectly free to follow the line of conduct which the most 
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inveterate hostility may dictate·" 
To recapitulate, then, the motives behind Metternich's first 
efforts after the crossing of the Rhine: he wanted peace and 
protection against the dubious intentions of Alexander toward France, 
as immediate necessities ·for stability. To make sure that peace would 
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oe offered (since he thought it would be accepted) he gave in to 
Prussia on the Saxon question; in return, Hardenberg pressed 
Alexander to consent to peace negotiations. He agreed with England 
on the boundaries of ~ance, and Castlereagh in turn, consented to 
peace being offered. To make sure that the :Bourbon question would 
not be pressed to the point of embarrassing peace, Metternich assured 
Castlereagh that Austria would not oppose a restoration but that the. 
French nation mnst decide for itself. 
Armed with Prussian and English support, Metternich was now 
ready to beard Alexander and force him to a new definition of 
Alliance objects. He was enthusiastic over Lord Castlereagh. "He 
has everything; grace, wisdom, moderation. He suits me in every way, 
and I am convinced tha.t I suit him equally. We shall bolster up the 
folly of a certain person, and I am no longer uneasy over his 
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. deviations·" With the prospect for peace, seemingly favorable, 
Metternich left for the front:.in:'. good humor. Castlereagh accoll!lanied 
him. 
At La.ngres, Alexander was eagerly awaiting the British minister. 
The conversation which had been delayed by the Czar•s departure for 
the front now took place at headquarters. Castlereagh came away 
from this first interview with soma misgivings. He had found the 
Czar set on the Bernadotte proposal and determined to press on to 
Paris. 110ur greatest danger at present is from the chevalresque tone 
in which the Emperor Alexander is disposed to push war," he wrote to 
Liverpool.·- "He has a personal feeling about Paris, distinct from 
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all political or military conibinations.n 
:But Metternich was determined that the Frankfort . o,verture 
should not be abandoned, and declared that retaining Caulaincou.rt at 
Ohatillon after moving h!m from Luneville was not "decorous in 
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point of good faith." His anx~ety over the status of affairs was 
increased on January 24 by news of Bernadotte•s treaty with Demta.rk. 
This turning aside from the general Allied program strengthened 
Metternich's belief that the Swedish ruler was playing a game contrary 
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to the principles of general stability. On January_25, caulaincourt 
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had written to offer an armistice. The Austrian minister now 
earnestly pressed upon Castlereagh the necessity for peace. He 
confessed complete _lack of faith i~ Alexander's actions in the event 
that the Allied armies should be defeated in the interior of France. 
Russi~ had deserted Austria before, as well as her other allies, he 
pointed out. The English minister was inclined to share this doubt 
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of Russia's constancy in time of danger. 
The ar€;om3nts of the Czar•s advisors, in turn, grew stronger 
in favor of a march to Paris. As Alexander was on the point of 
hurrying off to the front in order to avoid an open declaration of 
his intentions, Metternich presented a memoir which demanded an 
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explanation on Alliance objects. Had the objective of the coalition 
not been reached? Was war being waged to dethrone Napoleon? Were 
the bases proposed through St. Aignan to be abolished? These were 
only a few of the n:ost embarrassing qu.e st ions. Not all were answered, 
but at a conference of ministers on January 29, a decision was DBde 
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as to five of them. 
The question of whether or not the armies sh:>uld continue to 
advance v1as loft to the discretion of Schwarzenberg. It was agreed 
that negotiations with Caulaincourt should be opened. Metternich 
was authorized to communicate that decision to the French minister. 
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The bases for the negotiation were easily established. Metternich 
had already co~r_omised at Ba.ale. At Langres, Castlereagh urged that 
the Frankfort bases were no longer plausible. The Austrian minister, 
in the words of Castlereagh, "entered very liberally into the question," 
but desired "to reserve the consideration of sorre concession to France 
beyond the ancient limits •••••• the flat country of Savoy ••• or so~ 
territory on the left bank of the Rhine. n On the form of negotiation, 
Metternich had his wish granted. One instruction was to be given to 
all Allied parties, and it was agreed "that the Russian proposition of 
denying to France any right to enquire beyond the qu.estio~ of her·own 
limits was too odious a principle to be na.intained." Maritime rights 
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were to be excluded entirely from discussion. 
With the answers to these questions, Metterntch was forced to be 
content. Alexander departed for the front on the evening of this 
conference, refusing to enter into any more discussion. For the tine 
being, a crisis was averted, although Count Munster felt that the 
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reestablishment of good feeling did not go beyond the surface. 
Still left to be arranged were the questions of the precise 
limits of France, the European settlements outside of France, the 
sta.te of possession to be adopted in a. nari tine peace with reference 
to a continental peace. Poland and saxony were the thorniest barriers 
to peace, outside of France. Metternich set himself to bind Castlereagh 
more firmly to the defence of stability and equilibrium in the peace. 
If Austria and Prussia., he told the British minister, were to be 
reconstructed on the 1805 basis and Russia given territorial gains 
in proportion to her efforts in the war~ then everything could be 
arranged very simply. :But·, if a system of conquest and ,aggrandizement 
was to be adopted, conplicatidns were inevitable. For if Russia was 
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to have Poland, then Austria.mu.st have indenm.ity for Galicia, increases 
on her frontiers all around ,and the Netherlands. This was a wily m:>ve 
on the Austrian diplomat• s pa.rt. English anibi tions for the independence 
of the Netherlands would be blighted if Austria denanded that territory. 
Metternich, therefore, urged the necessity of m9.k:i.ng Russia declare 
herself on Poland in order that ideas of conquest all around might be 
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removed. 
Meanwhile he was strengthening the Austrian position elsewhere. 
Gentz at Vienna, was commissioned to nake known to the Porte through 
Karadja, the Hospodar of walla.cia, the Austrian views on stability. 
"The intention of this court, n wrote C-entz, "has never been to simply 
exchange one danger for another, and to destroy the preponderance of 
France to prepare or favor that of Russia. The Prince Metternich 
today, more than ever, looks upon the Ottoman Porte as one of the 
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most essential counter weights in the general equilibrium of Eu.rope .t• 
At Ie.ngres, Me~ternich had succeeded in persuading the Allies 
to negotiate for peace, The pleinipotentiaries were to assemble in 
Chatillon on February 3. As has been noted, one set of instructions 
was to serve all the Allied representatives, who were to negotiate 
in the name of Eu.rope • Mari time rights were to be excluded from 
discussion. The limits of France were to be as before the revolution 
except for reciprocal arrangements outside that territory, and soroo 
colonial restitutions by England. European states were to regain 
their independence. Ger~y and Italy were to be independent. Spain 
was to be g~verned by Ferdinand VII within its old limits. Holla.nd 
to be free and independent under the sovereignty of the Prince of 
Orange with an increase of territory and a. suitable frontier. France 
39 
was to abandon all influence outside her own dominions .. 
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At Allied hea.dqo.arters in the first days of February, events 
were moving swiftly toward another crisis. Metternich had learned 
from Alexander the extent of that monarch's plans for the march to 
Paris. Once there, according to the Czar's idea, the Allies were to 
sumrr.on the original assemblies to elect a ruler. Metternich thought 
that this would unchain the Revolution, but Alexander was confident 
that the presence of the Allied armies would prevent not only .an 
outbreak but the revival of the Republic. La.harpe was to be 
4o 
entrusted with directing the assembly along proper lines. The 
strong distaste with which Metternich met this whole proposal may 
be well imagined. The very idea of a march to Pe.ris was pre judicial 
to a stable peace. Matters were complicated, according to Metternich, 
by the fact that Alexander was being urged forward by three distinct 
parties, "the purely royalistic, the philanthropic, and the Tugendbund: 
or to speak plainly, the German Jacob ins," led reepecti vely· by Pozzo 
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di ::Sorgo, Laharpe, and Stein. 
Metternich, with characteristic vigor, began at once to summon 
to SUDlDX>n his forces against Russia. On February 6, he wrote to 
Herdenberg from :Bar sur Aube, asking that he hasten to headquarters. 
He wrote to Stadion, then a.:t Chatillon, to hold close to the line 
taken by Castlereagh who was the only Allied minister present at 
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the negotiation. "The disposi.tions which I have found here among our 
allies, whom the late successes have exalted anew, unfortunately, do 
not give ~ any certitude that they (the negotiations) will be 
43 . 
arranged in accordance with our views .,11 :But Wrede, he informed 
Stad.ion, had assured him that :Bavaria would support Austria and that 
the other princes of south Germany would be equally loyal. 
Hardenberg arrived at headquarters on February 9. On the same 
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day Alexander ordered Razoumofsky the Russian representative at 
44 
Chatillon to withdraw from any negotiation on peace. Metternich 
irnzoodiately sent off a letter to Stadion, urging Lord Castlereagh. 
45 
to come to Troyes at once. On the 10th, Metternich received a 
communication from Caula~ncourt, offering an armistice on the basis 
of the restitution of all territory which had not belonged to France 
in 1792. To show intention of good faith the French minister also 
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offered to make arrangements with re~rd to certain fortresses. 
Bernadotte was arriving at the Bhine. Laharpe bad returned 
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from Paris with new arguments for a crusade to the French capitol. 
Alexander was freshly strengthened in his conviction by a letter from 
Lievin which declared that the Prince Regent's view of peace was not 48 . 
that of Castlereagh. The Austrian minister was determined to obtain 
a clear expression of Allied intention before the invasion had 
progressed farther. 
Castlereagh arrived at Troyes on February 12, and on that day 
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Metternich presented a virtual ultimatum to the. Allies. A nuniber 
of questions tvere presented to the ministers. What answer was to. be 
given to Caulaincourt•s proposal for an armistice? Were the Allies 
to pronounce themselves for Louis XVIII, or continue to leave the 
dynasty question to the initiative of FranceY What xooans were to be 
employed in order to ascertain with any certainty the real intentions 
of the French nation as ~o a chan~ of dynasty? What was the la~est 
tiir.e at which it would be known whether or not the nation wished a 
change of dynasty? If Paris declared for the :Bourbon·s, and Napoleon 
withdrew at the head of the forces which ren:ained faithful to him, 
would the Powers then also declare for the Bourbons or conclude peace 
with Napoleon? What attitilde would the Powers meanwhile observe 
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' toward Louis XVIII, the Coun£ of Artois, the envoys at headquarters, 
the Emigres, and the Royalists in France? What IIW3asures would be 
taken to rule Paris , after it had been conquered? Would a ·garrison 
be established there? Who would be entrusted with the command of the 
city? 
A careful examination of these questions will reveal the 
completeness of Metternich's understanding of the Pa.ris difficulty. 
He did not expect answers to all the questions but presented nany of 
them to force an appreciation of the hazard of undertaking to nake a 
crusade against France. 
The Austrian minister voted on his own questions as a 
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represents.ti ve of one of the coalition Powers. The Emperor of 
France, he said, had agreed to retire within the limits set by the 
Allies. The object of the war was thus fully attained. The Powers 
had agreed t~at a change of d~asty in France was not to be thought 
of as a goal of their efforts. Austria did not believe herself possessed 
of the right to meddle in the governmental forms of an independent 
state. She did not believe that "an invasion of the enetcy", or the 
presence of foreign troops in or around the capitol wcnld be propitious 
to the expression of the independent wish ?f a people," nor did she 
regard as less izrq;>ossible an attempt "to attribute to the votes of 
an asserr~ly of individuals chosen and convoked by foreign powers, 
the value of an expression of the national desire .n ·The Austrian 
Emperor was convinced :furthermore that the very act of a foreign 
appeal on the question of the choice of dynasty would be a rimost 
dangerous precedent for all governments·" 
The Prussian and British answers were in accord with ~he 
Austrian expression. Castlereagh placed the characteristic :British 
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emphasis on the bad faith of propo·sing a. negotiation with a.n 
existing government while countenancing the claims of a pretender. 
"I do not believe," he said, "that the allies can turn back from 
the principles of their own overtures and render personal, a conflict 
which was only motivated by a desire for certain conditions." 
"I believe consequently," he concluded, ••that if the peace which 
Eu.rope can dictate today to the enemy can be arranged •.. that peace 
ought to ~e signed, in policy and in good faith, unless a national 
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movement nakes doubtful ·:Bonaparte's coupetence to treat and to contract." 
Nesselrode, though privately in accord with the general Allied 
view, voted in the name of Russia to push on to Paris. Alexander 
asked to be charged with the regulation of affairs there, particularly 
the calling of an assembly of the existing authorities and tbe principal 
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inhabitants. 
On the 13th, the.answers of the allied ministers were nade known 
in conference. Metternich, Castlereagh and Hard.enberg signed a 
protocol in which Alexander was asked to order his plenipotentiary at 
Ohatillon to continue in the negotiation; Metternich was authorized 
to answer Caulaincourt•s letter of February 9, by declaring the 
Allied willingness to negotiate an armistice if France gave military 
surety for a general peace by returning to limits as recognized prior 
to 1792. At~the sans time instructions were drawn for the arrangement 
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of the armistice. 
Metternich, always anxious to preserve unity in the coalition, 
meanwhile had attempted to conciliate the Czar• s wish to go to Paris, 
by sw~gesting that during the armistice the three sovereigns might 
repair to a locality near Paris for the negotiation of peace. T'nis 
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proposal was co1nr!llD.ica"ted by Ha:rdenberg in a letter to the Czar. 
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However, when the ministers net ·1n conference to hear the Russian 
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response, Nesselrode declared that he had no answer. The singular 
aspect of this conference lies in the fact that the Czar had actually 
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.refused the proposals in a memoir written by Pozzo di Borgo. 
Nesselrode knew of the :rmmoir, and yet declared that he had no answer. 
It is difficult to account for this proceeding. The most probable 
explanation would be that he hoped that the Czar might yet be persuaded 
to treat for peace. 
Metternich now proposed to isolate Russia. He urged Prussia to 
separate from the coalition a.long with Austria and England, if a peace 
could be arranged on the chatillon conditions. :Bu.t King Frederick 
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William was unwilling as yet to desert his Russian ally. Metternich 
thereupon threatened to make a separate peace and to withdraw Austrian 
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troops from the field• 
At this juncture, news of the reverses experienced by the army of 
Silesia at Braye, Montmirail a~d Chateau-Thierry on February 10-13 
reached Troyes. As Ha.rdenberg said, it gave "new force to the argunents 
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for a prOJI!Pt signature of the peace .u Metternich, who now proposed 
a preliminary peace rather than an annistice, talked with the Czar on 
the morning of February 14. The new defeats had somewhat cooled 
Alexander's ardor for en advance. He agreed that if the Allies marched 
on Paris, then future conduct should be regulated by treaty beforehand. 
Metternich pressed upon him anew the dangers of calling together a 
deliberative assembly, urged the renewal of negotiations at Chatillon, 
and the signing of a preliminary peace in place of an armistice. 
Alexander largely acquiesced in Metternich's opinion, because he now 
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feared to assume the sole responsibility for continuing war. 
~ 
The Czar departed immediately for the front after this conversation. 
That afternoon, despit~ the fact that Nesselrode had been left 
without instructions, the other Allied ministers drew up drafts of 
a treaty between the coalition powers, and of a preliminary peace 
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with France. The treaty provided that the Allies would recognize the 
Bourbons if the French nation declared themselves for that family. 
Louis XVIII, or failing him, the person in whose favor he should 
abdicate would be accepted as ruler. The pr~liminary peace with 
France was in actuality to 1B an armistice of short duration, and 
Napoleon was to give over certain strategic fortresses during the 
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period .. 
The peace project was sent off to Alexander at Pont sur Seine 
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on February 14, for ~pproval. He replied favorably on the 15th. 
Castlereagh proposed to make definite Great Britain's willingness to 
cede certain colonial possessions as conpensa~~on to France for parts 
of Belgium and Italy which mu.st be renounced. Concerning the 
eventual treaty for joint Allied actions at Paris, some misgivings 
still lurked in the minds of the ministers. For as one of 
Ha.rdenberg's advisors declared, even if Alexander signed such a 
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treaty, he would be able to evade it. Metternich undoubtedly had 
mu.ch the same thought and resolved to push the negot-iations at 
Chatillon. He sent on the proposed draft of a peace to Stadion on 
February 15. France, he said, would undoubtedly raise her 'tone. 
after the late successes over Blficher•s army but Stadion was to 
point out to CauJ,.aincou.rt the inevitable results of a nnre ex~ended 
war. The draft was designed to give some play for adjustment in the 
treaty and was not to be considered an absolute document. In the 
matter of English concessions Stadion was to be entirely guided by 
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the opinions of the British- representatives. Castlereagh arrived 
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at Chatillon on February 16, once more ready to oversee the 
negotiation of a peace with France. 
The history of the march from the Rhine to Paris is a 
wearisom3 fugue with a theme made up of the struggle of Y.etternich 
to moderate the erratic cadenzas of Alexander's thoughts. The treaty 
among the Allies was not signed. :But the Austrian minister might 
ju.stly have believed that he had averted the Russian efforts to obstruct 
peace. He had been advised of the ratification by the King of Naples 
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of a treaty of alliance with Austria. All things pointed toward 
the possibility of forcing Napoleon to an early peace. The old theme 
however, was to be repeated anew in a different sense. This time it 
was excess of timidity rather than intrepidity. The defeats of Blucher 
had frightened Alexander. Frederick William was always a faint-
hearted soul. Schwarzenberg was fearful of famine as the bodies of 
Allied troops drew closer together. The Russian monarch had little 
difficulty in convincing himself or the comnander-in-chief, that an 
armistice should be offered. Consequently on ~bruary 11 a proposal 
for the cessation of hostilities was sent off to Marshal Berthier, 
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Prince de Neuchatel. 
When news of this n:anoeuver reached Chatillon, both Stadion 
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and Castlereagh wrote heated protests to Metternich. But the 
Austrian minister was proyoked as they over this new embarrassment, 
at a time when peace seemed in the offing, and hurried off to head-. 
quarters. He wrote Ste.d.ion that this action wruld change the whole 
face of the negotiation. Napoleon would be encouraged to continue 
the war. He urged the veteran diplomat to stand up as well as possible 
in the face of the new disadvantage while he, himself, atte~ted to 
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find a remedy. In answer to the armistice offer, Napoleon proposed 
the Frankfort bases given to St. Aignan in November of 1813 as the 
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grounds on which an arrangement might be nnde. Castlereagh, alarn:ed 
at the turn of events, left Chatillon on Febnuary 20 for Chaumont 
where Metternich was staying. After some deliberation the Allies 
finally agreed on March 2, not to prolong the parleys unless the 
Allied proposals were accepted; on the 3rd even stronger orders were 
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given - the negotiators were to withdraw unconditionally. 
Meanwhile the ghost of the Poli sh trouble was stalking abroad 
again. Czartorysky had arrived at headquarters to visit Alexander. 
Austrian fears were at once aroused; the nnre so because a. plan to 
give Alsace to Austria in con:pensation for Galicia was presented. It 
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was rumored that Czartorysky was to replace Nesselrode as chief minister. 
Castlereagh considered the arrival of the Polish patriot as most 
innopportune. He wrote home· that together with Metternich he had been 
laboring to procure an understanding on the point of Poland, but that 
Alexander had always evaded any definite agreement. Now in the face 
of reverses, he said, the Czar was anxious for peace, but the Russian 
actions had spoiled both the peace and any chance of restoring the 
Bourbons. ·However, if Russia would declare herself on the Polish 
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matter, he was convinced that Austria would stay with the coalition. 
Finally Alexander seems to have felt the necessity for retreating 
oil the Poli sh stand. On February 25, Count Mu.nster wrote to the 
Prince Regent, "I am happy to be able to add that the Emperor 
Alexander has at last given a satisfactory reply on Poland, in which 
. ~ 
he demands only western Galicia which did not belong to Austria." 
Castlereagh., also, found Alexander more temperate and firm in his 
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'views. "I have had communications with the Princes Czartoryski and 
Radzivil on the affairs of Poland, and I hope I have succeeded in 
discrediting their views considering them as in truth a diversion in 
favor of France •••. " Czartoryski promised to absent himself from 
headquarters if his presence created disunion there, and the English 
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minister assured him that it undoubtedly did. 
The first meeting at Ohatillon had been held on February 5. 
Caulaincourt had replied to the Allied terms (agreed on at Langres) 
by asking that the reciprocal arrange1:00nt s clause in the proposed. 
treaty be nade more specific, that the colonies which England was 
willing to restore be enumerated. He also desired assurance that if 
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France accepted the terms, the peace would in reality be signed. 
On the 9th, all progress was arrested by the reception of Alexander's 
order not to negotiate. The subsequent conferences at Troyes, ironed 
out the inmediate difficulties, and Castlereagh returned to Ohatillon 
on the 16th, to superintend the negotiation. 
The news of the French victories resulted in a return to the 
derrand on the part of France for the Frankfort basis, as well as for 
assurances of subsequent prov:isions for the Kings of Saxony and 
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Westphalia, and the Viceroy of Italy. The ill-timed offer of 
armistice on the 17th could only strength~n France in the new attitude. 
To bring matters to a definite status, the Allied ministers agreed on 
new joint instructions to the representatives at Ohatillon, as 
February came to a close. The negotiators were to demand a reply on 
the project.for a preliminary peace. Inquiries were to be rrade as 
to the time necessary for the French minister to cunmu.nicate with 
his government by the most direct route. If no answer was received 
78 
within that time, the negotiation should be terminated. 
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Stadion, who was now unessy over the general situation, found 
the instructions somewhat inadequate. He wrote in that tone to 
Metternich, pointing out that negotiators had been given some leeway 
in accepting the French reply. Bu.t how llll.lch leeway? He sent a list 
79 
of possible demands and asked for eventual instructions. He was, 
he said, very weary oi the mockery of this "congress." He thought 
that the departure of the plenipotentiaries, together with a 
declaration to the French people which laid the blame upon Napoleon 
would. be more effective for peace than "six •European' diplonats who 
dance attendance at Chatillon and repeat every eight days a page of 
so 
sacremental words in conference •••• n 
Metternich replied to Stadion•s request in two despatches, on 
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March 7, 9. If Caulaincourt offered a counter project, he was to 
announce that it would be transmitted to the Allied courts. A 
decision would be made as to whether or not it allowed a reasonable 
peace, and the answer re turned within twenty-four hours. If the 
French minister• s response was an entire acceptance, that also was to 
be referred to headquarters. If there was no response at all on 
March 10th (the day set for a reply) a conference was ·to be called 
on the 11th. The ministers were to say that their instructions 
enjoined them to regard the silence of Caulaincourt as a breaking off 
the negotiations by the French government. If excuses were offered 
they were to be referred to the Allied courts. 
On the 10th, . Qaulaincourt presented the French answer, but 
only after IIIllCh urging; perhaps because he hoped to delay any action 
until better terms would be conceded by Napoleon. Stadion wrote to 
Metternich that the response left the opportunity "to break if that 
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pleases you, or to remain indefinitely." Almost on the hour of 
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this writing, Metternich was forwarding to Stadion two pieces of 
French correspondence which had been intercepted. These missives -
written by Maret to Caulaincourt - were,.· in the tone of instruction, 
decidedly peaceful. Metternich had not shown them to the other Allied 
ministers, and cautioned Stadion against revealing their contents to 
his colleagues at Chatillon.. Austria had good reason to fear that sone 
of her fellows in the coal:ition would be less anxious for peace if 
privy to the fact that the enemy hopefully contemplated the end of 
hostilities. Metternich suggested that Stadio~ speak privately to 
Caulaincourt and assure him that the mldng of peace would not be 
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difficult. 
At midni@lt on the 11th, the Powers signed instructions for an 
ultima.tur to Caulaincourt; demanding that he accept, reject, or offer 
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a counter-project. This was -comnunicated to the French minister 
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on the 13th, after an unsatisfactory conference. Caulainco~t 
offered a counter project which did not approach the Allied terms. 
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New instructions were written on the 14th, and approved on the 17th. 
Negotiations were formally broken off on the 19th. l~tternich was 
quite willing to see the end of the "congress" for, as he wrote 
Schwarzenberg, he saw peace nearer wi thou.t these negotiations than 
with them. He hoped to arrange through Caulaincourt at headquarters 
what could not be ma.de in a ge~eral meeting. Everything, he said, 
depended on the military action. "If that goes well, all will •••. 
I do not always regard •the well' as a battle but always as a 
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military attitude." 
Still clinging to the idea of peace; he addressed several 
letters to Caulaincourt on Y.raroh lS, the eve of the rupture at 
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Chatillon. He assured the French minister that the end of the 
negotiation would perhaps facilitate matters. Austria, he declared 
would always be interested in the well-being of France. "It still 
depends, on your IIBS~er, as to whether peace is to be DBde; very 
shortly, perhaps it will no longer be :in his power.. • I will do all 
I can to retain Lord Castlereagh a few days. If this minister is 
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once allowed to depart, there will be no rrore question of peace." 
Coincident with the events at Chatillon during the first three 
weeks of March, came important developments at Allied headquarters. 
Castlereagh, afger many months of waiting, at last realized his 
hope for a general alliance treaty between the Allies. SU.ch a treaty 
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was agreed to on Marcil 4, and signed five days later. The 
provisions were essentially those of the preliminary treaty offered to 
France. Decisions on Gerneny, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Holland, 
were confirmed, although the boundaries of the latter country were 
left open to discussion. In Belgium, the native desire to return to 
the rule of Austria, was placated in a degree by giving that country 
an Austrian militery governor for the time being. ~e Austrian 
officials were to act as mediators in gaining the consent of the 
Belgians to being placed under the House of Orange. 
Most of these provisions were outlined in secret articles. 
Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Holland were invited to accede to the 
Treaty. The Allies bound themselves to keep forces on foot at least 
a year after peace had been concluded. An alliance of twenty years 
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duration was to serve as the guare.ntee of peace. Castlereagh had 
at last consummated the efforts of all the British diploma.ts since 
Wolsey. An iIIq>Osing barrier had. been erected around the enq>ire-seeking 
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and glory-thirsting nation which had been troubling the minds of 
good Englishmen for some hundreds of yeer s. 
Metternich was struggling on as usual, in an attelq)t to 
moderate the aims of the Allies, and bring Europe to a stable 
equilibrium rather than to establish an armed camp around the frontiers 
of France. At timas he grew weary of the task. He wrote to 
Hudelist at Vienna, 1! ...... in a period like the present in which so 
many ele~nts are acting for the ferirent of minds, the reasonable and 
temperate man is exposed to all storms, none of his flanks is imrrnme, 
and like the sailor on the sea he mu.st rely alone on his own good 
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fortune and principles." 
A typical example of the de.rmnds made upon his temper, may be 
~een in the quarrel which broke out at headquarters oyer the Austrian 
war orders, just at the time when negotiations were draJVing to an end 
at Chatillon. Diebitsch, a Russian, had been sent to Schwarzenberg 
to make some inquiries on the military situation. He returned on 
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March 18. That evening, at midnight, Alexander came to question 
Mette~nich; demanding to know whether or not Schwarzenberg had been 
forbidden in the past. to fight' or forbidden to enper an engagement 
now. Mette~ich answered with some sharpness. "On that," said 
Y..etternich describing the scene, "the King of Prussia and all the 
ministers in the world shouted treason, with one· voice; that Bltt.cher 
was to be let perish; that it was clear that we were in accord with 
France; that we renained on the Rhine, when :Sl'flcher seemed to have 
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the advantage of the enemy ,etc." 
Metternich awakened the E>:nperor Francis; and it was finally 
agreed that the Austrian m:in ister should write a letter to the 
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commander•dn-chief which should-clear up the misunderstanding. The 
Emperor was furious over the proceeding, as was Prince Schwarzenberg 
when he received the letter from Metternich, together with missives 
from Alexander and Hardenberg. Alexander's declaration that the 
Allies were unanious in the resolution "to completely untie his hands" 
was· fiercely resented by blunt general. He replied abwptly that his 
hands had never been tied, and that if his actions were not agreeable, 
94 
the fault lay with himself and his principles, and nowhere else. 
"They are all crazy," wrote Metternich to Stadion, ''all ready to 
be mettre aux plus petites ma.isons. We are always placed in the light 
of wishing to sell Monarchy, as if we had great interest in being 
defeated, devoured; as if Austria loved foreign slavery; a~ if, 
in a word, we were imbeciles. I believe that we alone are not out of 
our heads. Perhaps, we are; for a symptom of zra:dness is to believe 
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oneself sane." 
With all the irritation of these petty encounters, Metternich 
was forced during these weeks to grapple with a very serious problem-
namely, that of the government of France. A thorough treatnent. of 
the Austrian attitude has been postponed until this point in the 
narrative, because it was at this time that a definite decision was 
forced upon Metternich. The Austrian minister had looked upon the 
Napoleonic govern.imnt as the best for stability and equilibrium in 
Europe. ·His viewpoint is well presented in letter from Gentz to 
Karadja., of April 11, 1~14. "M. de Metternich was convinced, in his 
wisdom, that the reestablishment of the Bourbons wcnld serve better 
the particular interest of Russia and England, than the interest of 
Austria and Europe in general; that France, exhausted already almost 
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to the point of extinction by all she has suffered for twenty yea.rs, 
would fall back under the feeble scepter of the Bourbon princes into 
a state of impo~ence and complete nullity; rendering her incapable 
of forming a counter-poise in the balance of powers; that consequently 
Russia, bloated by her successes, by her glory, by the ascendancy 
obtained in Gernany, closely and henceforth invariably united with 
England, having no longer anything to fear from SWeden, little annoyed 
by Prussia, at least for some years - would have a vast open field for 
her ambitious enterprises, would menace anew the Porte, hold Austria 
in perpetual anxiety, and arrive finally at a preponderance truly 
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alarming for her neighbors and for the rest of Europe·" 
This is a clear exposition of the policy which guided Metternich• s 
actions. All his efforts to make a stable peace, beginning with the 
last months of 1812., had included the contention that France mu.st 
re ma.in strong and independent in Europe. He had assured St. Aignan 
in November that the Allies did not intend a change of dynasty, and 
he labored strenuously to hold them to that time. He repeated the 
decla.ra.tion whenever the chance was offered, and urged Schwarzenberg 
late in January to state it vigorously to the depu.ta.tion of :Bourbon 
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supporters which had visited the commander-in-chief in the field. 
At LangTes and at Troyes, as hes been seen, he vigourously 
resisted Alexander's efforts to supply candidates for the French 
throne. Essentially the moderator, the course of his arguments rre.y 
be roughly traced as follows: he favored the rentention of the 
Napoleonic government; when the czar began to talk Of Bernadotte, 
he reiterated his opin~on that choice must be left to the nation, 
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out declared that if the A;llies were to support any new government, 
it should be of the :Bourbons; when Alexander began to favor the Duke 
de Berry, having in mind a rre.rriage with a Russian princess, Metternich 
insisted that if the Eourbons were to be restored the rightful heir 
should alone be tolerated. In none of these cases did he place himself 
on the side of an overthrow of the existing government. His argument 
on the point ~n question was always in the name of order and stability. 
rt has been said above, thati he even feared that the downfall of 
Napoleon would rekindle the fires of anarchy and revolution. This 
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anxiety was shared by others, especially by citizens of France. 
New conflagrations in war-torn Europe would postpone indefinitely 
the establisbment of general equilibrium. 
As a matter of fact, Metternich was inclined to give little 
countenance to the idea c;>f a :Bourbon restoration. "Here and everywhere 
we are, 11 he wvote from La.ngres in the first days of February, "is 
only one voice - Peace and no Napoleon, because with him peace is 
impossible. But who shall replace Napoleon? The opinions· are 
divided. Some say the Bourbons. In this category belong all the Ci-
devants and Ernigres who have already distributed among themselves in 
advance, all the places at court. Most people say the Regency. The 
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commo11 people say nothing but peace and the end to this at any price." 
A few days later, he wrote that a Regency was scarcely to be thought 
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of. Therefore, during the month of February he continued to retain 
the strictness of his attitude upon negotiating in good faith with 
the Napoleonic government at Chatillon. Count Munster was frankly 
dissatisfied with the lack of support given to the Bourbon cause. He 
found the Emperor Francis, however, somewhat less moderate than his 
, 
mjnister. Stadion seems to have had doubts upon retaining 
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Napoleon. The British ministers, Munster thought, were inclined 
to be over-moderate because of the coming Parliairent in which 
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explanation mu.st be :nade of English moves. 
On March 10, a French emissary arrived at Chatillon to plead 
the caise of the Bourbons, bringing with him the first authentic 
sentiment of the national will in the matter of dynasty. At Paris, 
the intentions of the Allies were utterly unknown. "It became of 
the highest importance," explained Talleyrand in his Memoirs~ "to 
know the part which the united powers would take, when the day •••• 
came, on wliich they would overthrow the power of Napoleon. Would 
they ccu tinue to treat with him? Wou. ld another government be 
imposed on F1ance, or by leaving her at liberty to choose herself, 
would they deliver her up to the anarchy of which it was impossible 
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to calculate the results." With this in mind, Baron de Vitrolles, 
rrat this tine a man who had very pronounced opinions on the progr~ss 
of constitutional ideas," was sent to headquarters. His instructions, 
according to the Duke de ~al 1:erg, limited him to declaring the 
danger of postponing a definite decision, and to learn the Allied 
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sentinent on the maintenance of the Napoleonic regime. 
Whether or not this is true, the fact remains that Vitrolles 
argued for the cause of the Bourbons in very definite terms. All 
the French accounts of the restoration are exceedingly ga.rbled, due 
evidently to a desire to show the Bourbons everywhere in disfavor, 
but brought to the throne by the matchless efforts of the author -
whosoever he might be. However, it is not in point here, to write 
the history of the Bourbon return. The roomoirs of Baron de Vitrolles 
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seem honest enough, though hopelessly inaccurate in places. 
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At Ohatillon, the French envoy talked with Stadion, who sent 
him on to headquarters. Vitrolles found Nesselrode.suspicious, 
Metternich, however, declared that his identity was of small matter 
since the .Allies would speak the same language if he were an envoy 
of Bonaparte or Savary. Vi trolle said that France would have no 
peace with Bonaparte and that there could be no France with011t the 
Bourbons. Metternich was openly astonished at this, and said no such 
sentiment had been found in France, so far.. He added that the law of 
nations forbade meddling in French affairs.. SU.ch an example might 
justify any sort of repri'sal, or even threaten the existence of 
106 
nations. Vi trolles had many conferences with the Austrian minister 
whom he fcund quite charming. Metternich disclaimed any idea of a 
Regency, saying that the Austrian experience in the German Empire had 
been lesson enough. The envoy from Paris urged Alexander, in an 
interview on March 17, to march straight to Paris. The Emperor said, 
"I leave this evening for the general quarters of Prince Schwarzenberg, 
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and I promise you that this conversation shall have great results .. " 
Castlereagh was willing to listen, but said England was "not willing 
to make the slightest sacrifice for the reestablisluwnt of the ancient 
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dynasty in France." 
Vitrolles presented his dem9.nds to the Allied mfnisters in the 
middle of March. He asked that the Congress of Chatillon be dissolved; 
a declaration made that the coalition wai ld not treat with Napoleon; 
that the King be explicitly recognized, and the conquered provinces 
given over to him. At three points in French territory, general 
quarters IIUst be set up for the three princes as rallying points for 
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loyal forces. Subsidies were to be advanced to the Royalists. 
Bu.t Metternich was still thinldng of peace. "The sentimnt of 
the people is really al together concentrated in a longing for rest," 
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he wrote to Hu.delist. On the 18th, as has been noted, he sent off 
letters to Caulaincour t. About the 22nd, in a ministerial conference, 
the Vitrolles deue.nd was refused and a xmmorandum drawn by Metternich 
declining to impose the Bru. rbons on France. However, Monsieur was 
to be encouraged to take action himself, and Vitrolles was to 
carry the sympathy of the Allies to Paris. If the Bourbon cause was 
not successful, the Allies promised that an amnesty for all their 
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supporters would be included in the Treaty of Peace. 
Though Metternich was not willing to declare for the Bourbons, 
his· attitude tow~d them was changing. Prussia and England abandoned 
Napoleon, after the rupture at Chatillon. Both openly favored the 
Bourbon cause, al though they avoided any public endorsemnt out of 
deference for the Austrian stand. If Austria gave in on the dynasty 
question, Prussia would be more active in cur,tailing the Czar• s 
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Polish ambitions. Fllrthermore, the conversations with Vitrolles 
had convinced Metternich that a considerable party in France longed 
for the return of the old rulers. If Napoleon continued unfavorable 
to ideas of peace, and the Bourbons remounted the throne, Austria 
would scarcely be favored by ~ government which it had strenuously 
opposed. Perhaps in this reasoning lies the explanation for his 
cordiality toward Vitrolles, even when refusing his demand. One 
of the possible factors in the new attitude was the intercepting on 
March 20 of a letter from Maret to Caulaincourt. The former hinted 
that certain cessions of~fortresses might be made, since Napoleon 
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after ratification "would be guided splely by military considerations .. 11 
If this letter is genuine there can be little doubt of the imnense 
effect which it would produce in Metternich's mind. Fournier accepts 
the letter, but :Baron Ernouf declares it a forgery produced during the 
Congress of Vienna to excuse the Allied actions in the French 
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campaign. 
After the conference at :Bar sur Aube at which the Allies 
refused to declare only for the :Bourbons, Vitrolles announced his 
intention of visiting Monsieur, before going to Paris. Metternich 
attenpted to dissuade him fromthis action, but found the French envoy 
quite decided on the point. Metternich evidently feared that the Allies 
had committed themselves too far, even in the little they had said. 
He managed to detain Vitrolles until after the battle of A.rcis sur 
Aube, after which the latter proceeded to Nancy where the Count 
d'Artois was staying. :But in his detention be rmde the acquaintance 
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of a.1.·:diplomat in the Austrian service, Bombelles by name. 
Castlereagh had been urging a more active comuunication with 
the Bourbons, and insisted to Metternich that an Austrian agent 
should be sent, "the better to satisfy Monsieur and those who are 
disposed to support Louis XVII~, that this with His Ill!lerial Majesty 
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is a national and not a family question.n Metternich finally 
consented, but was still, in the words of Lord Castlereagh; "anxious 
to found the cause as mu.ch as possible upon a French interest, that 
this should be created by the Bourbons accepting the peace which 
Bonaparte has rejected; and thus making themselves the inu-rediate 
and only resource to which the nation can appeal •...• n be the 
harbingers of stability. On March 25, Bombelles was despatched to 
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Nancy with instructions "in which 'the Emperor of Austria's 
sentinents are sufficiently marked - "to quote Lord Qastlereagh 
again. There were four conditions to Allied support of Bourbon 
restoration. "(l) The pledge of the king to rule constitutionally. 
(2) T.he royal sanction, explicit and without evasion, of the 
validity of the acquisition of national properties. (3) The sanction 
of the public debt. (4) The preservation of public functionaries, 
116· . 
civil as well as military." 
On the same day as the departure of Bombelles, the Allies 
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issued their manifesto to the French nation. The course of the 
negotiation at Ohatillon was reviewed in some detail. The French 
people could blame none but thei~ government for prolonging the war, 
the coalition announced. 'nl.e Allied monarchs were ready for peace. 
This docunent expressed accurately the attitude which Metternich 
wished to take towa:rtl France. The previous day a military conference 
had decided to advance to Paris, despite the misgivings of Schwarzenberg. 
Rising exultantly from the table at which the conclusion.had been 
reached, Alexander pointed towards the F.rench capitol and cried, 
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"Marchons, c•est la qu•est le salut de tous!" The armies took 
up the IllB.l'ch, Alexander and King Frederick William going wilh them. 
The Emperor Francis, l!.etternich, Castlereagh, and Hardenberg journeyed 
to Dijon on the 26th. 
A great royalist demonstration followed the entrance of the 
Austrian Emperor at Dijon, but Francis bade the people to remain 
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quietly in their hones. In this si~le act, advised doub~.lessly 
by Metternich, is mirrored the character of the Austrian policy -
peace, order, stability. On the 28th, news cane to Dijon of the 
capture of Bordeaux by Wellington and the subsequent declaration there 
'for the :Bourbons. The ministers dined gaily in honor of the 
ca.pi tula.tion and drank the healths of the mayor of Bordeaux and 
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of the Bourbons. 
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Three days previous, and coincident with the Bombelles mission, 
Caulaincourt wrote to Metternich, "I only reached the emperor tonight. 
His Majesty immediately gave me his final orders for the conclusion 
of the peace. I hasten to inform you that I am ready to return to 
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headquarters·" But the acquiescence of Uapoleon cane too late. 
On the 28th, Wassenberg, who had been taken prisoner on his journey 
from England, was informed by Napoleon that peace would be nade on 
terms less than those of the boundaries of the Enpire. An Austrian 
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Regency would be favored in France , he said. :But when the report 
of that interview came to Metternich, Paris had fallen. 
Events moved swiftly in the French capitol. The city was taken 
at dusk on the evening of the 30th. Napoleon, l:nlrrying to the rescue, 
saw the fires of Mortier 1s vanguard, read Marmonts letter which 
abandoned all hope of resistance, and turned back, himself to 
Fontainebleau. The next morning Alexander and King Frederick William 
rode in to the city.. They proclaimed thro'Ugh Talleyrand that the 
Allies would no longer treat with Napoleon. On April 2, Bonaparte 
was deposed by the Senate and a provisional governw~nt was organized 
to deliberate on a cons ti tu ti on. As yet the Bourbons had not been 
mentioned by Alexander. Ta~leyrand agrees to that in his Memoirs, 
but he fails to add that he had not mentioned them himself, as Baron 
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Vitrolles testifies. "The Bourbons have not been named, wrote 
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Sir John :Beckett to Lord Sid.mouth, "except by les da~s de la Halle." 
On April 4, Napoleon signed a decree abdicating in favor of a 
Regency by the Empress. But as bas been shown, Austria was resolved 
against any such connection, although Talleyrand wrote in the 
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opposite sense in his Memoirs. Macdonald reported in his Memoirs 
the utter surprise with which the French Marshalls learned from 
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Schwarzenberg that Austria would oppose a Regency. Therefore, 
Napoleon's decree was refused. The desperate adventurer now thought 
of joining Eu.gene in Italy and winning new power by supporting the 
cause of Italian unity. This chimera faded from si~t wi~hin a day. 
On April 6, Napoleon abdicated without condition. 
The wisdom of the 1301 rbon restoration hS:d been a meaty morsel 
for controversy. A new recapitulation is not necessary here. One 
Ill.lat agree in the end with Talleyrand that the :Bourbons alone could 
have brought about the withdrawal of the allied armies, insured the 
retention of the ancient fortresses; they alone ncould veil, in the 
eyes of the French nation, so jealous of her military glory, the 
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impression of the reverses which had ,just befallen her fl.ag.rr 
One of the sharpest darts to sting the sides of the new 
government was the accusation that it had been brought back and forced 
upon France by foreign bayonets.. So Cru.nt Mole declared in his 
Memoirs. 110f course it is ·true," he wrote, "that if Napoleon had not 
vanquished by these bayonets the :Bourb.ons would not have returned. 
:But the lie, the clumsy a.nd patent lie, is in the words 'forced upon' • 
My evidence cannot be suspectr ·for.: I was one of the younger generation, 
who had known the Bourbons only in history, and while loathing the 
crimes of which their princes had been the victims, as well as the 
revolution which had overthrown them, regarded their return as 
impossible. 
"Yet I declare here, without the slightest hesitation and 
before God and my honour, that when I returned from :Blois, whither I 
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had had to follow the Empress Marie Louise, I was absolutely 
astounded to observe how genuine, universal, and enthusiastic was 
the welcome which every class in· Paris had given and was still giving 
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Lou.is XVIII and his family ••• ·" 
It was only natural that the Restoration should be mu.ch 
libelled by the partizans of different political complexion. Metternich, 
who did not reach Paris until April 10, having spent the first days of 
the recapitulation at Dijon, was absurdly enough, credited by one 
historian of the Restoration with receiving a. million francs from 
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Louis XVIII in payment for having placed him on the throne. In 
the Memoir of 1829, Metternich was anxious to place himself in the 
best light with the Bourbon dynasty and so represented Austria as 
always having favored the Bourbons. But good evidence tears away the 
tinsel from this pretence - only one of the ma.nywhich Metternich 
seems to have been unable to resist in writing his Memoirs. As soon 
as he pu.t pen to paper, the thought of the present became the policy 
of the past. 
Despite the pretence in the V~moirs, Metternich recorded sons 
very sound observations on the Restoration which reveal his own 
attitude toward the event. The republican form of government, he 
said, had few supporters in France; they had disappeared in · 
consequence of the Reign of Terror and the "depravity and weakness" 
of the Directorate. Napoleon's government had satisfied the people 
but they had grown weary of wars. The restoration of the Bourbons 
seemed the best wa:y to pea:ce. "The return of the :Bourbons was not 
longed for in the sense which the Royalists attributed to this feeling, 
and the Royalist party itself had mich diminished during the course 
of five and twenty years. It was longed for by the friends of public 
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order and political peace - that is; by the great majority of the 
nation, which in all titms and in all countries ever places first in 
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calculation the true interests·:of the Fatherland." 
At Dijon, where the Austrian and English parties renained during 
the first days of April, the fall of Paris created a great sensation. 
The populace asked permission to raise the royal colors, and Francis 
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finally gave his assent. Metternich, together with Hardenberg and 
Castlereagh arrived at Paris on April 10. The Allied ministers 
conferred that very evening. The convention with Napoleon had already 
been arranged. Metternich and Castlereagh felt that their hands had 
been forced by the actions of Alexander and the King of Prussia., and 
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lhey signed, albeit with reluctance. The most dissatisfactory 
provision was the placing of Napoleon in Elba, near the Continent. 
Metternich was destined to regret his acquiescence to this hasty 
arrangement. 
Thus Napoleon' s downfall was consumna ted . The country ha.d 
been saved from anarchy but the actions of Alexander had conu;>romised 
the position which Metternich was so anxious that the Allies maintain. 
"I venture the belief," wrote Munster to the Prince Regent, "that, 
if the Ministers of England, of Austria, and of Prussia, had been 
present at the taldng of the ca.pi tol of France, they would not have 
agreed to the declaration made, in the name of the Allies, by the 
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Emperor Alexander on the 31st of March." 
·The crusade to Paris had come to an end. Metternich, fighting 
on the defensive from the moment when the Allw d troops traversed 
the Rhine, had failed to obtain peace without the overthrow of the 
French government. At Basle, at Langres, at Troyes, at Chaumont, he 
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had labored and fought to make a peace which seemed to him a 
necessary basis for stability. In this he had received aid from 
Castlereagh, but the EngliSh minister could not escape the fact that 
his governn.ent was fundamentally ~pposed to any Napoleonic regime. 
Napoleon himself, by not heeding the offers of Metternich, had foolishly 
thrown to the winds the sole chance for the continued existence of his 
rule. The many worried weeks which Metternich spent in attempting 
to find a solution for the problem of an entry into Paris all came to 
naught. When the city fell, Alexander and King Frederick William 
entered to :take possession. When Metternich and Castlereagh arrived 




With the dQVTI1fall of Napoleon, this study must of necessity 
corre to an end. Metternich's conception of European politics has 
been outlined here in some detail. ~n the midst of disorder, he felt 
the imperative necessity of new stability in Europe. By that, he did 
not mean reaction, or the :restoration of the ancient regine. Through 
the year 1813 he repeatedly declared that such was not his intention. 
No one appreciated more than he, the sins of which the old order had 
been guilty. He ridiculed the Emigres and excoriated them for their 
foolish intrigues which kept Eu.rope in a state of ccnstant turmoil. 
He said of the new organization of France, "The return to what was 
called •the old regine• was impossible, because nothing was left of 
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it but the remembrance of the causes of its decay." 
Metternich's idea of stability, as has been shown, was nuch 
broader than a mare crusade against France and Napoleon. He had no 
hatreds to appease. He was the enemy of any powe.r which threatened 
to shatter the general equilibrium. In his opinion, peace could 
only be assured by hemming in French imperialism, checking Russian 
territorial ambitions, putting a halt to the militaristic tendency 
in Prussia, and equalizing to son~ degree the maritime supremacy of 
England. The demands that he made for Austria were more than 
moderate. In the year 1813, he was asking for much less than the 
Allied powers were willing to grant. As he told Castlereagh at 
Langres, in Je.nuary, 1814, Austria wished to be ~oderate, but if 
128 
. 
the principle of aggrandizement was adopted by the Allies, then the 
Emperor Francis I!nl.st protect himself by asking for more than the 
minimum.which would otherwise satisfy the demands of territorial 
unity and European stability. 
In the last months of 1812, when the disasters of the Russian 
campaign had turned back the legions of Napoleon, Metternich 
hastened to offer good offices for peace. He did not wish to see 
France crushed, nor :f{ussia over-triumphant_. To England, also, he 
made advances in order to include a maritime balance in the new 
European arrangement. All ended in failure.. The refusal of England 
to consider a mediation made one of Metternich's chief requisites to 
stability, iu;p?ssible of at~ainment. He therefore turned his 
attention to a continental peace, with the idea that En.gland, once 
isolated, would be forced to accede. By assuming the position of 
armed n:ediator of the continent, he hoped to give greater weight to 
the Austrian proposals. He persuaded Russia and Prussia to accept 
this mediation. Both of these powers were anxious to continue the 
war, but hoped to gain Austria to their side by agreeing to a 
negotiation which they were confidant would prove fruitless. 
Playing upon their eagerness for assistance, Metternich 
insisted on minima far below what the Allies were actually willing 
to accept. Napoleon in turn, accepted Austrian mediation, only to 
refuse the very modert:1.te terms which Metternich offered him. Austria 
then entered the war on the side of the coalition. 
Though now a party to the contest, Metternich did not relinquish 
the position of peacemaker. As soon as the Rhine had been gained, he· 
insisted the peace be offered but the reluctance of England largely 
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'blocked the effort at Frankfort. Metternich le~ned too, that he 
mu.st abandon his hope of settling the question of rnari tiroo rights, and 
leave it to be decided in the next war and the next peace. Beyond 
the Rhine, the Austrian minister fought desperately to retain a 
hold on the coalition, and not a.pow it to go beyond the limits 
which he considered necessary to stability. Outwardly, he failed, 
but actually his influence as modera.tor seems to have softened the 
Allied intentions toward France. At Paris, during the first days 
of the restoration, he was largely out of the picture. 
It is hoped that a study rray be presented at an early date 
on Metternich's part in the·difinitive settlements of Vienna and the 
Second Treaty of Paris. SUfficient to say here, that his infl.uence 
was entirely on the side of stability as against the special interest 
of the powers and attempts to punish too severely the enemies of the 
coalition. He agreed to the Holy Alliance, against his better 
judgment. 
When Eu.rope had been brought to some degree of equilibriUllJl., 
the task of maintaining it lay before Metternich. He began this 
task in the true spirit of the conservative, of the charrpion of the 
Rule of Law; seeking, not to crush out the natural forces of the 
age but to maintain peace and order so that exhausted Eul,ope might 
be revived. . Metternich was not the opponent of liberty or social 
erna.ncipation. He was the opponent of revolution, of political 
disorder, of bloodshed. In this, he was of the same opinion as the 
large part of the modera.tes of his day. 
Nor did he fail to understand the significance of the 
national risings. He praised them when they were defensive, but 
denounced them when, as in the case of revolutionary France or 
Piussia, following the do'Wnfall of Napoleon, they assumed the 
ambition to coerce their neighbors. Certainly, he was right. He 
saw the fal'lacy of national assertion, as it is seen today by all 
thinking men. Metternich's viewpoint was essentially that of 
Castlereagh, who has been equally reviled by the friends of liberty, 
but whose true place in history has been demonstrated by the 
2 
scholarly studies of Professor c. X. Webster. Metternich 1 s c~>n-
caption of stability, took into account the inevitable growth of 
constitutional governnent in Eu.rope. 
The moderate view point on constitutional government, is best 
presented-by a passage in one of Castlereagh's letters to Lord 
William Bentinck, whose rash actions in promising a re.newed consti tu-
; 
tion and republic to Genoa did much to embarrass the Italian situation. 
"It is impossible," wrote the English minister, "not to perceive a 
great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of 
freedom are in full operation. The danger is, that the transition 
may be too sud.den to ripen into anything likely to make the world 
better or happier. We have ne\V constitutions launched in France, 
Spain, Holland and Sicily. Let us see the results before we encourage 
farther attempts. The attempts may be ma.de, and we Im.1st abide the 
consequences; but I am sure it is better to retard than accelerate 
3 
the operation of this most hazardous principle which is abroad.ff 
In France, Metternich was favorable to a constitutional 
governrrent, despite the fact that Gentz warned him that the acceptance 
of the constitutional principle would necessitate a change in 
4 
Austria. The establishment of a constitutional government was one 
of the conditions of Bourbon restoration set down in the instructions 
5 
'Of the Austrian agent, Bombelles. Metternich wrote to 
E~eror Francis on April 11 that the French constitution was 
6 
much like the English, "but with some sensible modifica.tions." 
On the 19th, the Emperor of Austria replied to an ad.dress extended 
to him by the French Senate, in a short comrrronication written by 
Metternich. Gentz, an ardent monarchist who despised the idea of 
a constitutional government, hailed the Emperor• s address with ,joy, 
declaring th.';lt the absence of any mention of the Constitution 
.7 
indicated disapproval. The royalists of Europe never seemed to 
comprehend that Metternich was no worshiper of the old regime. 
An examination of document shows Gentz 1 s conception to be an 
absurdity. The Pe.ris address was, in tone, trpically cautious,~ The 
Austrian minister would have no occasion to comment on the interna1 
organization of France. He could leave that safely to Alexander, 
who had no compunctions about· neddling in anything. No hint of the 
doctrine of legitiuacy was contained in the address• The Emperor 
simply announced that he had always opposed the principles of 
destruction; that he had given his daughter in marriage to avert 
further disasters to Eu.rope; that he had failed .to attain his 
purpose. Now a "regular and paternal" government had been esta.blished· 
in France, which ought to insure a stable peace, he said, and all 
g 
parties ought to rally around the King. 
Some mention has been made of the liberal tendancies of 
Metternich's domestic policy. The spirit of the times did not pass 
Austria. by, al together. However, the good character of the Austrian 
governrrent seems to have engendered less discontent than was 
ordinarily abroad. The p~ople of the Netherlands were much loath to 
leave the Empire, and petitioned :Francis not to abandon them. Count 
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, Mole complained in his Memoirs, that "Even the spirit of the age 
seemed to have reS}')ected her (the Austrian ]inpire), or rather the 
paternal government of her sovereign had preserved her nations from 
a taste_ for novelty em an desire for change. The King of Prussia, 
in;>elled by an irresistible force, promised his subjects representative 
government; the Netherlands received that form of govermnent from 
their sovereign; a highly proclamation, issued by the E9pe astonished 
the three legations; the dernocra.ts of England threatened the three 
kingdoms with parliamentary reforms. :But Austria, the bulwark of 
ancient and monarchical institutions, placed her imposing 
9 
aristocracy in the way of democratized .Eu.rope. u 
This is an excellent example of the complete misunderstanding 
. which existed as regards the Metternichian policy. Count Mole was 
evidently not aware that the liberal proclamation of the Pope was the 
result of Metternich's strong advices. When Cardinal Consalvi was 
pres sing the claims of the Pope at the Congress of Vienna, he had 
many conversations with Metternich on the subject,of governing the 
legations. The Austrian minister warned the Holy· Fa,ther that a new 
age had come upon the world, that if he thought he could rule the 
estates of the Church in the fashion of othe~ days, he was sadly 
mistaken. Liberal tendancies in governrrent had come to·stay, he 
said, and if there was any hope of keeping an orderly dominion, those 
10 
tendancies DI11st be recognized in the Papal states. 
Little dema.nd was raised for constitutional government in the 
Austrian :Empire; perhaps because the people were i'gnoran t, perha;ps 
beca.use they were contented. Metternich was disposed naturally 
to believe the latter. There is an interesting passage in one of 
his letters to the Countess Lieven which most certainly would.have 
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puzzled his denouncers, if-they had read it. "Our country," he 
wrote, "or rather our countries, are the most tranquil, because 
they enjoy without anterior revolution, the greater pa- t of the 
benefits which incontestably arise from the ashes of empires over-
turned by political tempests. Ou.r people do not understand why 
they should enter into these moveroonts, when, in peace, they enjoy 
those things which the movement has procured for others. Individual 
liberty is complete, the equality of all classes of society before 
the law is perfect, all bear the sane taxes: titles exist, but there 
11 
a.re no privileges • n 
Here is Metternich's.fundamental attitude toward the Revolution. 
As a product of the Enlightenment, he was thoroughly in sympathy 
with the social reforms of the period. As a moderate man, who felt 
the necessity of peace and order, and the Rule of Law, he was 
distrustful of political revolution and of experiment which nust 
drench Eu.ro:Pe with more blood. Webster• s summing up of the politics 
of Castlereagh might stand equally well for the diplon:acy of 
Metternich. "Peace for Europe .... was the ob,ject which he felt llD.l.st 
be secured, and to which all his efforts were directed. For this 
he was prepared to sacrifice much, and perhaps, more than necessary. 
Yet we must always remember that for the moment it was peace and not 
the progress of nationality or liberalism that was the first necessity 
12 
of Europe .n· 
Metternich's passion for stability grew stronger as the years 
advanced. As the difficulties of maintaining·peace multiplied, this 
political conception of equilibrium gradually pushed all other ideas 
into the background of his mind. The rrore radical Europe became, the 
134 
more conservative was his outlook. 
But, it must be clearly understood that the generally 
current idea of a "Metternichian era" extending rcughly from 1815 
to 1848, is legend of the purest water. Metternich's actual 
domination in Europe had ended before the year 1815 opened. From 
the last months of 1812 to the first months of 1814, he was supre100. 
After that, necessity compelled him to unite with Castlereagh, the 
English minister, in order to hold the fort of stability and 
equilibrium against the ambitions of Russia and Prussia. Castlereagh 
held the balance in Europe through the congress Of Vienna, the 
second Peace of Paris, and the years which irrmediately followed. 
Metternich was ostensibly powerful, but the source of his strength 
was the understanding with England. 
In the late teens of the new century, when castlerea.gh, 
forced back by English pub~ic opinion in the shell of insularity, 
began to draw away from Metternich, Austrian power went with him. 
Metternich's fear of European disturbances was now increased 
fourfold. In his ddlemm9., he bargained with Russia wliom he feared, 
placated Prussia whom he despised; and flattered France in whom 
he no longer had confidence. Thus by turnings and twistings he 
atterqpted to thwa.rt the ambitions of those powers - in Gern:any to 
the north and west, and in Italy to the south - fearing that a new 
outbreak in Europe would dash Au$tria into the Abyss from which he 
had raised her. 
Until the middle of the century, Metternich fought· t~e battle 
of conservatism. He witnessed the revolutionary moveroonts of 1°$19-20 
of 1830, and finally of 1848, and with them the crumbling away of 
the system which he had labored to maintain. The revolution of 
1848 drove the old diplOID9,t into exile, in England the haven of the 
harried. He wa.s then seventy-five years old, and had been chief 
minister of the Austrian Empire for thirty-nine of them. Yet the 
old gentleman lived to return to the scenes of his power, to pace 
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the gardens of his old ho!lle, to visit the Rhenish highlands and look 
once more upon the land of his birth, then to pass quietly away in 
the eighty-sixth year of his life. 
Today, it is evident that he had fought a losing battle from 
the beginning. He suffered the fate of the conservative in an age 
of transition. He felt this himself. As early as 1819, reading the 
signs, he wrote; "My life has fallen at a hateful time. I have come 
into the world eiB~er too early or too late. Now, I do not feel 
comfortable; earlier, I should have enjoyed the time; later, I 
should have helped to build it up again; today, I have to give n:w 
life to prop up the mouldering edifice. I should have been born in 
13 
1900; and I should have had the twentieth century be!ffore roo .11 
Thus he stood; too conser.vati ve to be a radical, too liberal to be 
an "ultra.fl 
The most important period of Metternich's life, is that which 
falls within the limits of this study for the first step in the 
progress tn stability was the overthrow of Napoleon, To Metternich, 
all subseqt1ent experience was colorless against the background of 
those turbid years> when - young and strong, in the first flush of 
power and success - he had braved the mighty Emperor of France. He 
said of the Memoir of his life, "I conclude my work with the year 
1815, because everything which carre after that belongs to ordinary 
14 
llistory .n · So it seemed-to him, and so it was. That was the 
period of his usefulness to Europe. There can be little doubt but 
that Metternich outlived his usefu.lness, but just how long peace 
was necessary to Europe is difficult to decide. One thing is 
certain, if it had not been necessary for a time, Metternich would have 
not been a dominant figure. 
Napoleon and Metternich; how they loom up in the popular 
mind as protagonists in the drama of the early nineteenth centuryl 
Hero or villain; each has been cash in the character which best 
suited the fancy of his auditors. :Both drew to themselves the most 
ex~·ravaga.nt praises and the most violent maledictions; both were 
hailed as defender and as destroyer of good principle among mankind. 
l 
A greater contrast between men, could scarce be imagined. 
Born amid the ten~ests of the little island of Corsica, whose name 
was synonymous in Eu.rope with the struggle for liberty, Napoleon 
remained always a Corsice.n - swift, strong, vengeful, passionate, 
and rude. Metternich's early environment was the very antithesis 
of the wild beauty of Corsica; the mellow Rhineland, verdant and 
rich, with its long vistas of terraced vineyards; the easy 
indolence of court life in a petty division of the Holy Ronan E~ire. 
The diminutive, eagle-eyed general of France,_ in the three-
cornered hat and the long black cloa.k, rode to victory alpid the 
applause of his armies and his pe0ple. On the battle field, he was 
the military ideal of a continent; in a drawing room he was ill a.t 
east, and strutted like a barnyard cock, who is impatient because 
there is no enemy a.t whom he may fly. Metternich's efforts were 
confined to cabinets and sa~ons, and small measure of applause 
greeted his accolI!Plishments. Perhaps, it was his very person that 
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aided the drama.tic intensity of a struggle with Napoleon. 
Handsome and graceful, beloved of women, possessed of the rrost 
exquisite manners in Eu.rope, Metternich was the social favorite of 
every circle in which he moved. 
Both men had in common an early enthusiasm for the p9litie?-l 
doctrines of the eighteenth century enlightenment. Both outgrew 
that enthusiasm. Napoleon becaioo a veritable tyrant. !n 
accordance with his character, he spoke very liberally, but was the 
most illiberal of men- Metternich was little prone to boa.st of his 
liberalism, especially in a country whose ru.ler was not yet ena.nci-
pated from the ideas of the old regime. In reality the Austrian 
minister was a far more liberal man than Napoleon. That the contrary 
is generally believed, is the fault of legend. 
Napoleon was idealized, then hated; but the dramatic intensity 
of his downfall and the incon;petence of the Bourbons served to weave 
a legend of his life. He was made the holy champion of liberty, a 
martyr to reaction. Metternich fared rather badly in comparison. 
A calm and reasonable person cuts a poor figure .as a hero. As a 
villa.in, ?~1etternich would have been equally unimpressive had his 
story not been told by a gene~ation who worshiped the colorful 
leaders of revolution and national regeneration. Humanity must have 
its drama. If Napoleon was a hero, who then, was the black 
antagonist? Not Alexander, for he was the avowed chal'J!)ion of liberty. 
The most fanciful im9.gination could scarce make villains of George IV 
-or King Frederick William. 
But Metternich! There was a villain ready made for the 
occasion. Su.ave, cunning, holding in his hands the helm of Eu.rope, 
while he listened with bent head to the little currents Of 
revolution that whispered constantly through the land. As the 
years went on, this conception grew more wide spread, it beca.ne a 
legend; it entered the halls of learning and sat down in the seats 
of the mighty. V.ay the pages of this study offer some evidence 
to destroy the misconception which so generally exists concerning 
the policy of the great Conservative of nineteenth century Europe. 
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